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Abstract
This thesis introduces ‘spy agents’ as a new security paradigm for evaluating
trust in remote hosts in mobile code scenarios. In this security paradigm, a
spy agent, i.e. a mobile agent which circulates amongst a number of remote
hosts, can employ a variety of techniques in order to both appear ‘normal’
and suggest to a malicious host that it can ‘misuse’ the agent’s data or code
without being held accountable.
A framework for the operation and deployment of such spy agents is de-
scribed. Subsequently, a number of aspects of the operation of such agents
within this framework are analysed in greater detail. The set of spy agent
routes needs to be constructed in a manner that enables hosts to be iden-
tified from a set of detectable agent-specific outcomes. The construction of
route sets that both reduce the probability of spy agent detection and sup-
port identification of the origin of a malicious act is analysed in the context of
combinatorial group testing theory. Solutions to the route set design problem
are proposed.
A number of spy agent application scenarios are introduced and analysed,
including: a) the implementation of a mobile code email honeypot system for
identifying email privacy infringers, b) the design of sets of agent routes that
enable malicious host detection even when hosts collude, and c) the evaluation
of the credibility of host classification results in the presence of inconsistent
host behaviour. Spy agents can be used in a wide range of applications, and
it appears that each application creates challenging new research problems,
notably in the design of appropriate agent route sets.
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1.1 Synopsis
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. It discusses the rationale
for the concept of spy agents (§1.2), introduces the motivation for the work
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described and the research challenges it faced (§1.3), and outlines the structure
of the thesis along with the main contributions (§1.4).
1.2 Setting the scene
Preemptive protection of a computer network involves monitoring network and
host activity in order to detect policy violations and anomalous behaviour,
identify the origin of such activity, and make security evaluations. These eval-
uations can be used to formulate and report on an appropriate reaction, in
an attempt to address the detected security threats. For example, preemptive
host and network protection against mobile code aims to identify (or eval-
uate the risk of) software viruses, trojan horses , malware, etc. Approaches
to support such measures include intrusion detection systems , honeypots and
software decoys . Preemptive protection does not necessarily involve security
controls that thwart security attacks—it also includes measures for evaluating,
analysing and preventing their occurrence.
This thesis focuses on the protection of mobile code, inherently a harder
challenge than the protection of the mobile code hosts. We also assume that
malicious hosts are ‘intelligent’ in the sense that they mount attacks selectively
and that they are most likely to mistreat mobile code when it appears to them
that they will not be identified. Thus, the challenge is to find techniques that
‘outwit’ such malicious hosts. Spy agents, proposed in this thesis, address this
challenge through the use of Group Testing (GT) techniques.
The spy agent paradigm (see Chapter 3) involves the provision of a new
kind of security service designed to indirectly improve the overall security level.
It achieves this by using evaluation mechanisms that preemptively assess the
trustworthiness of remote hosts, before they are sent vulnerable mobile code.
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We introduce the notion of spy agents as ‘legitimate’ mobile agents which are
able to interact with remote, potentially hostile, mobile agent platforms in a
manner that helps to enable trust assessment.
Spy agents provide an auxiliary layer of defence. Such a layer is of value
since current security solutions do not offer complete protection; this issue
is discussed further immediately below, while a literature review is given in
Chapter 2. In general, spy agents may co-exist with, or even require the func-
tionality of, other security solutions; this may serve to increase the effectiveness
of each layer of defence.
Z Throughout this thesis we (by convention) use the terms ‘mobile agents’
and ‘mobile code’ interchangeably.
1.2.1 Mobile agent security issues
Mobile agents are the basis of a distributed programming infrastructure with
inherently beneficial characteristics such as autonomy, flexibility and intelli-
gence [69]. One widely cited example of an application of agent technology
is a price comparison agent which ‘visits’ a number of on-line retailer sites or
nodes and requests a price for a particular item. This agent could retrieve and
process information, including, for example, prices, from a number of different
retailers.
The two main actors in a mobile agent system are the following:
• Agent: an instance of mobile code;
• Host: a platform capable of executing an agent.
Mobile agent security has been the subject of a considerable volume of
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recent research [89] (see §2.4). As has been widely discussed (see, for exam-
ple, [18, 89]) there are three parallel sets of security issues associated with
mobile agents, namely protecting hosts (and other agents) against malicious
agents, protecting agents against malicious hosts, and protecting hosts (and
other agents) against third parties.
In a typical mobile agent system, legitimate mobile agents will interact with
hosts in a defined way, and hosts will be built to deal with expected agent be-
haviour. Viruses and other ‘illegitimate’ agents may attempt to access the
host in unauthorised ways rather than remain in the execution environment
reserved for agents (e.g. a sandbox ). Such malicious agents might steal sen-
sitive information from the host, such as personal financial details, cause the
host to act in an unintended way, for example causing it to send spam emails,
or simply corrupt the host so that it no longer functions properly.
The parallel security problem, and the main focus of this thesis, arises
from the fact that agents are at the mercy of the host which executes them.
Ultimately a host can choose to carry out the functions requested by the agent
as expected, and/or it can manipulate the agent. Such manipulation might
include reading data contained within the agent which is intended to remain
private, e.g. the source address or the identity of the agent originator. This
information could then be misused for a variety of purposes, including forward-
ing spam to the originator’s email address. Other examples of inappropriate
behaviour might include reading quotes from competitor on-line retailers and
providing a more attractive quote, or changing competitor quotes to make
them less attractive.
Autonomous mobile agents, apart from obtaining price quotes or retrieving
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other information for further analysis, might also be able to complete a trans-
action remotely in accordance with the client’s instructions. For example, to
purchase an air ticket, an agent might be instructed to visit several on-line
stores before automatically making the best value purchase. The client might
only wish to pass a third party certain personal information embedded in the
agent if there is a considerable discount on the final price. Giving an agent
power to make commitments on a client’s behalf clearly permits a range of
possible abuses by a host, as further discussed in §2.4.2.
1.2.2 Host protection
In this thesis we do not address techniques for host protection; nevertheless,
host protection techniques are relevant here since they can provide input to
spy agent security evaluation scenarios. Hosts can use a variety of techniques
to protect themselves against malicious mobile code. For example, ‘safe’ pro-
gramming languages can restrict mobile code permissions; a sandbox (such
as a Java security sandbox [136, 187]) can enforce a security policy for code
execution; and proof carrying code can provide a formal (authenticated) proof
that received code will execute as expected [125].
Host protection mechanisms are reviewed in §2.4.4.
1.2.3 Mobile code protection
As mentioned in §1.2.1, in this thesis we consider the threat posed to mo-
bile code by malicious hosts. This is an important research area, and many
schemes to provide protection for code have been proposed (including tamper-
proof hardware [199], tamper-proof execution environments [189], code obfusca-
tion [10], encrypted functions [145,152], and strategic division of functionality
across multiple agents [127]). Nevertheless, none of the existing solutions is
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able to address the problem in both a practical and robust manner.
Previously proposed mobile code protection mechanisms are reviewed in
§2.4.3.
1.2.4 Mobile code data privacy
One particularly important threat posed by a remote host to a mobile agent
is that it might breach its data privacy policy. A personal email address is
an example of private data whose use might be protected by a privacy policy.
Infringements of email address storage and usage policies could result in a
range of undesirable effects, including the receipt of unsolicited messages, i.e.
spam, identity theft, and phishing.
The misuse of sensitive private data contained in mobile code is a passive
attack, which leaves no signs of violation in the mobile code itself and may
only be detected indirectly (e.g. by checking an email address for the receipt
of spam). Current detection systems, such as Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PETs), monitoring agents and honeypots (discussed in §2.5), cannot be used
to identify unauthorised use of remote code/data, as in the latter case the
personal information is willingly exposed to multiple hosts.
1.3 Motivation and challenges
In order to help address the mobile code security issues discussed above,
this thesis introduces spy agents as a new preemptive mobile code protection
paradigm. The main motivation for proposing these agents is that current
security controls are limited in scope and application. We seek to design spy
agent systems that provide pragmatic remote security evaluations—one major
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challenge is that ‘sophisticated’ attackers may escape detection by misbehav-
ing selectively, i.e. only misbehaving when they can avoid detection.
Instead of trying to mitigate the mobile code threats discussed above di-
rectly, the challenge addressed is to develop a robust trust evaluation mech-
anism that can indirectly help to provide security for mobile agents. The
mechanism we develop employs special mobile agents to retrieve and process
security related information from target hosts. This concept was discussed
previously by Borselius et al. [19], who suggest that a security assessment can
be made when an agent migrates from a trusted platform to a target platform,
where it obtains certain information and then returns to the trusted host for
further analysis.
A wide variety of preemptive mobile code protection paradigms have been
proposed; the idea of a distributed security system made up of security agents
patrolling target hosts to monitor their behaviour is not novel. However, in
previous approaches [26,28,40,67] such security mechanisms or agents operate
in trusted environments and cannot be applied to evaluate remote, potentially
hostile, domains, where some hosts may exhibit complex malicious behaviour.
For example, in the scheme of Vogler, Spriestersbach and Moschgath [188],
part of an agent needs to run in a tamper-resistant environment, which is
trusted to perform sensitive operations.
The requirement for a trusted environment is relaxed in [19], where it is
suggested that a security assessment can be made as a result of agent migra-
tion to unknown hosts; however, this approach still has limitations. The main
problem is that it is assumed that the target hosts will adhere to their policies
and will provide the agents with all the security assessment information they
request. Hence a potentially corrupted remote host could provide security
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agents with apparently proper information. The host could later behave inap-
propriately when it has the opportunity to do so without being detected; also,
in order to escape detection, it might only selectively misbehave if it knows it
is being monitored.
In contrast with this previous work, spy agents are designed to be able to
obtain information that reflects the genuine character of a remote host. The
main functional constraint is that information should be acquired without
violating the hosts’ own security and privacy controls, regardless of whether
or not a host is malicious. Given this, the main challenge addressed by this
thesis can be formulated as follows. Spy agents should assess the genuine
character of remote hosts by providing the hosts with no indication of their
purpose and by interacting with visited hosts in the expected way.
Spy agents are analogous to software decoys [118] and honeypots [139] in
that they hide any indication of their purpose from a target. A spy agent
differs, however, in that it is mobile code which is fully under the control of a
remote host. It is interesting to observe that honeypots, software decoys and
other intrusion detection technologies can be used by malicious hosts against
spy agent deployments. Spy agents must address this challenge, and must
still be able to identify sophisticated malicious hosts that may adapt their
behaviour to avoid detection.
In some ways, spy agents are analogous to cryptographic tracing techniques,
which can be used to detect unauthorised modifications to an agent’s code in
a multi-host route [185]. A trace is a log of the operations performed by
an agent during its lifetime. In a tracing scenario, platforms are required
to create, maintain and exchange authenticated logs for all incoming agents.
After an agent has terminated, its owner can acquire all the logs and compare
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them against the logs produced locally to detect discrepancies. However, this
approach has the following limitations.
• If the language adopted for agents allows for the processing of very com-
plex data structures, modifications to the agent’s internal state could be
difficult to represent in a log entry and require a lot of space, rendering
the mechanism infeasible in practice [185].
• Privacy issues are likely to arise for secure log management.
• Only attacks involving illegal modification of code, state and execution
flow of a mobile agent can be detected. That is, indirect attacks, such
as misuse of a personal email address, cannot be detected.
The research challenge involved in designing the spying approach is to
allow unaware malicious hosts to abuse ‘normal’ (spy) agents (e.g. without
requesting proofs), and then to be able to infer the level of trustworthiness of
the visited hosts from the limited information (signs of abuse) available after
agent termination.
1.4 Thesis structure and contributions
The material in the remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 covers the background material necessary for the thesis.
Chapter 3 introduces the core contribution of this thesis: it presents the spy
agent concept and describes the spy agent system and framework.
Chapter 4 expands on the previous chapter by defining and analysing fun-
damental spy agent system requirements and system implementation
assumptions.
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Chapter 5 considers a number of fundamental spy agent routing protocol
architectures, and defines the main system parameters.
Chapter 6 focuses on the problem of designing spy agent routes and evalu-
ating the results from the deployment of a set of spy agents; a math-
ematical formulation of the design and analysis problem is given using
group testing theory.
Chapter 7 extends the analysis given in Chapter 6 to the case where complex
malicious behaviour and collusion by hosts may occur; a novel group
testing algorithm is described which enables hosts exhibiting complex
malicious behaviour to be detected (under certain reasonable assump-
tions about their behaviour).
Chapter 8 discusses an alternative spy agent scenario, and an optimal multi-
stage routing algorithm for host testing for this scenario is introduced.
Chapter 9 proposes and studies a probabilistic model for evaluating the cred-
ibility of spy agent host classification results on the assumption of incon-
sistent host behaviour; further, it introduces a methodology for analysing
the error-resilience properties of spy agent route designs.
Chapter 10 considers two important practical applications of the spy agent
paradigm, namely identifying data privacy infringements and identifying
code black box attacks.
Chapter 11 concludes this thesis and identifies possible directions for future
research.
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2.1 Synopsis
This chapter gives the technical background for the thesis. Each section of
this chapter, as listed below, can be read independently.
• §2.2 provides key definitions and notation for the cryptographic primi-
tives used throughout this thesis.
• §2.3 provides an introduction to mobile agents and mobile code; this
gives the necessary background for the spy agent system introduced in
Chapter 3.
• §2.4 reviews the state of the art in mobile agent security, and provides
a framework for the main contributions of the thesis.
• §2.5 discusses other related work, including data privacy, preemptive
trust assessment, and deception-based security mechanisms.
• §2.6 introduces the theory of group testing, and also provides related
background material on combinatorial designs. This is used in Chap-
ters 6, 7 and 8 to help in the design of sets of spy agent routes and agent
evaluation mechanisms.
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2.2 Cryptographic primitives
2.2.1 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some fundamental information security terms used
throughout the thesis. Dent and Mitchell [41] provide the following useful no-
tions. “A security threat is something that poses a danger to the security of a
system. A security service is selected to meet an identified threat, and a secu-
rity mechanism is the means by which a service is provided or implemented.”
Definitions for standard security services and security controls for data
communication systems can be found in [87]; standard information security
terminology can be found in [61,66]; and specifications of security controls with
industrial strength can be obtained from standards published by ISO/IEC JTC
1/SC 271. We provide key definitions below, adapted from [41] and and ISO
7498–2 [83].
Definition 2.1. Entity authentication: this service is the corroboration
that the entity at the other end of a communications channel is the one claimed.
Z Entity authentication addresses spoofing threats.
Definition 2.2. Data origin authentication: this service is the corrobora-
tion that the source of data received is as claimed.
Z Data origin authentication addresses tampering threats.
Definition 2.3. Data confidentiality: this service is concerned with pre-
venting the disclosure of data to unauthorised entities.
Z Data confidentiality addresses information disclosure threats.
1Subcommittee 27 (IT security techniques) of Joint Technical Committee 1 (Information
technology) of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
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Definition 2.4. Data integrity: this service is concerned with preventing
unauthorised alteration or destruction of data by an unauthorised entity (in
other words unauthorised tampering with data).
Z Data integrity addresses tampering threats.
Definition 2.5. Accountability or non-repudiation: this service is con-
cerned with preventing denial by an entity that it has taken a particular action,
e.g. sending or receiving a message.
Z Accountability addresses repudiation threats.
Definition 2.6. Access control: this service is concerned with preventing
unauthorised use of a resource.
Z Access control addresses elevation of privilege threats.
Definition 2.7. Availability: this service ensures that computer system as-
sets are available to authorised parties when needed.
Z Availability addresses Denial of Service (DoS) threats.
2.2.2 Cryptographic functions
Cryptographic functions are security mechanisms that can be used to provide
security services. In this section we introduce the main cryptographic functions
we use in this thesis, using definitions taken from Menezes, van Oorschot and
Vanstone [117].
2.2.2.1 Symmetric and asymmetric encryption
Encryption helps to provide confidentiality services. An encryption scheme
consists of two sets of encryption and decryption transformations {Ee : e ∈ K}
and {Dd : d ∈ K}, respectively, where K is the keyspace.
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An encryption scheme is said to be symmetric-key if, for each associated
encryption/decryption key pair (e, d), it is computationally ‘easy’ to determine
d knowing only e, and to determine e from d. In most practical symmetric-key
encryption schemes e = d; examples of such schemes include block ciphers,
such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [123], and stream ciphers,
such as the RC4 algorithm [146].
In contrast with symmetric encryption, an encryption scheme is said to
be asymmetric if, for each associated encryption/decryption key pair (e, d),
it is computationally infeasible to compute d from e. Typically, encryption
will use a public key (i.e. a key e that is widely known), and decryption will
use a private key (i.e. a key d that is kept secret by its owner); examples of
such schemes include the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) scheme [147] and the
ElGamal scheme [53].
2.2.2.2 Hash functions
A (cryptographic) hash function helps to provide integrity and authentication
services. It is a computationally efficient function that maps binary strings of
arbitrary length to binary strings of some fixed length, called message digests
or hash values, where this function has the following properties:
1. Pre-image resistance: given any output, it is computationally infeasible
to find an input which maps to that output.
2. Second pre-image resistance: given any input, it is computationally in-
feasible to find a second input which yields the same output.
3. Collision resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find two inputs
which map to the same output.
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An example of a hash function is SHA-256 [133] (32-byte output).
2.2.2.3 Message authentication codes
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) function can be used to provide data
origin authentication and integrity services. A MAC function takes as in-
put a message and a secret key, and outputs a fixed length binary, called a
MAC value (or simply a MAC). The secret key can be used to recompute the
MAC and verify that the original message has not been tampered with.
Examples of MAC functions include CBC-MACs [85] and HMAC [86].
2.2.2.4 Digital signatures
A digital signature can be used to help to provide authentication, non-repu-
diation, and integrity services. Its purpose is to provide a means for an entity
to bind its identity to a message. A digital signature scheme consists of a
signing function SA and a verification function VA for an entity A. The signing
function SA is a transformation from a message set M to a signature set S.
This transformation uses a signature key which should be kept secret by A and
should only be used for the purpose of creating signatures. The verification
function VA is a transformation from the set M× S to the set {true, false}.
This transformation uses a verification key which is typically publicly known,
and which can be used to verify the signatures created by A.
Examples of digital signature schemes include the RSA signature scheme
[117, p. 433], the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme [117, p. 447], and the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) [117, p. 451].
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2.2.3 Key establishment, management and certification
Key establishment is the process of setting up a secret key shared by two (or
more) parties for subsequent cryptographic use. Key management refers to the
set of processes supporting key establishment and the maintenance of ongoing
keying relationships between parties, including key substitution, key recovery,
and key revocation.
Key establishment and key management schemes typically involve the use
of cryptographic protocols. A cryptographic protocol is a distributed algorithm
defined by a sequence of steps precisely specifying the actions required of two
or more entities to achieve a specific security objective. As a more general
term, a security mechanism is a technique encompassing protocols, (single-
entity) algorithms and other (non-cryptographic) controls to achieve specific
security objectives.
A key transport protocol is a special class of cryptographic protocol which
supports the secure transfer of a secret key. An example of such a protocol
using digital signatures and public-key encryption and which enables entity A
to send a secret key k to entity B, is as follows, [117, p. 510].
A→ B : tA
∗, PB (iA, k) , SA (iB, tA
∗, PB (iA, k)) ,
where iA and iB are identifiers for A and B, tA is a timestamp created by
A, the asterisk denotes that tA is optional, PB is an asymmetric encryption
function that uses the public key of B, SA is a digital signature function that
uses the private key of A, and the comma denotes message concatenation.
The main purpose of the above protocol is to provide integrity, confiden-
tiality and authentication services for the communicated key. The (optional)
timestamp tA provides guarantees regarding message ‘freshness’. Further, the
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identifier iA within the scope of PB prevents signature stripping. That is, it
prevents a third party C from sending B the message
tA
∗, PB (k) , SC (B, tA
∗, PB (k)) ,
thus defeating authentication by means of impersonation. We note that the
above protocol is a one-pass protocol that does not provide authentication of
B to A. For mutual authentication it is necessary to employ more advanced
protocols, such as challenge-response protocols.
The above key transport protocol depends on the existence of asymmetric
key pairs for A and B. This gives rise to one of the fundamental key estab-
lishment problems, namely the distribution of keys in such a way that the
recipients can verify that they are genuine. One well-known key establishment
scheme is the Diffie-Helman (DH) protocol [20, Chapter 5]. However, the
DH protocol does not offer authentication, and is susceptible to man-in-the-
middle attacks. Other examples of key establishment protocols can be found
in [117, Chapter 12].
When using public key cryptography (including asymmetric encryption and
digital signatures) the fundamental key management problem is the reliable
distribution of user public keys. One mechanism for achieving this is known as
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [2,170]. A PKI typically involves the use of
a special purpose Trusted Third Party (TTP) called a Certification Authority
(CA). A CA is responsible for issuing (digitally signing) public key certificates,
which bind a public key to the name of its owner (together with other relevant
information). In order to validate a certificate a user must have access to a
trusted copy of the relevant CA’s public key, in order to verify the signature.
A CA may revoke a certificate by including it in an Certificate Revocation
List (CRL), or by using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [2]. A
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widely adopted standard for digital certificates is X.509 [88].
2.3 Mobile agents
2.3.1 Introduction to mobile agents
Mobile agents were briefly introduced in §1.2.1. They are mobile software
components in network systems, and they can be used to participate in dy-
namic multi-party interactions. Mobile agent architectures are an alternative
to ‘standard’ client-server software architectures, and they have been intro-
duced with the goal of providing more efficient networking and enhanced ap-
plication functionality.
Typical mobile agent applications include information filtering, electronic
commerce, education and entertainment. Such applications, for example, re-
quire network functionality for advertising, finding, combining, using, present-
ing, managing and updating information.
The term agent appears to have been introduced in computer science in
the context of Artificial Intelligence (AI) [74]. However, the term agent is
today used in a wide range of contexts; typically, agents are “active, persis-
tent (software) components that perceive, reason, act, and communicate” [80].
Some authors add further properties, such as autonomy, rationality, reactiv-
ity, or proactivity, whereas others limit agents to the role of representing a
user or database. Agents can also be perceived in different ways. For exam-
ple, some discuss agents as if they are conscious and cognitive entities that
have feelings, perceptions, and emotions emulating humans, whereas others
treat agents merely as automata that behave in expected ways as designed or
programmed.
Adding the term mobility to some of the above features, Braun and Rossak
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give the following two definitions [22].
AI view: “Mobile software agents are computer programs that act as repre-
sentatives in the global network of computer systems. The agent knows
its owner, knows his or her preferences, and learns by communicating
with its owner. The user can delegate tasks to the agent, which is able
to search the network efficiently by moving to the service or information
provider.”
Distributed systems view: “Mobile agents refer to self-contained and iden-
tifiable computer programs, bundled with their code, data, and execution
state, that can move within a heterogeneous network of computer sys-
tems. They can suspend their execution on an arbitrary point and trans-
port themselves to another computer system. During this migration the
agent is transmitted completely, that is, as a set of code, data, and exe-
cution state. At the destination computer system, an agent’s execution
is resumed at exactly the point where it was suspended before.”
There is an extensive literature on mobile agents. A useful collection of
papers has been put together by Bradshaw [21]; an introduction to agent topics
and applications can be found in [34]; and another useful collection of papers
is given by Huhns and Singh [80].
Agents are typically implemented as components of a multiagent system.
For example, resource agents might advertise services and user agents find and
interact with (querying or informing) the resource agents. Multiple user agents
might either collaborate in finding and combining information, or compete for
resources. Similarly, service agents may either collaborate with or compete for
(with) users, resources, and other service agents.
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Figure 2.1: Client-server paradigm architecture.
Further information regarding multiagent and distributed AI systems can
be found in [59] and [191].
2.3.2 Computing architectures
The traditional client-server paradigm is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The client
code (executing within a Virtual Machine (VM) of Host A) makes a request
to server code (executing within the VM of Host B). The server code may in
turn access a resource before replying to the client code. Access to a resource
is controlled by the VM, which could be an Operating System. Typical client-
server programming language constructs include the Remote Procedure Call
and the Java Remote Method Invocation.
In more complex paradigms, a client request may contain dynamic code to
be executed at the server. In this case, the dynamic code would typically be
encapsulated in the initial request message (Figure 2.1). A widely used exam-
ple of the dynamic code paradigm is provided by the PostScript R© language
for printers.
A client could also request dynamic code from a server; in such a case the
dynamic code would typically be encapsulated in the server’s reply message
(Figure 2.1). An example of this paradigm is provided by web clients fetching
and executing Java Applets.
The effect on the client-server architecture of a shift to the mobile agent
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Figure 2.2: Mobile code paradigm architecture.
paradigm, as described in §2.3.1, is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The mobile agent
is shown as an autonomous code component (A) which runs on an Agent
Execution Environment (AEE) within the VM of a host. The mobile agent
can then request to be migrated to another host, and so on.
2.3.3 Mobile agent implementations
For agents to operate, communicate, and migrate successfully it is essential
that they have a common representation, i.e. that they ‘speak the same lan-
guage’. This is usually provided by a ‘common ontology’, which is a represen-
tation of knowledge in some domain of discourse that is available to all the
agents [124]. Existing examples of ontologies and semantic mappings include
the DARPA ontology sharing project [137], and Princeton’s WordNet [119].
Complete mobile agent systems have been implemented and are available as
mobile agent toolkits—some widely discussed examples are listed in Table 2.1.
More comprehensive lists of mobile agent toolkits can be obtained from online
sources. IEEE distributed systems online2 lists available agent toolkits, while
the AgentLink project3 maintains a list of ongoing mobile agent projects.
2http://computingnow.computer.org
3http://www.agentlink.org
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Table 2.1: Examples of mobile agent toolkits.
Toolkit Organisation URL
ADK Tryllian www.tryllian.com
Aglets IBM (Open Source) aglets.sourceforge.net
Ajanta Univ. of Michigan www.cs.umn.edu/Ajanta
D’Agents Dartmouth College agent.cs.dartmouth.edu
Grasshopper IKV www.grasshopper.de
Semoa Fraunhofer Society www.semoa.org
Bee-gent Toshiba www.toshiba.co.jp/rdc/beegent
Tracy Univ. of Jena www.mobile-agents.org
The Mobile Agent System Interoperability Facility (MASIF) is a stan-
dardisation body for mobile agent systems that has been promoted by a num-
ber of organisations including IBM, GeneralMagic, GMD Fokus, and OMG.
MASIF defines interfaces for interoperable mobile agent toolkits; however, it
relies on the use of CORBA4 for agent communications.
The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA)5 is a parallel stan-
dardisation body for agent technology. FIPA attempts to address a broader
range of agent interoperability issues than MASIF, including agent communi-
cation, message transport protocols, ontologies, and mobility (migration).
Interoperable mobile agents supplied by different implementors may com-
municate with each other using a common Agent Communication Language
(ACL), such as one of the following.
• KQML: The Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML)
assumes a layered architecture, using common communication proto-
cols at the bottom, common application functionality at the top (e.g.
Structured Query Language (SQL)), and, in the middle, agent specific
primitives [60].
4http://www.omg.org/spec/CORBA/
5http://www.fipa.org
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• Arcol and FIPA: Arcol was the basis for the first FIPA standard,
discussed above.
2.3.4 Mobile agent applications
In general, applications built using mobile agents could also be implemented
using traditional client-server techniques, as discussed in §2.3.2. However, the
use of mobile agents is likely to offer advantages when it can improve the
efficiency of network resource usage and reduce the complexity of developing
applications.
Mobile agents are thought to be best-suited for open information-rich en-
vironments made up of a large number of distributed heterogeneous resources,
in which applications require delegation of tasks, asynchronous processing and
service adaptation. These characteristics make agents useful for efficient re-
source discovery, information retrieval, database queries, information filtering
and data fusion.
As an example we consider theWarren system, which consists of intelligent
agents that support financial portfolio management [176]. In particular, some
agents are designed to combine market data, financial report data, technical
models, analysts’ reports, and breaking news with current prices from a ‘stock
ticker’; others integrate all the information; (ultimately) yet others present the
processed information or create alerts. Agents may also take actions based on
learned user preferences.
A review of mobile agent e-commerce applications can be found in [115].
As stated in a recent study [70], the success of mobile agents depends on their
trustworthiness, which in turn depends on the existence of adequate security
controls. This is the focus of the next section.
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Z In this thesis we do not adhere to any specific mobile agent definition,
implementation, computing architecture, toolkit, or standard. The spy
agents we introduce in the main part of this thesis can be implemented
using a range of technologies; the exact agent functionality and imple-
mentation will depend on the context and scenario requirements. Also,
we regard a spy agent system as a multiagent system within which spying
information is acquired from untrusted agent hosts before it is combined
for analysis in a trusted computing environment.
2.4 Mobile agent security
Mobile agent security was briefly introduced in §1.2.1. In this section we
review known threats, security requirements, and security solutions, focusing
primarily on mobile agent protection and secondarily on host protection.
2.4.1 Analysis principles
The process of evaluating the security of a system typically involves identifica-
tion and analysis of applicable threats and vulnerabilities, so that appropriate
security controls can be applied. The following approaches can be used:
• Top-down approach: threats and vulnerabilities are identified for specific
scenarios.
• Bottom-up approach: ‘common’ security requirements (such as integrity,
confidentiality, authentication, accountability, availability, and anonymi-
ty) are analysed for the various system components and functions.
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2.4.2 Security threats and requirements
2.4.2.1 Threats
Threats to mobile agent security were briefly discussed in §1.2.1. An adversary
might be able to compromise an agent using one or more of the following
approaches.
• Observing the agent’s code, data and flow control.
• Manipulating the agent’s code, data and flow control.
• Executing the agent’s code inappropriately, including re-execution.
• Returning false values to the agent’s system call functions.
• Denying execution of the agent’s code, either in part or whole.
• Masquerading as a different host.
• Eavesdropping on agent communications.
• Manipulating agent communications.
A similar and more elaborate classification of security threats for shopping
agents (and corresponding security requirements and controls) is given by
Schaefer [155]. Further discussions can be found in [17,71,75,89]. Key classes
of threats are discussed in greater detail below.
2.4.2.1.1 Attacking agent data
Yee [200] has studied the threats to mobile agent data arising in an e-
ticketing scenario, in which agents collect offers from merchants. We follow
Yee’s classification.
An agent can carry either static (unmodifiable) or dynamic (modifiable)
data, which may be either public or private. Public static data (e.g. user ticket
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query information) require integrity protection, whereas private static data
(e.g. parameters for price negotiations) also require confidentiality protection.
Malicious hosts that access or modify such data could compromise market
competition rules as well as customer security.
The use of encryption may not suffice to protect agent private data. For
example, a malicious host might use a cut-and-paste attack in which the en-
crypted agent data is inserted into a new agent with code that instructs it
to migrate to a host authorised to access the data; the agent then instructs
the host to decrypt the encrypted data and return it (unencrypted) to the
malicious host.
2.4.2.1.2 Attacking agent code
As agent is (by definition) under the control of the host that executes it;
this makes it hard to maintain code confidentiality. A list of attacks of this
type can be found in [200].
In a black-box attack an agent is executed by a malicious host multiple
times, each time with different input parameters, with the goal of under-
standing its logic and state by observing its behaviour under a wide range of
conditions. For example, in the e-ticketing scenario, a malicious host could
gradually improve its offer until it is (marginally) better than previously re-
ceived offers (and this is revealed by the agent behaviour). Alternatively, a
malicious host might analyse the agent’s code and attempt to understand its
semantics.
A malicious host could also ‘sabotage’ the agent code by arbitrarily mod-
ifying it, or by inserting malware to cause it to behave in unintended ways.
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Inserted malware could, for example, allow a malicious host to remotely con-
trol the agent after it migrates elsewhere. Alternatively, agent code could be
temporarily changed; for example, execution could be manipulated to omit
security checks or other conditional behaviour.
2.4.2.1.3 Truncation attacks
Truncation is an attack on agent data, code, or a combination of both, in
which a malicious host removes information from the agent that was added
by previously visited hosts (e.g. price offers). One example of such an attack
would involve two malicious hosts colluding in order to remove all data from
an agent that was inserted by hosts visited between visits to the two malicious
hosts. Such an attack may be hard to detect if the agent itinerary is not fixed
(e.g. for free roaming agents).
Specific types of truncation attacks include the following. In a growing a
fake stem attack a malicious host selectively removes genuine offers and ap-
pends fake offers [103]; in a revisiting attack a malicious host modifies the
agent’s migration logic so that the agent will revisit it (which could, for exam-
ple, allow this host to truncate all succeeding offers) [202]; in an interleaving
attack a malicious host creates a new agent that appears to originate from
a legitimate source by selectively combining information from one or more
previous hosts [149], an attack similar to the cut-and-paste attack discussed
above.
2.4.2.2 Security requirements
A summary of mobile agent security requirements is given below. This list is
based on discussions in [17, 143].
2.4. Mobile agent security
• Agent authentication and authorisation: the origin and integrity of mo-
bile agents should be verified, and agent access to host resources should
be subject to an authorisation check.
• Situatedness: an agent should be aware of the environment it is executing
in, and be able to apply the necessary security controls.
• Autonomy and migration: an agent should have control over its internal
state and migration. Greater degrees of autonomy and more sophisti-
cated migration capabilities require higher levels of security as a result
of the increased risks arising from agent code manipulation.
• Communication: agent communication with its environment (i.e. other
agents, hosts or humans) needs to be protected. Confidentiality, in-
tegrity, authenticity, non-repudiation and availability services must be
provided for communicated data.
• Rationality, veracity, and benevolence: the agent should act in an ex-
pected way (and not act maliciously).
• Anonymity: while knowledge of the identity of an agent may be im-
portant for certain applications and services, it may not be needed by
others.
• Trust: agents need to be capable of assessing the trustworthiness of
received information [27] (e.g. by using a reputation system [156]).
• Delegation: it must be possible for an agent to be granted rights to
carry out certain tasks on behalf of another entity. The security for such
a delegation act could, for example, be supported by the use of public
key and attribute certificates.
50
2.4. Mobile agent security
2.4.3 Security controls
We divide our discussion of security controls for mobile agents into three main
classes, as follows [22].
Collateral techniques: These controls restrict the operations of agent sys-
tems for security purposes—they neither prevent nor detect attacks.
Prevention techniques: The purpose of these controls is to prevent security
attacks from occurring.
Detection techniques: The purpose of such controls is to identify an attack
and (or) the attacker after the attack has occurred.
2.4.3.1 Collateral techniques
2.4.3.1.1 Trusted host itinerary
When using a trusted host itinerary, hosts will not accept agents coming
from, and will not despatch agents to, untrusted hosts (such functionality has
been implemented in the Aglets agent system). In some implementations this
limitation can be relaxed by allowing agents to visit untrusted hosts if they
do not contain sensitive data or code; for example, an agent could be designed
so that secure computations are only executed in trusted hosts. One major
problem of using such an approach is determining when or whether to add a
host to, or revoke a host from, the list of trusted hosts.
2.4.3.1.2 Host reputation
Rasmusson et al. [140] suggest that agents could report hosts to a central
registration agency which maintains trust assessments (reputations) of hosts,
so that hosts behaving in unauthorised ways damage their reputation. Such an
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evaluation process uses a social control approach, in which entities are judged
according to defined behavioural rules. The problem with such an approach
is that it is very difficult to make reputation systems robust against gaming
by malicious hosts which know how reputation values are calculated. For
example, a correctly performing host could be given a poor reputation score
by a malicious agent, and a malicious host could behave correctly for a period,
thereby gaining a ‘good’ score, before misbehaving.
2.4.3.2 Prevention techniques
2.4.3.2.1 Encrypted Functions
Sander and Tschudin [152–154] and Wilhelm [193] propose a technique in-
volving executing an encrypted agent without decrypting it. The idea is to
permit a host to execute an agent carrying an encrypted function without
revealing the original function. The scheme operates as follows.
• Alice has a function f and computes the encrypted function E(f).
• Alice sends a program P (E(f)) that executes E(f) to Bob.
• Bob executes P (E(f)) using input x, and sends P (E(f))(x) back to
Alice.
• Alice ‘decrypts’ P (E(f))(x) and obtains P (f)(x) by some means not
available to Bob.
It is noted that even if the function f is encrypted, a malicious host might
still be able to mount a black-box attack, as discussed in §2.4.2.1.2. A host
could repeatedly execute P (E(f)), and in certain circumstances might then
be able to use the obtained pairs of inputs and (encrypted) outputs to recon-
struct (reverse engineer) the function f . One solution to this problem proposed
52
2.4. Mobile agent security
in [4] involves use of a third party called a secure computation service, which is
employed to execute the encrypted operations and which is trusted not to at-
tempt to learn anything about the decrypted functions and their outputs. This
technique is similar to the use of trusted execution environments, discussed in
§2.4.3.2.4.
Barak [10] propose a somewhat similar technique designed to obfuscate the
code so that it becomes difficult to analyse its functionality in real time. A
more recent study of this technique can be found in [160].
Historically, whilst the notion of computing using encrypted data is very
attractive, not least because of possible applications in the cloud, there is a
shortage of practical schemes. However, in recent years a number of possible
schemes have been proposed which come close to realising a general purpose
function of the desired type [32,135]; recent work of Gentry [65] is of particular
interest, although a truly practical scheme of universal applicability is not yet
available.
2.4.3.2.2 Time-limited black boxes
An agent is called a black box if its data or code cannot be accessed and
modified. Relaxing this definition a little, an agent is called a time-limited
black box if it is a black box for a specified time interval. Hohl [76] proposed
a scheme of this latter type that obfuscates the agent code in a manner that
makes it hard to ‘comprehend’ the code semantics, and inserts an (unforgeable)
expiration date into the code. However, the scheme has a number of practical
limitations arising from the difficulty of successfully obfuscating the code (as
discussed in §2.4.3.2.1), and the problem of choosing an appropriate block box
time interval.
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2.4.3.2.3 Environmental key generation
Riordan and Schneier [145] proposed a technique in which a ‘clueless’ agent
is unaware of some of its possible future actions, because portions of its code
or data are encrypted with an unknown key. After an agent’s migration has
commenced, the agent receives input from its environment which enables it to
generate the secret key necessary to decrypt its code or data. Two variants
of the scheme are proposed, namely the forward-time approach, which per-
mits key generation only after a specific point in time, and the backward-time
approach, which permits key generation only before some point in time.
A recent study of this technique can be found in [192]. One limitation of
this scheme is that access to sensitive mobile code information will still need to
be protected against the entities that might be involved in the key generation
process.
2.4.3.2.4 Trusted execution environments
Agents can be protected by executing them on trusted tamper-proof hard-
ware [194] or secure co-processors [199]. The use of software-based tamper-
proof environments has also been proposed in [76, 189]. More recently, it has
been suggested that agents can be securely executed in hosts using trusted
computing technologies [72].
2.4.3.2.5 Agent spreading
Borselius et al. [19] suggest that the threats posed by a malicious host to
trading agent transactions can be reduced by spreading a single trading task
amongst multiple agents. The authors propose two possible ways of achieving
this.
• In the first scheme, agents are equipped with ‘shares’ of the means to
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commit to a transaction. They then jointly commit to the transaction
using a threshold signature scheme, such as the scheme of Shoup [161].
• Alternatively, a trusted host can be used as the final destination for the
agents, after they have visited a number of untrusted hosts. Following
analysis of the agents, the trusted host can commit to what it believes
to be the optimal transaction.
Ng and Cheung [127] propose a similar method in which mobile agents are
divided into many independent parts, and computational tasks are distributed
among multiple hosts.
2.4.3.3 Detection techniques
2.4.3.3.1 Replication
Schneider [157] and Yee [200] discuss the use of replication to detect attacks
on mobile agents.
2.4.3.3.1.1 Replication of hosts
The host-replication approach of Schneider [157] works on the assumption
that that there are enough agent replicas to ensure that some of them will
escape attacks from, or encounters with, malicious hosts. Consider a case
where a mobile agent executes in a sequence of stage actions Si (0 ≤ i ≤ n),
and has an itinerary of hosts to visit. Stage Si is processed at host i, and
for each stage multiple hosts provide the same set of services. More formally,
at stage i, there is a set {Ai0, . . . , A
i
n} of hosts (0 ≤ i ≤ n). Once an agent
has been executed, each host Aik sends a copy of the agent to all the hosts
implementing stage i + 1. Similarly, each host Aik receives multiple copies
of the same agent. By comparing the received agents, a host can determine
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whether or not no more than half of the hosts in stage i − 1 are malicious.
The host can then choose to execute the agent with the most frequent state.
Details of a protocol that can be used to identify the malicious hosts in stage
i− 1 are given in [157].
One major problem with this approach is that it may be unrealistic to
assume that an agent will only be attacked by a subset of the hosts imple-
menting each stage. In addition, the scheme will not be appropriate in all
scenarios. For example, replication is difficult to apply to an e-ticketing agent
with purchasing capabilities.
2.4.3.3.1.2 Replication of agents
The agent-replication approach proposed by Yee [200] detects an attack
on the e-ticketing scenario by comparing the results of two replicated mobile
agents. These two agents follow the same predetermined itinerary but in
reverse order, and the scheme works on the assumption that there is only a
single malicious host in this itinerary. Suppose that the first agent encounters
the malicious host at state i, and this malicious host modifies the best offer
provided by a host at stage j of the route, j < i. However, the malicious host
cannot modify the offer provided by the jth host to the second agent (with the
reverse route). As a result, a comparison of the results produced by the two
agents will yield the best offer, and will also enable the attack to be detected
(but not the attacker).
2.4.3.3.2 Detecting black box attacks
Black box attacks (see §2.4.3.2) typically involve analysing how a black box
agent reacts given a range of input parameters. Hohl and Rothermel [77]
discuss how to detect black box attacks by making an agent maintain a log
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of host responses to mobile agent requests. At each visited host the agent
sends a message to a trusted host containing a unique identification number
associated with the agent’s code call, and a hash value of the host’s data
response. The trusted host can then compare the host response hashes for
equal code calls. The trusted host will return an error to the agent if the host
response hashes for equal calls do not match. One limitation of this approach
is that a malicious host might not allow the agent to log host responses that
reveal malicious host behaviour.
2.4.3.3.3 Detection using cryptography
Standard security services (such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity
and accountability) can be offered with the use of standard cryptographic
protocols, as discussed in §2.2.3. These mechanisms can help address attacks
on the migration process of mobile agents, such as impersonation attacks (also
known as kidnapping host attacks), which involve modifying the agent’s owner
Identification Data (ID) and signing the agent with a different private key.
A malicious host could also attack a mobile agent by deleting data added
by a previous host, as well as any corresponding tracing data (e.g. a digital
signature).
Security protocols designed to address attacks on multi-hop migration
routes are discussed in [104], where append-only logs are introduced; further
proposals are given in [149]. Using such protocols, an attack can be identi-
fied after the mobile agent returns to its originator and the integrity of the
host-inserted logs is checked. However, the proposed schemes are subject to
a cut-and-paste attack in which two malicious hosts on the agent itinerary
collude [149].
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A similar, yet simpler, technique using a Partial Result Authentication
Code (PRAC) has been proposed by Yee [200]. Rather than relying on asym-
metric encryption of partial results, this technique uses symmetric encryption,
which is faster to compute.
2.4.3.3.4 Forward integrity
Bellare [12] proposed a technique called forward integrity in which mobile
agents produce partial logs as they proceed on a multi-host itinerary. This
can be viewed as the integrity analogue of ‘forward privacy’ (also known in
the literature as ‘perfect forward secrecy’).
The aim of this mechanism is to generate a MAC for each audit log in such
a way that, even if the MAC key is compromised, data pertaining to the past
cannot be forged, i.e. the attacker cannot modify entries or create non-genuine
entries for past logging events.
2.4.3.3.5 Detection using cryptographic tracing
Vigna [184,186] proposed a technique called execution tracing that makes it
possible to save the history of execution at a host in an unforgeable way. The
protocol requires the nth host An, n ≥ 1, visited by an agent to compute an
execution trace for this agent. The trace is securely stored by An and is sub-
sequently sent to a trusted host A0. The protocol has two main components,
which are summarised below.
Secure multi-hop migration. The host An, n ≥ 1, supports execution of
the mobile agent until the agent decides to migrate to the next host An+1.
The host An then computes an execution trace for the agent, and sends
this trace along using the agent to An+1 with a protocol that supports
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the required security services. This protocol uses hash functions and
digital signatures to offer authentication, confidentiality and integrity
(see, for example, §2.2.3).
Notification of migration. The host An+1 receives the message from An
and verifies that it was the intended recipient, that the mobile agent and
its state were actually sent by An, and that the agent and state have not
been modified. If so, then An+1 sends A0 a message that confirms receipt
of the agent and execution trace. Further details are given in [186].
When the mobile agent completes its migration, the originatorA0 can check
correct agent execution by simulating agent execution at all visited hosts using
the traces it has received from each of these hosts. The trace consists of the
values returned by all system calls made by the agent while executing on the
host.
One limitation of this method is that the size of the trace grows linearly
with the number of visited hosts. Vigna [185] proposes a number of techniques
that can help reduce the tracing overheads. The security features of the origi-
nal protocol were enhanced in [103] and [177]; however, the practicality of the
approach remains questionable.
2.4.3.3.6 Detecting itinerary manipulations
Roth [148] proposes a technique that involves pairs of agents cooperating to
detect agent migration blocking attacks. The two agents migrate and exchange
information at each host they visit. At each host, one agent sends the other
the names of the previous, current, and next host in its migration path. The
receiving agent can examine this information for migration inconsistencies.
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One drawback of this protocol is its communication overhead. Also the
protocol assumes that the two agents are always executing on different hosts;
a pair of colluding hosts could attack the protocol by, for example, killing both
agents simultaneously.
2.4.3.3.7 Detecting truncation
In the previous sections we have discussed a number of techniques that
can be used to detect attacks on agent data, code and itineraries. Some of
these techniques can also be used to protect against truncation attacks (see
§2.4.2.1.3).
A well-established method of detecting truncation attacks is the use of se-
cure chain relation protocols. Karjoth et al. [103] introduced a chain relation
protocol that uses digital signatures and hash functions to link the result ob-
tained at the currently visited host to the result generated at the previously
visited host and the identity of the next host to be visited. This protocol
extends Yee’s forward integrity using the PRAC scheme [200] (see §2.4.3.3.3).
Similar protocols have also been proposed in [36,104]. However, none of these
protocols protect against truncation attacks in which two or more hosts col-
lude. This issue is addressed in [31], where a scheme is proposed in which
previously visited hosts jointly sign a result generated at the current host; as
a result, colluding hosts need previously visited hosts to jointly sign a fake
offer as part of any attack. This work has been further developed by a number
of authors [109, 114, 198, 202].
Other schemes protecting against truncation attacks use a TTP to record
itinerary information [36, 79]. Such schemes, however, require a mobile agent
to communicate with a TTP every time it visits a host, which introduces
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a significant network overhead. However, this problem can be addressed by
using trusted execution environments (see §2.4.3.2.4).
2.4.4 Host protection controls
We outline below host protection methods, designed to prevent agent technol-
ogy from being used for malicious purposes.
2.4.4.1 Java security
The most widely discussed mobile agent toolkits use Java technology and se-
curity. A helpful introduction to Java security can be found in [130]. Java
security functionality is particularly useful in protecting hosts against mali-
cious agents, as discussed below.
2.4.4.1.1 Code signing
Java implements standard cryptographic functions to support agent in-
tegrity, confidentiality and authentication.
2.4.4.1.2 Bytecode verifier
The code of a Java class can be verified at the bytecode level. This enables
the structural correctness of the Java class to be verified with respect to Java
semantics.
2.4.4.1.3 Sandboxing
Sandboxing protects the VM during runtime in a number of ways. For
example, permissions specify actions that code is allowed to perform within a
protection domain, as determined by policy files defining the permissions given
to code executed within the domain. Signed code can be verified with the aid
of certificates contained in keystores.
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2.4.4.1.4 Java security limitations
Java security is not a panacea; a properly signed agent code might still
contain malicious content and harm a host. The security limitations of Java
are discussed by Roth [150]: “Java has simultaneously been a fortune and a
misfortune. Without the many features of Java, it is undoubtedly more difficult
to develop a mobile agent toolkit—on the other hand, all these limitations and
shortcomings of Java with regard to security make it next to impossible to build
and maintain a publicly deployed and dependable mobile agent system.”
2.4.4.2 Agent trustworthiness
Code signing, discussed above, is used in almost all mobile agent toolkits
to verify the origin and integrity of an agent and to authorise certain agent
requests. We discuss below other techniques that can be used to verify the
trustworthiness of agent code.
2.4.4.2.1 Proof-carrying code
This technique, proposed by Necula and Lee [125,126], provides a host with
guarantees that it is safe to execute an untrusted piece of mobile code. The
host publishes a safety policy describing the properties which mobile code must
satisfy. The agent must then contain a proof that its code complies with this
safety policy. The proof-carrying code is a special form of intermediate code
representation containing the mobile code and an encoding of a formal proof
that the code complies with the safety policy. This approach is currently an
active and promising research topic [3, 113].
2.4.4.2.2 Path histories
Trust in a network transaction typically depends on the identity of the
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communications partner, which is verified in an authentication process. For
a mobile agent, trust might also depend on the agent’s path history [134].
A path history enables a host to verify the sequence of hosts an agent has
previously visited. This might be important if, for example, a host maintains
a list of trustworthiness scores of other hosts. This technique is similar to the
trusted host itinerary and host reputation techniques discussed in §2.4.3.1.
2.4.4.2.3 State appraisal
Farmer et al. [58] proposed a technique that helps detect attacks on an
agent’s state. Unauthorised modifications to an agent state can be predicted,
described, and later verified using a state appraisal function provided by the
agent owner. Such a function defines a set of permissions that limit the func-
tionality of hosts that the agent visits. The function will then check that these
permissions have not been violated. For example, this might be verified by
checking that certain conditionals are true, or that certain invariants have the
expected value.
This approach can be combined with the concept of detection objects , i.e.
‘bait’ that can be inserted in agent code that does not affect the code’s main
functionality [116]. If a detection object is modified then it can be deduced
that the code has been tampered with. This technique relies on the detection
object being non-obvious; i.e. the presence of the detection object must be
concealed from executing hosts.
The state appraisal technique has also been studied by Berkovits et al. [14].
Stengel et al. [171] propose a similar method for detecting mobile agent state
manipulation by observing agent communication patterns, e.g. the repeated
transmission of the same information.
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2.4.4.2.4 History-based access control
This technique involves maintaining a selective history of accesses requested
by the code, and using this information to distinguish between trusted and
untrusted code [52]. It is claimed [52] that in some applications it may be too
restrictive to use static privileges; e.g. if all accesses to the local file system were
to be prohibited, then it would not be possible to open a socket to a remote
host. Instead, mutually exclusive privileges could be used, e.g. the code could
be allowed to read a file but not open a network connection afterwards (and
vice versa). The scheme employs unique identifiers for programs, which are
computed using hash functions. This prevents the approach being used for
programs that use dynamic code loading during runtime.
2.4.4.2.5 Host architecture
Borselius [17] proposed a universal host architecture which can be used
to describe mobile agent functionality in remote hosts. This architecture is
depicted in Figure 2.3, and includes the following components.
• AEE: is the governing management and control function, responsible for
all agents executing on the platform.
• Communication services: provide communications facilities to agents.
• Security services: provide agent security controls.
• Mobility service: enables and controls agent migration.
• Event logging service: logs security related events for storage in an audit
trail.
• Security policy and access control database: regulates the behaviour of
security mechanisms.
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Figure 2.3: Agent execution environment architecture.
• Storage and post processing: manages and processes log data.
• Local resources and subscription module: provides access to resources
(hardware or software).
• Trust Service Provider (TSP): provides various trust services.
• Remote resources: provides access to resources residing on other plat-
forms.
2.4.5 Summary: mobile agent security controls
We have reviewed a range of security mechanisms protecting mobile agents and
hosts. Host protection technologies have been developed to the point where
some authors consider them adequate for some applications [24] (although
there remain unresolved issues). On the other hand, there remains a lack of
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Table 2.2: Mobile agent security solutions.
Countermeasure Subject Type Code or data
Encrypted functions Agent Prevent Both
Time-limited black boxes Agent Prevent Both
Environmental key generation Agent Prevent Both
Host replication Agent Detect Both
Agent replication Agent Detect Both
Detecting black-box attacks Agent Detect Data
Static data integrity Agent Detect Data
Forward integrity Agent Detect Data
Execution tracing Agent Detect Both
Secure itinerary recording Agent Detect Data
Secure chain relation Agent Detect Data
Sandboxing Host Prevent Code
Code signing Host Detect Code
Proof-carrying code Host Prevent Both
Path histories Host Detect Both
State appraisal Host Detect Data
History-based access control Host Prevent N/A
completely effective security measures to protect mobile agents against mali-
cious hosts [57]. Table 2.2 summarises the mobile agent security techniques
that have been discussed in the previous sections, [22]. Further information
can also be found in the outputs of the Mobile VCE project6.
It should be emphasised that the overhead (communication or computa-
tional) associated with certain mobile agent security measures needs to be
carefully considered before adoption. For example, forcing a mobile agent at
each host to securely communicate tracing logs with a trusted party (resulting
in a star-shaped communication pattern) may defeat the purpose of using mo-
bile agents to reduce the communication and computational overheads arising
from the use of standard client-server architectures.
Z This thesis focuses on mobile agent security; the objective is to use spy
6http://www.mobilevce.org
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agents to identify the origin of a attack, based on information obtained
using attack detection techniques.
2.5 Other security topics
2.5.1 Data privacy
2.5.1.1 Notions
This section provides background on data privacy. We first give the following
fundamental definition.
Definition 2.8 (ISO 7498–2, [83]). Privacy is the right of individuals to con-
trol or influence what information related to them may be collected and stored
by whom, and to whom that information may be disclosed.
An alternative, somewhat more specific, definition is given by the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):
Definition 2.9 (OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, [132]). Privacy is the
status accorded to data which has been agreed upon between the person or
organisation furnishing the data and the organisation receiving it and which
describes the degree of protection which will be provided.
A more functional definition of privacy is given in ISO/IEC 15408:2008,
which covers evaluation criteria for information technology security and, in
particular, security functional components [84]. This multipart standard is
also known as the Common Criteria (for Information Technology Security
Evaluation). It expresses privacy as a ‘functional class’ with four ‘member
families’: anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability. Defini-
tions for these families have also been provided by Pfitzmann and Hansen [138]
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with the purpose of establishing a consistent terminology within the research
community.
Providing a privacy service often relies on other security services such as
authentication, confidentiality, accountability, and access control. For exam-
ple, the use of cryptographic mechanisms can ensure that (personal) data is
controlled by, and is only accessible to, authorised entities, and that these
entities are accountable for the exercise of such privileges. However, privacy
services might also conflict with security services. For example, the provision
of accountability could be adversely affected if anonymity is used to protect
user privacy.
2.5.1.2 Regulations
Data privacy is the subject of a wide variety of legislation. For example, in
Europe privacy is addressed by the European Union (EU) Data Protection
Directive (aka ‘the Directive’) [164]. The Directive defines ‘personal data’ as
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data
subject’); an identifiable person is “one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or
more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity” [164, article 2(a)]. The Directive requires that personal data
should (among other things) a) “be collected for specified purposes and not
be further processed for other purposes”, and b) “be merely adequate and not
excessive for the purposes motivating its collection” [164, article 6(1)].
The Directive helps to protect against inadvertent disclosure of private
data to unauthorised parties. However, its scope is restricted to safeguard
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other (conflicting) interests such as a) national or public security; b) police in-
vestigations; c) important economic or financial interests; and d) monitoring,
inspection or regulatory functions connected, even occasionally, with the ex-
ercise of official authority in previous cases. These exceptions (some of which
are equivocal) weaken the protection it provides.
Privacy can also be protected by requiring domains in which private data is
exposed to abide by particular data protection policies. These policies may be
based on standard privacy principles such as notice, choice and consent, collec-
tion, use and retention, access, disclosure to third parties, security for privacy,
quality, and monitoring and enforcement (see, for example, the OECD Guid-
ance on Policy and Practice, [131], or the UK Data Protection Act, [182]).
In this direction, the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [141] defines a
framework allowing a policy to be negotiated by two parties. For example, dur-
ing a registration process, a user may be requested to read the policy and opt
in if they agree with it [102]. However, such notice and consent frameworks
have been widely criticised and should not be relied upon for privacy pro-
tection [78]. For example, even though individuals may wish to protect their
privacy, they may still disclose personal information for reasons of convenience,
financial incentives, and/or a lack of understanding of the consequences.
2.5.1.3 Detection and prevention
Breaching a data privacy policy is a security threat posed by hosts that handle
mobile agents, particularly if the agents are issued by individuals. Personal
email addresses provide an example of private data which might be held by a
mobile agent whose use could be protected by a privacy policy. Unauthorised
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use of an email address has a number of possible (detectable) side effects, in-
cluding the reception of unsolicited messages (spam), identity theft, phishing,
viruses, worms, malware and adware.
Information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single
individual is known as Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Although
data privacy is heavily regulated, the growing trend towards mass collection
and exploitation of PII (e.g. data mining, data retention) in databases, renders
regulations and security policies hard to enforce. This becomes even more
challenging in mobile agent scenarios in which PII is willingly exposed to
multiple hosts, within the scope of data protection agreements. The misuse
of PII contained in mobile agents is a passive attack, which leaves no signs
of violation in the mobile agents and may only be detected indirectly (e.g. by
checking an email address for unauthorised use).
Even though privacy attacks can be detected (e.g. by employing e-mail
filters), it might still be hard, or even impossible, to identify the origin of such
attacks. For example, spammers might use open proxies to remain anonymous
during harvesting and spamming. More specifically, spammers might collect
private data using protocol parsers (potentially both at a low level, e.g. IP
traffic monitors, and at a higher level, e.g. chattering); administration moni-
toring procedures (e.g. Internet Service Provider (ISP) procedures); or higher
level applications (e.g. email marketing, newsgroups, Web browser plug-ins
leaking information, or other spyware) [6]. Further, spammers and blackhats
might use third-party relays or compromised hosts (e.g. botnets) in order to
route large volumes of e-mail messages [91].
Privacy attacks can be prevented by employing PETs [7,23,73]. Examples
of such technologies include the use of blind signatures [1], mix networks [29],
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crowd systems [144], and privacy assurance seals [13, 122, 168, 195].
Z Spy agents can help identify hosts that are responsible for email privacy
infringements; this is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10.
2.5.2 Monitoring agents
The notion of spy agents and mobile agent preemptive security assessments,
discussed in this thesis, can be seen as techniques for providing internet se-
curity monitoring services. Strategically placed control mechanisms can per-
form service monitoring, [26,67], including monitoring of enhanced IP services,
Quality of Service (QoS) and VPN packets. Similarly, in distributed intrusion
detection systems, [28, 165], control agents can be used to protect a domain
by ‘interrogating’ suspicious agents.
Mobile agents can be used to to assist in intrusion detection; for example,
agent requests and delegation rights could be assessed by a trusted ‘security
management component’ that is concerned with the security of the host and its
execution environments [183]. As compared to the use of single-point security
systems (e.g. firewalls), agents in a distributed system might be able to handle
detected intruders more efficiently. Similar agent protection systems have
also been proposed for wireless ad hoc networks [95, 179, 201]; the systems
involve analysing audit data collected by wireless network agent sensors both
to detect intrusions and to deter intruders. Detection of misbehaviours can be
performed using a range of methods; for example, models have been proposed
that emulate natural immune systems, or evolve using machine learning and
fuzzy logic algorithms [40, 43, 92].
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2.5.3 Deception
Deception in the form of social engineering and code breaking is commonly
used by hackers [121]. However, it has been observed that it can also be used
for attack detection and prevention by providing the attacker with a false
reality (fiction) [108]. Indeed, deception is one of the main requirements for
effective operation of a spy agent system.
Deception can be consistent or inconsistent. In consistent deception the
objective is to ensure that the attacker does not perceive that deception is used.
In contrast, in inconsistent deception the objective is simply to confuse the
attacker, regardless whether or not the attacker perceives an act of deception.
We next describe two security protection systems that are based on the
notion of deception.
2.5.3.1 Honeypots
The origin of remote attacks can potentially be identified with the aid of
‘honeynet’ systems [139], which “are nothing more than a security resource
whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised” [166]. As such,
honeynets (aka honeypots) are designed to resemble valid systems; they use
this masquerade to collect information about attackers and their methods.
Honeypots can be used in various ways. For example, email address har-
vesting and spamming may be detected in the following ways [5].
• A honeypot installed in a web site could ‘poison’ harvesters with decoy
email addresses.
• A honeypot installed on an open proxy could discover a spammer’s iden-
tity.
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• A honeypot installed on an open relay could detect and block unsolicited
emails.
The objective of a honeypot system is to collect valuable information from
unsuspecting attackers. This is not always possible; for example, an attacker
could use anti-honeypot techniques to detect the existance of a honeypot. For
example, the Send-Safe’s Honeypot Hunter “is a tool designed for checking lists
of HTTPS and SOCKS proxies for so called ‘honey pots’. ‘Honey pots’ are
fake proxies run by the people who are attempting to frame bulkers by using
those fake proxies for logging traffic through them and then send complaints
to ones’ ISPs7.”
If a honeypot can be detected, it can potentially also be attacked. For
example, a malicious user might be able to flood (poison) a honeypot with
false information [106]. By poisoning the honeypot, a malicious entity’s other
hostile activities might go unnoticed. More generally, just as spam originators
evolve new ways of bypassing spam filters, spammers are also developing ways
of combating honeypots. Hence honeypots can only continue to be a useful
security mechanism if their operators maintain technical superiority over the
adversaries of the resources being protected.
2.5.3.2 Software decoys
A decoy is intended to deceive something or someone into believing it is the
object it advertises itself to be. Therefore, the creator of a decoy must make
the decoy resemble a genuine object as much as possible in order to effect
the desired deception. Daniel and Herbig define deception as the “deliberate
misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage” [39].
7http://www.send-safe.com/honeypot-hunter.php
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Intelligent software decoys bear certain similarities to honeypot systems;
however, they differ from honeypots in a number of ways. Decoys are used
to actively defend components rather than just collect data; they are not
designed solely to attract the attention of adversaries; and they do not rely
on the concept of a perimeter of defences (in particular they might operate
autonomously) [118].
Z One of the aims of deception-based security mechanisms is to deter parties
from performing malicious acts. As compared with decoys and honey-
pots, spy agents differ in that attacks on mobile code take place in an
adversary’s environment, rather than a trusted one.
2.6 Combinatorial group testing
In this thesis we use combinatorial group testing (GT) to construct spy agent
routes. We next provide a short introduction to this mathematical theory.
2.6.1 Introduction to group testing theory
In GT a (large) population of items containing a small set of defectives is
tested in order to identify the defectives [45]. Items can be pooled together for
testing; a group test reports ‘positive’ if the tested pool contains one or more
defective elements, and reports ‘negative’ otherwise.
There are two main types of GT algorithms: sequential and nonadaptive.
Sequential algorithms allow the selection of later tests to be based upon the
outcomes of previous tests. In a non-adaptive scheme, the set of tests is
completely predetermined. Sequential algorithms require, in general, fewer
tests, since the extra information allows for more efficient designs. On the
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other hand, non-adaptive algorithms allow tests to be conducted in parallel
which, in general, reduces the overall test time if not the number of tests.
The GT problem is often denoted by S(d, n) where S is the sample space
of objects to be tested, where at most d defective items from the sample space
are to be detected. If it is assumed that the sample space contains exactly d
defectives, then the GT problem is denoted by S(d, n).
2.6.2 Sequential group testing
The history of Sequential Group Testing (SGT) algorithms goes back over 60
years [44]. There are two main mathematical models for the classical GT prob-
lem [45].
• Probabilistic models assume that a certain item is defective with prob-
ability p (typically using a Bernoulli distribution).
• Combinatorial models assume that the maximum number of defective
items is known prior to testing.
In the original GT work [44,163] the problem was to determine which blood
samples from a certain population contain the syphilis antigen. When indi-
vidual blood sera were pooled in groups, the test being used had the property
that:
• if none of the sera in the pool contained the syphilitic antigen, then the
pool tested ‘negative’, and
• if one or more of the sera in the pool contained the syphilitic antigen,
then the pool tested ‘positive’.
The goal of the GT design problem as originally formulated was to detect
all the positive samples using the minimum number of tests (as a matter of
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Figure 2.4: The idea of group testing.
economy). This optimisation problem is summarised in Figure 2.4.
Dorfman [44] showed that, when considering a Bernoulli probability dis-
tribution and a small p, the best group size S is approximately p−1/2 and the
resulting minimal ratio of tests to items tested is approximately 2p1/2.
In SGT, a fundamental objective is to minimise the total number of tests
required to find all the (up to) d defective items within a group of n items.
For given values of d and n, we therefore write N(d, n) for the minimum
number of tests in a SGT scheme which can identify up to d malicious hosts
from a set of n hosts. Since each test divides the sample space of hosts S(d, n)
into two disjoint sets, the following information theory bound applies [37,
Section 5.4: Bounds on the Optimal Code Length]: N(d, n) ≥ ⌈log2 n⌉. In
general, it is not easy to determine N(d, n). In fact, Du and Hwang [45] proved
that, if d = 1, then N(1, n) = ⌈log2 n⌉, and this is the only case in which
the exact value of N(d, n) is known [45]. General purpose SGT algorithms
include Hwang’s generalised binary splitting algorithm [93] and Li’s s-stage
algorithm [110].
2.6.3 Non-adaptive group testing
Non-adaptive algorithms have been studied for a shorter time: Non-adaptive
Group Testing (NGT) theory first arose in the study of superimposed codes
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[105]; however the connection with NGT was only established much later in
the study of the d-complete designs [25] and the hypergeometric NGT prob-
lem [82].
Much recent NGT research has been driven by applications in Deoxyri-
bonucleic Acid (DNA) library screening in molecular biology, in which the
items are DNA subsequences (clones) and tests are performed on pools of
clones to determine which contain a particular DNA sequence [128]. In this
context NGT schemes are also known as pooling designs [8].
In the hypergeometric problem, it is also assumed the number of defectives
never exceeds d; in the strict problem, it is required to verify this assumption.
That is, a scheme will only identify a set of defective items if the assumption
has been verified.
The following tentative taxonomy of non-adaptive pooling designs is given
in [128].
• Deterministic designs: Every pool is deterministically specified.
• Random designs: Some or all of the entries are randomly determined
with parameterised probabilities that can be optimised based on certain
criteria.
• Error-tolerance designs: Deterministic or random designs with the addi-
tional ability to tolerate tests yielding erroneous outcomes (e.g. reporting
‘false positives’).
A range of NGT constructions have been proposed based on block de-
signs [35], superimposed codes [49, 50, 105], transversal designs (e.g. grid de-
signs [11]), cover-free families [54, 55, 175, 190], and other combinatorial de-
signs [9, 11, 54, 111, 129] (see §2.6.5). A recent survey of NGT can be found
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in [46].
2.6.4 Group testing for complexes
In (classic) GT a set of elements possible containing defective elements is tested
in order to identify any defective elements. A test on a subset of elements gives
a positive result if and only if this subset contains at least one defective (or
positive) element. An important extension to the standard GT theory is the
theory of Group Testing for Complexes (GTC), in which elements can be
collectively positive. We call such a collectively positive element a ‘defective
complex’. In this model, a test gives a positive result if and only if the test
set contains at least one defective complex.
GTC is commonly associated with hypergraph testing. A hypergraph con-
sists of a set of vertices (corresponding to elements to be tested) and a set
of edges (i.e. sets of vertices) that correspond to the (candidate defective)
complexes. The rank of an edge is the number of vertices in it. In this
representation Du and Hwang define the following particularly important hy-
pergraphs [46, Chapter 6]:
• r-graph: a hypergraph whose edges all have rank r,
• r-graph: a hypergraph whose maximum rank is r,
• r∗-graph: the complete r-graph.
In hypergraph testing [63], the problem is to identify a hidden subgraph
using a small number of tests. This problem was first studied in the context
of identifying DNA complexes [112], in which there is a set S of molecules and
an unknown family D = {Di} of subsets of S, where each subset is a cause of
a certain disease. Hence, unlike in NGT, in hypergraph testing a combination
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of a set of elements is required to induce a positive effect. This defines the
fundamental GTC problem, where we wish to identify the ‘set of defective
complexes’, D, using a small number of tests.
Chen andWei [30] showed that the GTC problem is connected to the secure
Key Distribution Pattern (KDP) problem [120] (see §2.6.5.7), generalised su-
perimposed codes [49] (see §2.6.5.5), and Cover-free Families (CFF) [175,190]
(see §2.6.5.4).
2.6.5 Useful combinatorial structures
2.6.5.1 Block designs
Combinatorial designs (block designs) are examples of set systems. The def-
initions below are taken from Colbourn and Dinitz [35]; standard set theory
and notation can be found in [90].
Definition 2.10. A Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD) is a pair
(V,B), where V is a v-set and B is a collection of b k-subsets of V (blocks)
such that each element of V is contained in exactly r blocks and any 2-subset of
V is contained in exactly λ blocks. The numbers v, b, r, k, λ are the parameters
of the BIBD.
Definition 2.11. The incidence matrix of a BIBD (V,B) with parameters
v, b, r, k, λ is a v × b matrix A = (aij), in which aij = 1 when the ith element
of V occurs in the jth block of B, and aij = 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.12. A t-(v, k, λ) block design (or simply a t-design) is a pair
(V,B) where V is a v-set of points and B is a collection of k-subsets of V
(blocks) such that every t-subset of V is contained in exactly λ blocks.
Remark 2.13. A 2-(v, k, λ) design is a Balanced Incomplete Block Design
(BIBD).
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For a 2-design the following equations apply [15]:
bk = vr (2.6.1a)
λ(v − 1) = r(k − 1) (2.6.1b)
Beth et al. [15] provide a thorough introduction to design theory; a com-
prehensive collection of results on combinatorial designs is given in Colbourn
and Dinitz [35].
2.6.5.2 Vectors
Let x = [x0, x1, . . . , xn−1]
T and y = [y0, y1, . . . , yn−1]
T be binary n-dimensional
vectors. The superposition sum, denoted by x∨y = [x0∨y0, x1∨y1, . . . , xn−1∨
yn−1]
T , is the element-wise logical OR of the two vectors. We say that a vector
x is contained in a vector y, if x ∨ y = y.
2.6.5.3 Separating matrices
A u× b binary matrix M with columns indexed by {1, . . . , b} is a:
• d-disjunct matrix if the superposition sum of any d columns of M does
not contain any other column of M ;
• d-separable matrix if, for every D1, D2 ⊆ {1, . . . , b} with |D1| = |D2| = d,
the superposition sum of the columns indexed by D1 and the superposi-
tion sum of the columns indexed by D2 are equal only if D1 = D2;
• d-separable matrix if, for every D1, D2 ⊆ {1, . . . , b} with |D1| ≤ d and
|D2| ≤ d, the superposition sum of the columns indexed by D1 and
the superposition sum of the columns indexed by D2 are equal only if
D1 = D2.
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A family of v subsets C1, . . . Cv of a b-set X is d-disjunct if, for every subset
D of X of size at most d and for every x ∈ X−D, there exists an i (1 ≤ i ≤ v)
such that x ∈ Ci and Ci ∩D = ∅.
Theorem 2.14. (Colbourn and Dinitz [35, Section VI.56]) Every d-
disjunct matrix is d-separable. Every d+ 1-separable matrix is d-disjunct.
2.6.5.4 Cover-free families
A family of b subsets B1, . . . Bb of a v-set V is [190]:
• d-cover-free if, for every D ⊆ {1, . . . , b} with |D| = d and i 6= D,
Bi *
⋃
j∈DBj ;
• d-weakly union-free if, for every D1, D2 ⊆ {1, . . . , m} with |D1| = |D2| =
d,
⋃
j∈D1
Bj =
⋃
J∈D2
Bj implies D1 = D2;
• d-(strongly) union-free if, for every D1, D2,⊆ {1, . . . , m} with |D1| ≤ d
and |D2| ≤ d,
⋃
j∈D1
Bj =
⋃
J∈D2
Bj implies D1 = D2.
The notion of a d-cover-free family can be generalised in the following
way [47]: A family of sets B is said to be (w, d)-cover-free if, whenever B1,B2 ⊂
B, |B1| = w, |B2| = d, and B1 ∩ B2 = ∅, it holds that
⋂
B∈B1
B *
⋃
B∈B2
B. A
d-cover-free family is (1, d)-cover-free.
2.6.5.5 Superimposed codes
A d-superimposed code of size b and length v is a collection of b binary vectors
(codewords) of length v, with the property that the superposition sum of a set
D of d or fewer codewords uniquely determines D [49].
Theorem 2.15. (Colbourn and Dinitz [35, Section VI.56]) d-Super-
imposed codes of length v and size b, d-separable v × b matrices, and d-
(strongly)-union-free families of b subsets of a set of size v are all equivalent.
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A superimposed code has constant weight w if every codeword contains
exactly w ones. Equivalently, the corresponding set system is said to be w-
uniform.
2.6.5.6 Frameproof codes
An electronic object (e.g. a file) can be fingerprinted by placing marks in
locations within the object that do not affect its meaning and/or functionality.
Suppose that an object (e.g. a plaintext message) contains L possible lo-
cations for the inclusion of marks. If s values can be assigned to each of the
marks, then we define a fingerprint as the sequence of values assigned to each
of the Lmarks. Thus a fingerprint can be thought of as a word of length L over
an alphabet Σ of size s. The process of fingerprinting an object then involves
assigning a unique codeword from ΣL to each user. By colluding, users can
detect the location of a specific mark if the value assigned to it differs between
their copies; otherwise, a mark location cannot be detected.
The main property that the marks should satisfy is that users cannot
change the state of an undetected mark without rendering the object useless.
Naive redistribution occurs when a user redistributes his copy of the object
without altering it. If an unauthorised copy of the object is found containing
user’s u codeword, then user u is said to be guilty.
However, u could claim that he was framed by a coalition of users that cre-
ated an object containing his codeword. We would therefore like to construct
codes that satisfy the property that no coalition (of at most d users) can col-
lude to frame a user not in the coalition. Such codes are called d-frameproof
codes [16].
Finally, if a coalition colludes to generate an unregistered object, we would
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then like (when this object is found) to be able to determine the users (or a
subset of them) that colluded to create the object. Codes that support such
traceability algorithms are said to be secure-frameproof.
Theorem 2.16. (Stinson et al. [172]) A d-frameproof code is equivalent to
a d-cover-free family.
2.6.5.7 Key distribution patterns
Suppose that n users want to communicate securely in groups of size e. If a
conventional (symmetric or secret key) cryptosystem is being used, where a
trusted authority generates and distributes a secret key to each e-set of users,
then
(
n
e
)
keys would be required, and each user would need to store
(
n−1
e−1
)
keys.
The number of keys to be stored can be considerably reduced by somewhat
weakening the security requirements. Suppose each user is equipped with a
set of secret keys. Given a subset of e members and a disjoint subset of d
non-members, we require that there exists a key owned by each member of the
e-subset and by no member of the d-subset [120].
2.6.5.8 Some applications
GT designs and related combinatorial constructions (see above) have been
used in addressing a range of information security problems, including:
• frameproof codes and traceability schemes [16, 33, 62, 169, 172–175];
• broadcast encryption [42, 64, 107, 174];
• key storage [51, 120]; and
• multi-receiver authentication [151].
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Also, such combinatorial designs have been used in many other fields, in-
cluding multi-user communications, in which contemporaneous messages must
be successfully decoded [197], and DNA testing, where finding complex dis-
eases needs to be performed in an economical way (see §2.6.4).
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed a range of background topics. It has provided an
introduction to cryptographic primitives, mobile agents, mobile agent security,
data privacy, deception, and the theory of combinatorial group testing. This
material provides the basis for the remaining chapters of this thesis.
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3.1 Synopsis
In this chapter we introduce spy agents and provide a spy agent system ar-
chitecture and design methodology. More specifically, we describe how spy
agents can be deployed within a variety of network protocol architectures in
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order to perform high fidelity trust assessments of remote agent hosts. The
spy agent framework consists of: a spy agent architecture that instantiates spy
agents with appropriate content; a spy agent routing framework that dictates
how spy agents are deployed; and an evaluation entity that implements the
necessary security analysis mechanisms.
Spy agents is a novel concept; most related prior art falls within the area
of mobile agent security (§2.4), while the closest (albeit different) concepts are
those of agent spreading (§2.4.3.2.5) and replication (§2.4.3.3.1).
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: the spy agent concept is
discussed in §3.2 and §3.3, and the elements of the spy agent architecture are
given in §3.4.
Most of the material in this chapter has been published in [101].
3.2 Introduction to spy agents
Spy agents, the notion of which was introduced in §1.3, are mobile software
agents that are despatched from one (or more) secure platform(s) and migrate
through a series of potentially insecure remote hosts, before returning to a
secure location. Their purpose is to gather information to help evaluate the
trustworthiness of visited platforms. Unlike malicious agents such as viruses,
spy agents are legitimate mobile agents in the sense that they interact with
visited hosts in the way expected by the hosts. As such they are analogous to
software decoys (see §2.5.3.2) and honeypots (see §2.5.3.1).
The main objective of a spy agent system is to evaluate trust in remote
environments, where the remote hosts should be unaware that their trustwor-
thiness is being assessed. The structure of a spy agent should be no different
to that of a generic mobile agent (e.g. an agent designed to obtain the prices of
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goods from multiple e-commerce sites), as discussed in §2.3.4. A spy agent will
include decoy private data and a pre-coded routing scheme, which hosts are
typically able to access to enable migration. The evaluation of remote plat-
forms is based on the collective outcomes of the spy agents (i.e. the detectable
impacts on the agents after visiting the defined set of platforms). Each indi-
vidual agent outcome could either be negative (if there is no sign of security
violation) or positive (otherwise).
Spy agents can be used to mitigate the threats posed by malicious hosts by
preemptively assessing the trustworthiness of remote hosts. Such assessments
should take place before remote hosts are sent vulnerable mobile agents or
sensitive data.
3.3 Developing the spy agent concept
The main idea behind a spy agent is to provide a means to evaluate trust in
remote environments without the target hosts knowing that they are being
assessed. This is achieved by selecting spy agent routes in such a way that
malicious remote hosts will not suspect that they can be held responsible for
any malicious acts. As a result, spy agents have the potential to determine
the target hosts’ genuine behaviour, i.e. the degree to which a host complies
with its policies or, more specifically, with its responsibility to respect client
security and privacy requirements.
A significant part of a spy agent’s task is the extraction of security-related
information from a remote host without violating the host’s policy or security
protection mechanisms. This means that a spy agent should retrieve the in-
formation it needs from remote hosts in a legitimate way and with the explicit
permission of the host concerned; at the same time this must happen in a way
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that does not reveal the spy agent’s true objectives. The information retrieved
by a spy agent will not necessarily be directly security-related; it simply needs
to be information that can be used in some way to assess host behaviour,
possibly when combined with information retrieved by one or more other such
agents.
We identify the following fundamental principles underlying the use of spy
agents.
• Target hosts should be incapable of deciding whether they are dealing
with a spying scenario or not.
• Spy agents should appear as ‘normal’ (e.g. m-commerce) agents.
• Target hosts should be given a motive to misbehave by using spy agents
as ‘bait’.
• The results obtained from the dissemination of spy agents should be
analysed in a safe environment.
As discussed above, spy agents are unlike viruses and other ‘illegitimate’
agents in that they should not breach host security and privacy. Instead, spy
agents should interact with hosts in ways which hosts expect e.g. by complying
with the host’s ‘sandbox’ functional requirements. This concept is depicted in
Figure 3.1.
We assume that the information acquired by spy agents is willingly pro-
vided by the hosts, directly or indirectly (e.g. by the impact of host actions),
and that the use of such information for evaluation purposes is both legiti-
mate and ‘ethical’. Note that similar assumptions cannot be made about host
behaviour, as mobile code is at the mercy of the host which executes it.
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Figure 3.1: Spy agents versus malware and viruses.
Z In summary, spy agents can be defined as legitimate mobile agents which
are able to interact with remote, potentially hostile, mobile agent hosts
in a manner that is expected by the hosts, and that support trust as-
sessments without host knowledge.
3.4 Spy agent system architecture
A spy agent system involves the dissemination of a number of spy agents to
target network nodes (hosts) in a network, and the retrieval of these agents
following interaction with the nodes. As further discussed in Chapter 5, the
deployment of a large number of spy agents can provide cross-referenced anal-
yses of host trustworthiness.
The spy agent system can be regarded as an extension of a standard mo-
bile agent system. We suppose that the spy agent system is based on standard
mobile agent components, interfaces, and functions, including standard com-
munication, mobility, and security protocols, as discussed in §2.3. Spy agents
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Figure 3.2: Fundamental spy agent system components.
can be implemented within any mobile agent framework, such as a system
conforming to the FIPA specifications (see §2.3.3).
The rest of this section is concerned with architectural extensions to a
mobile agent system that are required by a spy agent system.
3.4.1 Spy agent network components
A fundamental requirement is to provide spy agents with anonymity. A degree
of anonymity can be achieved by associating a set of agents with a number
of different sources or transmitters. That is, spy agents can be forwarded (by
their originator) to a multiplicity of trusted nodes in the network. Each such
node modifies the received agent’s code in order to show itself as the source
of the agent, before forwarding the agent towards the target node. Such an
arrangement is shown in Figure 3.2.
For reasons that are analysed in more detail below, a spy agent should
give away as little information about its purpose as possible. In this context
it is proposed that the modified spy agent should ultimately be destined for a
trusted node different to the node that sends it to the target host. This second
trusted node will be notified by the first trusted node to expect a particular
spy agent, and on receiving the agent will be able to forward it back to its
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Figure 3.3: Spy agent internal structure.
origin.
When all spy agents return to their original source, the system can then
analyse the agent interactions with the target hosts, in order to assess their
level of trustworthiness.
3.4.2 Spy agent content framework
Spy agents will contain pre-coded routing and remote execution mobile code,
and they should implement standard security protocols for access control, non-
repudiation and data encryption (see §2.4).
A schematic of a software spy agent is shown in Figure 3.3. The agent
includes an agent ID, an origin or source ID field, a final destination ID field,
a number of intermediate node IDs, and a payload. The payload includes per-
sonal data such as a name, address, email address, digital certificates, security
logs, financial information, and other information associated with a person or
client. Finally, the agent includes executable code.
The spy agent’s private data, such as ID information, email address, public
key certificates, etc., should preferably correspond to a temporary entity set
up by a mobile platform in a legitimate manner. That is, spy agents should
appear to be originated by a normal client, and their relationship with the real
client should be hidden. This helps to ensure that the target hosts will process
the spy agent in exactly the same way as they would treat any other mobile
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Figure 3.4: Spy agent system—interactions with trusted parties.
(e-commerce) agent. In order to be able to disguise a spy agent in this way,
the spy agent system might need to (securely) interact with on-line services
such as e-mail providers, certification authorities and banks, who would need
to be aware of the purposes of the spy agent and be prepared to support them.
These relationships are shown in Figure 3.4.
For example, the spy agent originator might need to set up a temporary
email address or request a certificate from a certification authority for tem-
porary use in assessing a host. This certificate need not allow an agent to
perform any transaction automatically since it will be temporary. However a
target platform should not be aware of this, and should believe that the agent
will be equipped with all the ‘normal’ functions of an (m-commerce) agent.
That is, it must appear to be just another mobile agent that could, if it wishes,
decide to complete an electronic transaction.
The requirement for a spy agent to have a commonly used structure serves
both the principle of mobile agent interoperability and the spy agent principles
discussed in §3.3.
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3.4.3 Spy agent routing framework
One of the most important aspects of a spy agent system is the routing mech-
anism. This determines the migration logic of each spy agent, and also influ-
ences the content of an agent, as described in the previous paragraph. The
routing logic needs to address the complexity of dealing with multiple agents,
issued from a multiplicity of trusted nodes, and routed over a variety of dif-
ferent paths. This complexity is necessary since the agent routing strategy
plays a critical role in determining how well the system requirements are met.
Amongst other things, the routing scheme should help to disguise the fact that
spy agents originate from a specific client device and are in any way related.
A typical routing scenario is shown in Figure 3.5. A number of spy agents
are created by the originator, anonymised by certain trusted platforms, routed
via a number of target platforms, and are programmed to return to specified
trusted platforms. Note that a trusted platform could, for example, be a
mobile terminal, a home computer, or a public server set up for this purpose,
although the latter option might increase network and end user costs.
In this thesis we assume that all the spy agent functionality in the trusted
network (e.g. secure communication and anonymisation mechanisms) can be
implemented using standard mechanisms. Following from this assumption,
we focus on routing protocols within the (insecure) domain of remote target
platforms. In line with the principles given in §3.3, we next discuss two funda-
mental parameters of an agent routing scheme, namely path correlation and
path length.
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Agent 1 Agent 2 ... Agent n
Originator
Trusted platform Trusted platform Trusted platform
Target platform 1
Target platform 2
Target platform 3
Target platform 4
Outgoing 
agent
Incoming 
agent
Roaming 
agent
Figure 3.5: Spy agent routing architecture.
3.4.3.1 Path correlation
A migration path for an agent is a list of the target platforms that it is in-
structed to visit during its life (starting from a trusted platform). In order to
minimise the probability of detection, peer spy agents visiting the same target
platform should have minimal correlation, including between their migration
paths.
Ideally, the information that target hosts retrieve from different visiting
agents should be uncorrelated. To achieve this, it is necessary to know the
nature of the inter-relationships between those target hosts that are to be
visited by at least one of the spy agents. For example, we could assume that
none of the target hosts will share information about visiting agents. In this
case two spy agents would only need to be uncorrelated if these agents visit a
common target host.
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3.4.3.2 Path length
We assume throughout this thesis that spy agents will migrate through two or
more target hosts rather than just one. We make this assumption for two main
reasons. Firstly, we wish to try to minimise the number of spy agents required
to assess a set of target hosts. Secondly, we assume that receiving an agent
with only one destination will make a malicious host less likely to misbehave,
since it can be held accountable for whatever happens to this agent. This is
an important requirement that influences the design of agent routes.
Further, if a target host receives an agent that is programmed to migrate
to another host not known to the target host (without migrating, for example,
to a known competitor), then it will have a motive to refrain from behaving
badly, either because it believes that this incoming agent might be a spy agent,
or because it cannot identify any direct competition. Thus a malicious target
platform might behave well to avoid possible detection, and the spy agent
evaluation results will therefore be less likely to meet the system objectives.
By contrast, a target host may feel free to misbehave if an incoming agent is
programmed to migrate to a rival service provider. We also note that a trusted
platform may not be able to be used in more than one host assessment process,
lest a target host suspects that further incoming agents are spy agents, e.g. by
making use of records of past events and/or statistical analyses.
3.4.4 Trust evaluation
The assessment of the trustworthiness of a target platform could yield esti-
mates for a variety of security issues. Possible issues include the probability of
the host reading or altering private data that should not be accessed, or the
likelihood that it will block or divert migration of the agent.
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These assessments could be made in a variety of ways, for example by
comparing the data retrieved by a variety of agents using different routes.
Also the returned agents could be examined to see if they have been altered
in any way other than in terms of their retrieved data, such as blocking,
delaying or changing a migration route. Alternatively, an agent could contain
a temporary (unique) email address which is monitored to see whether spam
emails are sent to this address in the future. If unsolicited emails are received
at this address, then it can be deduced that one of the hosts visited by the
agent containing this address may have violated the agent security policy by
using private data in an unauthorised way. [The above ideas are developed
further in Chapter 10.]
As discussed in the previous section, the information gathered from mul-
tiple agents visiting multiple hosts can be cross-referenced to make host as-
sessments. The idea here is that if misbehaviour is detected involving one or
more agents and the route design is selected with care, then the host plat-
form(s) responsible can be identified with high probability. Alternatively, if
an unmodified agent is returned as expected and there are no associated signs
of mishandling, then it can be assumed with high probability that all visited
target platforms have behaved properly.
The analysis of agent deployment can be either deterministic or probabilis-
tic, and depends on the assumed spy agent scenario and the spy agent route
design. Some fundamental spying scenarios are analysed in §5.3.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has introduced the concept of spy agents, and has described the
possible benefits of their use. We have also described a generic agent structure
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and discussed route design issues for spy agents.
A key issue for the proposed framework is the manner in which spy agents
are coordinated to collect network information, from which conclusions about
the trustworthiness of network entities can be drawn. It is proposed to use
multiple spy agents coordinated by a number of trusted platforms, which will
hide the identity and association of the agents.
In the future, spy agent networks can be used to offer security services to
trusted networks, the price of which will depend on the required service cred-
ibility. Further, evaluation assessments of high quality (credibility) could be
used by other applications in order to adapt their security to existing circum-
stances, and to perform further security assessments such as remote surveil-
lance and risk analysis. Ultimately, it should be possible not only to evaluate
a target host, but also to determine the benefit of using a specific quantity of
resources within a specific spying scenario.
The remainder of this thesis expands on the introduced spy agent paradigm
as follows. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed description of the fundamental
spy agent system requirements. In Chapter 5 we introduce metrics which are
designed to try to quantify the effectiveness of a specific spy agent route design.
Techniques for designing efficient route designs for specific spy agent scenarios
are given in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 9 considers the credibility of spy
agent results. Spy agent applications are discussed in Chapter 10, and overall
conclusions are drawn in Chapter 11.
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4.1 Synopsis
This chapter defines the fundamental spy agent security requirements, and
gives our assumptions regarding the deployment scenario. Part of the work
described in this chapter has been published in [100].
The spy agent security requirements are derived from the principles dis-
cussed in Chapter 3; these provide the basis upon which the spy agent routing
problem is formulated in Chapter 6. First, the assumptions regarding ma-
licious host behaviour are given in §4.2. The spying requirements are then
classified into three groups: spy agent dissemblance requirements (see §4.3);
host evaluation requirements (see §4.4); and spy agent routing requirements
(see §4.5). Next, §4.6 discusses the security requirements for spy agent system
operations that take place in trusted environments. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of routing implementation issues and assumptions (§4.7).
4.2 Malicious host behaviour
Spy agents are intended to be used to determine whether or not a target host
is malicious by observing the outcome of the host’s behaviour towards visiting
spy agents.
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One key type of misbehaviour considered in this thesis is the malicious use
of agent data (by hosts). This is defined as using agent information in an
unintended manner, including the unauthorised transfer of information. Such
misuse could include the unlawful use of, or access to, information, which
might result in data protection, copyright, or privacy infringement. We note
that in some cases it may be difficult to distinguish between deliberate (malign)
behaviour and accidental misuse of data.
For our purposes, unauthorised handling of personal data will be regarded
as malicious regardless of the intention of the host, on the basis that it is the
duty of the authority holding sensitive information or code to protect it against
unauthorised access or use (on behalf of the person or agent that the data or
code relates to). This approach is consistent with laws which state that the
data holder must take ‘reasonable precautions’ to protect sensitive data (see
§2.5.1.2). For example, sensitive data stored on a server should be encrypted,
and sufficiently strong authenticated access control mechanisms should be in
place to ensure that stored data is not accessed by malicious parties.
In this thesis we thus assume, for simplicity, that hosts are responsible
for any intended or unintended infringement of their data privacy policy and,
hence, hosts allowing such infringements are either malicious or untrustworthy.
For convenience, these terms are used interchangeably.
4.3 Spy agent dissemblance requirements
The spy agent dissemblance requirements analysed in the following subsections
cover both the appearance and behaviour of a spy agent. These requirements
are derived from the principles outlined in §3.3.
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4.3.1 Subterfuge requirements
In order to be effective, spy agents need to be read and executed by remote
hosts in the same way as any other agent. Spy agents should therefore provide
remote hosts with no evidence of their purpose (see also §2.5.3).
One important subterfuge property is anonymity. Spy agents need to main-
tain their anonymity by hiding contextual information that could compromise
their identity. This can be achieved using techniques such as the inclusion of
fabricated context information.
Spy agents should operate in a non-malicious manner, as discussed in §3.3.
Hence, a spy agent should use subterfuge only to protect its true identity and
not to deceive a host into providing it with information that the host would
not wish to reveal.
4.3.2 Statutory requirements
A spy agent must comply with the privacy and security requirements of a
visited host, and conduct itself in accordance with stated policies. Software
spy agents, unlike spyware, should not attempt to compromise the security of
remote hosts, regardless of whether or not these remote hosts are malicious.
A spy agent’s task is the assessment of host behaviour without violating the
host’s policy or security protection mechanisms.
As part of these requirements, target hosts, including malicious hosts, may
have the right to deny access to mobile agents if these agents do not conform to
the host’s public policy and requirements. For example, target hosts may block
agents that exceed their computational limits in order to protect themselves
against DoS attacks. Legitimate spy agents should not exceed such agreed
limits.
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A spy agent should only retrieve information from remote hosts in the
manner offered by the hosts, while the hosts should not be given any evidence
of the spy agent’s true objectives.
The statutory spy agent requirements to some extent reinforce the sub-
terfuge requirements. Any attempt to breach a host’s security might cause
the host to suspect that the mobile agent is not a ‘normal’ agent. In such a
case the malicious remote host may adapt its behaviour to avoid detection, or
simply to avoid an increased risk.
4.3.3 Protection requirements
Spy agents should comply with standard mobile code security requirements,
including the incorporation of any standard mobile agent protection controls
(see §2.4).
Protection requirements (indirectly) stem from the subterfuge require-
ments discussed in §4.3.1. If spy agents do not comply with standard mobile
code security requirements, then it may be possible to distinguish them from
other mobile agents. Also note that an abused agent may only be able to hold
a malicious host accountable for its misbehaviour if the agent incorporates all
reasonable protection precautions.
However, spy agents may not necessarily comply with all standard mobile
code requirements in interactions with trusted networks and authorities; they
only need to do so when interacting with target hosts. For example, spy agents
might carry certified credentials bound to a fabricated ID.
4.3.4 Incentivisation requirements
Reasonable motivation should be given to malicious hosts to exhibit unautho-
rised behaviour. If a host is likely to violate the security of a normal mobile
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agent, then it should be given an incentive to violate the security of a spy
agent. Spy agents can use two techniques to achieve this: subterfuge (see
§4.3.1) and incentivisation.
The nature of the required incentives will be application-dependent. For
example, consider the following scenarios.
1. A malicious host with a good reputation might wish to frame an innocent
rival host (especially if the innocent host already has a bad reputation).
2. A malicious host might wish to influence the result of a shopping agent so
that the agent perceives that host more favourably than would otherwise
be the case.
3. A malicious host might have a secondary unintended use for data con-
tained within an agent.
4. A malicious host might wish to reduce its processing burden.
In the above examples, the incentive for misbehaviour can be increased in
1) by sending a spy agent to a large number of target hosts both reputable
and non reputable; 2) by including within a spy agent high value inquiries
which are potentially lucrative for the host; 3) by including within a spy agent
information that could be useful to third parties (although the inclusion of
large quantities of spurious data might arouse host suspicions); and 4) by
sending processor-intensive agent code (which, however, should still induce a
‘reasonable’ computational expense, as discussed in §4.3.2).
Subterfuge requirements reinforce the incentivisation requirements. By
encouraging hosts to believe that they can ‘safely’ misbehave, they are in
some sense given an incentive to misbehave.
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4.3.5 Summary of dissemblance requirements
The fundamental dissemblance requirement is that target hosts should be un-
able to exhibit special behaviour in order to make a false positive impression.
Summarising the above analysis, we can expand the spying principles discussed
in §3.3 to obtain the following list of spy agent requirements.
• Target hosts should be incapable of deciding whether or not they are
dealing with spy agents.
• Potentially malicious target hosts should be given a motive to misbehave
by using spy agents as ‘bait’.
• Spy agents should appear to be ‘normal’ (e.g. m-commerce) mobile agents,
and use full standard mobile code protection.
• Spy agents should use pseudonymous identities and credentials created
in a legitimate manner.
• Spy agents should comply with all security requirements and behave as
expected by the hosts.
• Information or feedback should be gathered and processed by the spy
agent originator in a legitimate manner.
• Feedback should always be analysed in a safe environment.
These fundamental spy agent security requirements are analogous to those
for honeypot systems, which “are nothing more than a security resource whose
value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised” (see §2.5.3.1), and those
for decoy systems which use the notion of deception as the “deliberate mis-
representation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage” (see §2.5.3.2).
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Spy agents differ in that attacks on mobile code take place in an adversary’s
environment rather than a safe one.
4.4 Spy agent evaluation requirements
The dissemblance security requirements discussed in §4.3 form one set of inputs
to the design of a spy agent system. In this and the following section (§4.5) we
consider other design constraints, namely evaluation and routing requirements.
4.4.1 Attack detection requirements
A malicious host can only be identified if the occurrence of an attack is de-
tected. Hence spy agents are only useful in scenarios where a malicious act
yields a detectable impact.
A taxonomy of possible attacks on mobile agents is given by Borselius [18]
(see also §2.4.2.1). The impact of an attack depends on the scenario. For
example, unauthorised manipulation of agent code [36] might be detectable,
or the delayed return of an agent could imply deliberate retention of an agent
for malicious processing [56]. However, it is not always possible to detect
an attack. As discussed above, spy agents are only useful in scenarios where
attacks result in detectable impacts, and the origin of such attacks (i.e. one or
more malicious host(s)) can then be inferred by examining the results of all
the spy agents.
Note that it is not necessary for all the agents to arrive back in a safe
environment in order to complete the analysis. In an appropriate scenario, a
lost agent could be considered as a positive outcome. Further, for the pur-
poses of attack detection, spy agents could be combined with state appraisal
or detection object techniques, as discussed in §2.4.4.2.3. Examples of such
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combinations are further discussed in Chapter 10.
4.4.2 Attack identification requirements
In a spy agent system, the outcomes of spy agent tests are combined to deduce
which hosts are (likely to be) misbehaving. The information obtained from
an attack on a single spy agent is, in general, insufficient to assess visited
hosts. Indeed, if an attack on a single agent could be linked with certainty
to a particular host then that host would have no motive to misbehave, as
discussed in §4.3.4. Hence, in order to meet both the dissemblance and attack
identification requirements, more than one spy agent will be needed. The
combined test outcomes should allow the origin of detected attacks to be
identified.
4.4.3 Host evaluation fairness requirements
Regardless of whether or not certain hosts are believed to be malicious (e.g. by
reputation or previous spy agent evaluations), we suppose that a new spy agent
evaluation analysis will be based on the assumption that all target hosts are
equally likely to be malicious. This ‘fairness’ requirement does not preclude
further uses of evaluation results by other schemes, such as reputation systems.
4.4.4 Security evaluation optimisation requirements
Spy agents should be designed to yield evaluation results that are as correct as
possible, given the resources used. An error in host trustworthiness evaluation
could arise in various ways, including:
• an assessment error, e.g. occurring from the uncertainties of a proba-
bilistic evaluation; and
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• a model error, arising when a malicious host behaves in an uncharacter-
istic way, e.g. to avoid detection.
To alleviate the above problems, a spy agent system should be designed to
minimise the probability of a) obtaining erroneous outcomes and b) making
uncertain assessments, and to maximise tolerance to such errors. For exam-
ple, if malicious target hosts misbehave inconsistently, spy agents should be
designed to either detect this inconsistency (error detection) or, if possible,
still make correct evaluations (error correction).
4.5 Spy agent routing requirements
As the outcomes of more than one agent need to be combined to identify the
origins of attacks (as discussed in §4.4.2), spy agent route selection is a critical
issue (see §3.4.2).
Z For convenience, the terms ‘routing’ and ‘migration’ are used interchange-
ably. Also the term spy agent routing is used to refer to the set of
migration paths assigned to the spy agents used in a single instance of
the system.
Spy agents are assumed to have a predetermined migration logic, which
will be available to all visited target hosts. A spy agent is expected to be
executed on visited hosts as specified by its originator, unless one of these
hosts maliciously changes the agent’s code or migration logic. That is, a spy
agent should only be accessed by the hosts it is expected to visit, unless one
of the specified hosts maliciously modifies it. This agent routing security
requirement can be guaranteed through the use of standard cryptographic
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protocols that hosts should be required to use. Violation of this protocol is
likely to be detectable (see, for example §2.4.3.3.6 and §2.4.3.3.5).
Additional routing requirements can be divided into the following two cat-
egories.
• Single-agent routing requirements: cover the security aspects of agent
communication and migration.
• Multi-agent routing requirements: cover the migration logic for each
agent in a single instance of the spy agent system.
4.5.1 Single-agent routing requirements
As discussed above, we assume that if a spy agent is misused then one of
the hosts on its predetermined migration path must be responsible. Again as
stated above, this assumption can be satisfied by requiring all hosts to use
secure communications protocols to transfer agents.
In line with the spy agent protection requirements (§4.3.3), the migration
logic of each spy agent (as provided by the originator) should be fixed. Given
this, and as above, if the migration path is in any way modified then it is
assumed that at least one visited host has misbehaved.
4.5.2 Multi-agent routing requirements
The collection of spy agents used in a single instance of the system will possess
a set of routes designed to efficiently test the trustworthiness of a predefined
group of target hosts. Hence, in theory at least, target hosts could pool infor-
mation about visited agents to try to detect such a design and hence detect the
use of spy agents. Thus sets of spy agent routes should be designed to minimise
108
4.6. Spy agent trust services
the risk of a successful analysis of this type (as stated in §4.3.5). In particu-
lar, spy agent route sets should be designed so that peer spy agents visiting
a target host have minimal common routing information (as also discussed in
§3.4.3).
Algorithms for generating spy agent route designs form the core of the
research described in this thesis.
4.6 Spy agent trust services
Spy agents should be trustworthy. That is, if spy agents do not comply with
the statutory requirements (given in §4.3.2), then they should be classified as
malicious agents. To guarantee spy agent trustworthiness, the following trust
services should be provided.
4.6.1 Services in trusted networks
As discussed in §3.4.2, the active support of a number of trusted third parties
may be required in order to set up a spy agent scenario. For example, if the spy
agents require certified decoy credentials or bank accounts, then appropriate
organisations will need to participate.
Although spy agents are anonymous (or pseudonymous), as discussed in
§3.4.2, they should still be accountable for their actions. For example, violated
target platforms should be able (with the help of trust services) to identify the
source of malicious spy agents. In general, the following trust services should
be provided.
• Spy agent accountability: spy agent originators, or any parties that ob-
tain decoy IDs and certificates, need authenticate themselves to the au-
thorities that provide them with these credentials. Spy agent originators
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should not be able to repudiate their actions.
• Integrity of spy agent results: spy agents should not be able to modify
spying outcomes.
• Confidentiality of spy agent results: spy agent outcomes and evaluation
results should only be accessible to authorised (trusted) parties.
4.6.2 Evaluation services
Spy agents constitute a passive preemptive trust assessment mechanism that
detects but does not thwart security attacks. However, the very existence of
such evaluation mechanisms can in the long run contribute towards preventing
malicious acts from taking place.
This prevention mechanism (like all schemes involving detection after the
event) will still allow target hosts to misbehave. However, our assumption
is that hosts are expected to eventually develop good behaviour regardless of
whether or not they are actually assessed.
Evaluation results can be used for post-data processing and in the provision
of other security services, such as risk management and digital insurance ser-
vices. However, care should be taken to avoid biased evaluations (see §4.4.3).
4.7 Other assumptions
4.7.1 Agent anonymity and host identification
As discussed in §3.4.1, a spy agent needs to be anonymised before it is despat-
ched to a target platform. How anonymity is provided depends on how the
spy agent is identified by a target platform. For example, if the agent ID is
supported by a public key certificate, the associated certificate chain can be
used to help authenticate the agent’s identity.
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The means that can be used to anonymise an agent will depend on the
nature of its ID. For example, if the ID is a URL (or URI) then the orig-
inator could use NAT [167], visualisation [196], dynamic DNS [178], and/or
anonymity networks such as onion routing (see, for example, [142]) to provide
anonymity. The trusted platforms (with individual URLs) through which the
originator despatches its spy agents may not necessarily be mapped to indi-
vidual physical hosts; in this case a platform ID refers to a logical rather than
a topological entity. Multiple hardware devices could share the same logical
identity within a subnet, and a single hardware platform could have multiple
logical identities belonging to different subnets. A logical platform could phys-
ically exist anywhere within a network, and a network could consist of many
logical or physical platforms.
As a result, in general, trusted platforms and spy agents will not be able
to verify the real physical identity of a platform, as this may be encapsulated
within a complex network. Hence, spy agent evaluation results will apply to
virtual hosts; in such a case the detection of a physical malicious entity may
require further network identification procedures, such as ISP enquiries. The
scope of such further procedures is outside the scope of this thesis.
It should be noted that, in order to avoid target hosts sharing informa-
tion, the identifiers of two logical target hosts should preferably correspond
to different physical hosts. If information is shared between hosts, then the
difficulty of correctly evaluating these hosts is increased. [The problem of host
collusion is discussed further in Chapter 7, where a possible solution is given.]
Since it is common practice to have multiple physical hosts and multiple local
identities for redundancy and resilience to single point failure, a spy agent
originator should ideally be aware of this network configuration information.
111
4.7. Other assumptions
Target 
platform 1Agent (2)
Agent (3)
Agent (1)
Agent (5)
Trusted 
network
Agent (4)
Target 
platform 2
Target 
platform 3
Target 
platform 4
Figure 4.1: Spy agent virtual route.
In such a case such linked identifiers can be treated as a single logical host. Fi-
nally, spy agent models should take into account the possibility of other errors
in assumptions made about the network and the target hosts (see §4.4.4).
Z Henceforth, terms such as nodes, platforms, and hosts (either target or
trusted) will be used to refer to (logical) entities that have distinct public
IDs, and which can be authenticated using public key certificates or other
cryptographic credentials.
4.7.2 Inter-networking assumptions
A spy agent route (as shown in Figure 3.5) may require the agent to be routed
through a complex network before reaching the target platforms. Such a sce-
nario is depicted in Figure 4.1. Provided that secure end-to-end agent com-
munication protocols are used, as discussed in §4.5.1, it seems reasonable to
assume that intermediate routing entities do not affect agent migration.
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4.8 Conclusions
This chapter has set out the spy agent system requirements and assumptions
regarding the usage scenarios. These requirements are used in the next chapter
to analyse certain fundamental spy agent protocol architectures, and are used
in Chapter 6 to motivate the design of a spy agent routing model.
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5.1 Synopsis
This chapter analyses certain fundamental spy agent protocol architectures,
using the spy agent framework given in Chapter 3 and the spy agent system
requirements given in Chapter 4. Aspects of the work described in this chapter
have been published in [101].
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines imple-
mentation principles; §5.3 analyses a number of spy agent protocol architecture
implementation scenarios; and §5.4 describes certain architectural parameters
and metrics that can be used to quantify the effectiveness of a specific routing
protocol.
5.2 Scenario implementation issues
As discussed in §4.3.4, a spy agent should be designed to encourage malicious
hosts to misbehave, in order to obtain the most accurate assessment of their
genuine behaviour. Furthermore, the very existence of spy agents seems likely
to mitigate the existence of malicious service providers, since they will be un-
able to distinguish between spy agents and normal e-commerce agents. Hence
it will not be possible for them to know if they can breach security policies
without being detected.
The design requirement that target hosts should be prevented from deter-
mining whether or not they are dealing with a spy agent, may run counter
to the requirement to make precise trustworthiness assessments of the target
platforms. A deterministic assessment could be made by sending a number
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of spy agents to just one target host; however, such a strategy is likely to
raise suspicion in the target host, potentially resulting in atypical behaviour.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that when processing spy
agents that migrate via a large number of competitor hosts, malicious hosts
are more likely to exhibit characteristic behaviour. However, in the latter case,
assessments of individual hosts become significantly more difficult to achieve.
Clearly an optimal protocol architecture should try to balance the various
conflicting requirements to obtain the best strategy. The optimal strategy will
almost certainly vary depending on a range of factors, including: how many
trusted devices a mobile terminal has, what the computational costs are, what
the objective of the analysis is (e.g. to maintain high quality security profiles or
to perform an ephemeral test), when the results are needed (e.g. immediately
or within a fixed time period), the required accuracy of the results, and how
much the spy agent originator is willing to pay for the results.
5.3 Fundamental spy agent protocol architec-
tures
5.3.1 Single-agent-single-target scenario
In this scenario (shown in Figure 5.1) a single agent migrates to a single
target host before returning to a trusted host. The single-agent-single-target
host scenario is not interesting for our purposes, since it will be clear to the
target host that it can be held accountable for any detectable malicious act
involving the agent or its data.
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Figure 5.1: Testing a target platform with the aid of a trusted platform.
Figure 5.2: Testing two target hosts with a single agent.
5.3.2 Single-agent-two-target scenario
If a single spy agent migrates to two (or more) target hosts (as shown in
Figure 5.2), a malicious host might reasonably decide that it can risk misusing
the agent since it will only be jointly accountable for any misbehaviour with the
other host(s); indeed, it may even be able to ‘frame’ another host. However,
this scenario does not meet the attack identification requirements (§4.4.2),
since the agent originator will be not be able to uniquely identify a misbehaving
host.
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5.3.3 Unbalanced routing scenarios
An ‘unbalanced routing scenario’ is one in which spy agents are designed to
evaluate (deterministically or stochastically) only a subset of the target hosts.
This might result in one host being visited by more spy agents than another;
in such a case the former host might be deemed to be unfairly targeted by spy
agents.
Unbalanced routing scenarios do not meet the host evaluation fairness re-
quirements, as discussed in §4.4.3.
5.3.4 Two-agent-two-target scenario
Results regarding multiple hosts can be obtained by deploying multiple agents.
If two agents each visit two hosts, a minimum of two and a maximum of four
targets can be tested, as discussed below.
1. The two agents could visit the same two platforms. If the order of visit
is of no significance (as discussed in §5.4.4) or if the agents visit the
hosts in the same order, then this scenario is equivalent to two identical
instances of the single-agent-two-target scenario, as discussed in §5.3.2.
2. The two agents could visit four platforms. This scenario is equivalent
to two independent instances of the single-agent-two-host scenario, as
discussed in §5.3.2.
3. The two agents could visit three platforms. One platform is visited
by two agents, whereas the other two platforms are only visited by one
agent. This yields an unbalanced routing scenario, as discussed in §5.3.3.
It is interesting to further analyse case 1), if we assume that the two agents
visit the same two platforms in reverse order. This is shown in Figure 5.3. The
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Figure 5.3: Testing two target platforms with two agents.
following subcases can be distinguished.
a. Suppose that the outcome of the spy agent SP1 is positive and the out-
come of SP2 is negative. If the two target hosts do not behave consis-
tently, then the two target platforms have an equal probability of being
malicious. If, however, the two hosts behave consistently, it follows that
the order of visit influences at least one host’s behaviour (assuming there
is no other significant difference between SP1 and SP2). The degree to
which the order of visit influences the behavioural model depends i) on
each target host’s motivation to misbehave, and ii) on each malicious
host’s level of sophistication. If, for example, we assume that the second
visited target platform has a motive to modify the previously visited
host’s input, and the first visited platform does not attempt to ‘frame’
the second visited platform, then we can infer that the second visited
platform is more likely to misbehave. Hence, in this case target platform
2 is more likely to be malicious. More general versions of this example
have been studied in the context of agent replication (see §2.4.3.3.1).
b. Suppose that both agents yield positive outcomes. This might mean
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that both platforms have misbehaved. However, even if both hosts are
potentially malicious, it might not be the case that both hosts have
actually misbehaved if one target platform is sophisticated enough to
modify its behaviour to disrupt the evaluation analysis.
c. Suppose that there are no signs of an attack in both agent outcomes.
This suggests that both target hosts are well-behaved. However, this
may not be the case if, for example, a potentially malicious target does
not misuse an agent if the agent is due to visit just one other host, and
this host has a good reputation.
5.3.5 Three-agent scenarios
While the single-agent-two-target scenario (see §5.3.2) is the simplest scenario
that could in principle satisfy the spy agent incentivisation requirements (see
§4.3.4) and the routing requirements (see §4.5), this scenario still does not
satisfy the identification requirements (see §4.4.2). This is still the case if an
additional spy agent is introduced (see §5.3.4). However, the situation changes
with the introduction of a third target platform; this defines what we refer to
as the three-agent-three-target scenario. This is the simplest spy agent routing
scenario which can satisfy both the security and identification requirements
for spy agents.
The three-agent-three-target scenario is shown in Figure 5.4. The origina-
tor creates and disseminates three spy agents via trusted platforms within the
trusted network. Each agent migrates to two target platforms before returning
to a host within the trusted network.
We denote the three target platforms by s1, s2 and s3. We suppose that the
first spy agent, SP1 say, migrates to the first and the third target platforms,
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Figure 5.4: Three-agent-three-target scenario.
s1 and s3, before returning to the trusted network; SP2 migrates to s2 and
s1; and SP3 migrates to s3 and s2.
Target platform s1 is visited by SP1 and SP2, and is thus able to retrieve
the following pair of migration paths: (s1, s3), (s2, s1). Assuming that target
hosts do not collude, s1 cannot observe any correlation between the routing
behaviour of SP1 and SP2 since it is the only common element in the two
routes. As a result of the symmetry of this route design, similar assertions can
be made for s2 and s3.
Assuming that the target platforms demonstrate characteristic behaviour
and do not modify their behaviour to avoid detection (e.g. as might be the case
if they suspect the purpose of one or more of the spy agents), then this routing
scenario enables us to make the following deductions. Suppose that SP1 and
SP2 yield a positive result, but SP3 does not. Then, since SP1 visited s1
and s3 and SP2 visited s2 and s1, it can be deduced that s1 is more likely
to have misbehaved. In a scenario involving greater numbers of agents and
hosts, it is envisaged that more detailed and fine-grained conclusions can be
drawn by examining all the spy agents after they have completed migration,
as long as it is possible to predict to what degree malicious target platforms
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Figure 5.5: Three-agent-three-target scenario with guidance.
might modify their behaviour to avoid detection.
5.3.6 Guidance spy agent scenarios
The three-agent-three-target scenario (as discussed in §5.3.5) can be extended
by introducing the notion of ‘guidance spy agents’. In this scenario the orig-
inator uses three trusted platforms to support a distributed routing strategy,
as well as to maintain anonymity. The originator instantiates six spy agents,
separated into two matching groups of three (as shown in Figure 5.5):
• The first three spy agents start their migration from a single trusted
platform and then each migrate to two target platforms in turn. The
spy agents do not contain any logic dictating where they should migrate
after visiting the second target platform.
• The three spy agents in the second group, called guidance spy agents,
are in one-to-one correspondence with the spies in the first group, and
contain migration information for the corresponding agents of the first
group. They each visit the platform where their corresponding spy agent
is waiting to be instructed where to go next. This technique enables the
anonymity of the spy agents to be further enhanced.
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This scenario is built on the assumption that two agents executing in a
remote host can inter-communicate. It is also assumed that such communica-
tions are only allowed between two mobile agents that have been instructed
in advance to do so. Hence, agent inter-communication will only be allowed
between a spy agent and its respective guidance spy agent. Mobile agents
could employ cryptographic techniques to thwart any breach of this require-
ment. For example standard cryptographic protocols can be used for mutual
authentication and integrity (see for example, Boyd and Mathuria [20]).
Let s1, s2, s3 and t1, t2, t3 denote the target platforms and trusted plat-
forms, respectively. The first spy agent, SP1, (see Figure 5.5) leaves the first
trusted platform, t1, visits the first target platform, s1, migrates to s3, and
waits for the arrival of the first guidance spy agent, SP1′, which is sent from
t2. Analogously, SP2 starts from t2 and migrates to s2, then s1, and waits
for further instructions from SP2′, which is sent from t3. In a similar way,
SP3 migrates via s3 to s2 and waits for guidance from SP3
′. Finally, SP1,
SP2 and SP3 are instructed by their guidance agents to return to t2, t3 and
t1 respectively.
Target platform s1 is visited by three agents: SP1, SP2 and SP2
′. Hence,
s1 is able to retrieve the following information regarding the migration paths
for SP1, SP2 and SP2′.
• SP1 : (t1, s1, s3)
• SP2 : (t2, s2, s1, t3)
• SP2′ : (t3, s1, t3)
As in the three-agent-three-target scenario, s1 cannot observe any corre-
lation between the routing behaviour of SP1 and SP2, since s1 is the only
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common element in the two routes. It can observe that the routes of SP2
and SP2′ share t3, but this does not look suspicious since SP2 is expecting
guidance from SP2′. A similar argument applies to s2 and s3. Hence this
routing design satisfies the basic spying requirements.
An obvious potential weakness of this routing design is the fact that the
target platforms could learn about the spying scenario if they exchange infor-
mation. However, this weakness can be avoided by employing more trusted
platforms and designing the routes for each agent in such a way that the risk
of platform collusion revealing spy agent behaviour is minimised.
5.3.7 Multiple target agent scenarios
As the number of spy agents and target hosts increases, the analysis of the
results becomes increasingly difficult. This gives rise to the need for a method-
ology for designing sets of agent routes and for corresponding evaluation algo-
rithms. A formal approach to this problem is presented in §6.3, and solutions
are given in the chapters that follow.
We end this section by discussing a scenario in which two agents each visit
three target hosts. In such a case a minimum of three and a maximum of six
targets can be tested, as follows.
• The two three-target agents could visit the same three platforms. If the
two agents visit the three hosts in a different order (i.e. there is no agent
mirroring) and the order of migration has an effect on the outcome, then
this is an unbalanced routing scenario, as agents do not visit hosts in all
possible orders.
• The case where two agents visit six platforms is equivalent to two un-
correlated three-target agent scenarios.
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• All remaining cases give rise to unbalanced routing scenarios.
5.4 Spy agent system parameters
The degree to which the spy agent system requirements discussed in Chap-
ter 4 are met depends on a range of variables. In this section we analyse the
parameters that determine critical properties of spy agent systems.
5.4.1 Number of spy agents
If used rationally, the larger the number of spy agents, the greater the amount
of evidence about host behaviour is generated. On the other hand, a large
number of spy agents with common elements visiting common target hosts
may trigger suspicion amongst these hosts, and may therefore compromise the
accuracy or credibility of the observed spy agent outcomes (see §3.4.3.1).
Thus selecting the number of spy agents is a trade off between maximising
the generation of information and minimising possible host suspicion. Ideally,
sufficiently many agents should be deployed to recover the desired evaluation
information whilst minimising the exposure of the hosts to spy agent informa-
tion.
5.4.2 Number of trusted platforms
As discussed above, increasing the number of trusted platforms used by a
spy agent system helps to increase spy agent anonymity. However, there is
a potential cost associated with every additional trusted platform used, and
thus it is desirable if trusted networks can be re-used by spy agents, in a way
that minimises their exposure to target hosts. In practice, however, it may be
easier to assign one trusted network to every spy agent.
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5.4.3 Number of target platforms
Increasing the number of hosts a spy agent visits may provide a greater in-
centive for a malicious host to misbehave, as discussed in §3.4.3.2. However,
this might also make the evaluation analysis harder. Thus a long migration
path is likely to improve the accuracy of evaluation at the cost of increasing
the level of uncertainty about individual host behaviour. Ideally we need to
achieve a route design which has adequately long migration paths and which
can at the same time yield useful evaluation results.
5.4.4 Order of target platforms
The order in which spy agents visit target platforms may or may not be signifi-
cant, depending on the nature of the evaluation. Examples in which the order
might influence a spy agent assessment were discussed in §5.3.4 and §5.3.7.
One application where the order of host visits may be significant is e-ticketing
(see §2.4.3.3.1.2).
5.4.5 Cost and overheads
Cost is an essential factor in any kind of security evaluation. The cost of
implementing a security mechanism should not be greater than the cost of the
potential damage prevented by this mechanism. The cost of deployment of
a spy agent scenario depends on the amount of resources used. Apart from
the network and computational resources, spy agents require an infrastructure
offering a number of trust services (see §4.5). The cost of such an infrastructure
could be significant, given that the agent credentials and IDs should only be
used once.
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5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has introduced a number of fundamental spy agent routing ar-
chitectures for the spy agent framework introduced in the previous chapter,
and has analysed issues arising in their use. This analysis forms the basis for
the adversarial modelling, and the spy agent routing problem formulation and
evaluation given in the next chapter.
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6.1 Synopsis
This chapter introduces a methodology for constructing route designs for spy
agents. The need for this methodology was discussed in §5.3.7.
In the design problem, a network of remote agent platforms are tested by
roaming spy agents in order to identify those that are malicious, where the
results are derived from observations of the outcome of each agent. As we
discuss below, given a set of spy agent requirements (see Chapter 4), the task
of choosing the sets of platforms which each spy agent visits can be abstracted
as a GT problem (see §2.6). In particular, the applicability of NGT (see §2.6.3)
is considered in detail, and a simple combinatorial construction for a set of
agent routes is presented which combines known results from the prior art.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the
routing problem, §6.3 gives a mathematical formulation, and §6.4 presents a
simple scalable NGT construction for sets of spy agent routes.
Most of the work described in this chapter has been published in [100].
6.2 Introduction to the routing problem
As discussed in §1.3, the main problem with remote security assessments (us-
ing roaming agents) is that a corrupted remote host could detect incoming
security agents and selectively behave well in order to escape detection. The
same host could behave inappropriately when it has the opportunity to cheat
without being detected. Careful design of route sets for spy agents can help to
address this issue, and we consider here the use of combinatorial GT methods
(introduced in §2.6) to develop good route sets.
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That is, the main focus of this chapter is the choice of sets of routes for
spy agents which efficiently identify which remote hosts misbehave. For the
purposes of the methodology presented in this chapter, a route is defined as
an (unordered) set of hosts visited by an agent. This contrasts with the more
usual definition of route, in which the order of destinations is of significance
(see §5.4.4).
As discussed in previous chapters (and, in particular, in §5.3.1), a simple
solution to this routing problem would be to send each spy agent to a single
target host. The evaluation process for such a design is trivial, since a positive
result for a spy agent implies a misbehaving host. However, improved solutions
are sought for the following reasons:
• Security : Larger test groups yield more credible results. As discussed
in §3.4.3.2, the longer the migrating route, the less likely it is that a
malign host will suspect a spying scenario, and the greater the chance
that it can cheat without being detected. As a result, it is more likely
to misbehave, revealing its true character.
• Economy : Less agents and less time are needed if hosts are tested in
groups instead of one by one. This is of particular importance when
routinely performing large scale tests.
6.3 Problem formulation
6.3.1 Assumptions and objectives
We make the following assumptions when designing sets of agent routes.
• The order in which a spy agent visits a subset of target platforms is of
no significance. Thus, the subset of target hosts to be visited defines a
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route.
• A target platform is aware of the routes of all the spy agents that visit
it.
• Potentially malicious target hosts do not share any information about
visiting agents, and will not collaborate to attempt to avoid detection.
• A compromised spy agent will always provide information, or perform an
act, which will enable the sender of the agent to detect that it has visited
a malicious platform. That is, a spy agent visiting a malicious host will
always yield a positive outcome. (This is a rather strong assumption,
which we relax in Chapter 7.)
These assumptions enable us to consider spy agent routes as unordered
sets of hosts that spy agents visit, where each set returns ‘positive’ when it
contains at least one malicious host, and ‘negative’ otherwise. Clearly the
problem of efficiently identifying the malicious (defective) hosts is identical to
the classic GT problem (see §2.6.1).
Optimal sets of spy agent routes can be designed using ‘efficiency criteria’,
‘security criteria’ or a combination of both. In terms of efficiency, the following
criteria are adapted from the GT literature (see, for example, [128]):
(Eff-1) A design is deemed optimal if it can be used to test the maximum
possible number of target hosts using a given number of spy agents.
(Eff-2) Alternatively, we can define a design to be optimal if it can reliably
detect the maximum number of malicious hosts from amongst a given
number of target hosts.
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From the spy agent dissemblance requirements listed in §4.3.5, and the
routing principles for path correlation (see §3.4.3.1) and path length (see
§3.4.3.2), the following security criteria can be derived.
(Sec-1) The number of hosts that each spy agent visits should be maximised.
The rationale for this is that the more target hosts that a spy agent
visits, the greater is the likelihood that the target host is unable to
distinguish it from a ‘regular’ agent and, hence, the more reliable the
tests are.
(Sec-2) The number of hosts in common between any pair of spy agent routes
should be minimised. This follows from the assumption that target
hosts will be less likely to be able to distinguish spy agents from ‘reg-
ular’ agents if spy agents appear to be as different from one another
as possible. Ideally, any two spy agents should visit no more than one
common target host.
From the above it is clear that the spy agent route optimisation problem
is a version of the classic GT problem, modified by the inclusion of some
additional security optimisation criteria.
6.3.2 Group testing scenario hypotheses
As described in §2.6, there are many different GT algorithms, including se-
quential and non-adaptive schemes; the choice of algorithm depends on the
application. In this chapter the following assumptions regarding the usage
scenario are made.
• Completing a single test may take a long time.
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• A test outcome that is initially negative may, after some unidentified
time, change to positive. In such cases, adaptive tests may perform
poorly from both an efficiency and a security point of view.
• The assumption that malicious hosts always process agents in a de-
tectably malicious way is more likely to be valid within a longer time
frame.
These hypotheses may characterise, for example, a scenario where each
spy agent contains a unique decoy email address and the test for target hosts
is whether there is a violation of PII privacy (see §2.5.1); this application is
discussed further in Chapter 10. In this case, the impact of the misuse of an
email address could be realised at any time after the spy agent carrying this
address has commenced its migration.
It is clear that in scenarios such as the one described above, NGT designs
are preferable. There is a rich literature on such schemes and their appli-
cations [46] (see also §2.6.5.4). Constructing optimal examples of the various
classes of design is an ongoing research topic, and comparing different schemes
is a non-trivial subject [128].
It is important to note that NGT designs are usually deemed to be ‘good’ if
they involve a relatively small number of tests. Such designs may also possess
relatively long routes, in which case they are, in addition, ‘good’ spy agent
route designs (by the above criteria). For example, Balding et al. [8] have
shown that maximum sized packings correspond to NGT designs containing a
very small number of tests.
In this chapter we propose the use of a rather simple NGT construction
based on well-known combinatorial block designs. We first give some funda-
mental notation and describe certain properties of such designs.
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6.3.3 Definitions and fundamental results
6.3.3.1 Route design and incidence matrix
We define a special class of design to represent the incidence of hosts (items)
with network routes (tests) as follows. Let S be the set of n items (hosts), i.e.
|S| = n. We define a spy agent route design, H, to be a set system H = (S,R),
where R (the set of routes) is a set of subsets of S. The route design is said
to be uniform if all routes contain the same number of hosts, i.e. |Ri| = |Rj|
for all Ri, Rj ∈ R. The cardinality of R, |R|, is simply the total number of
spy agents (i.e. one spy agent is assigned to each route).
A route design may be represented by an incidence matrix M = (mij),
whose rows are labelled by routes (tests) and columns by hosts (items), and
where mij = 1 if route Ri contains host j, and mij = 0 otherwise. The ith
row is the incidence vector, ri, of the subset {j|mij = 1} (representing route
Ri), and the jth column is the incidence vector, cj , of the subset {i|mij = 1}
(representing the jth host).
6.3.3.2 Combined set and binary vector operations
Standard set theory notation can be obtained from Jech [90]. Also, elemen-
tary binary vector notation is given in §2.6.5.2. We extend this notation by
combining set and binary vector notation in the following way.
We identify row and column vectors (ri and cj) with the routes (Ri) and
hosts, so that we refer to a route ri and a host cj . We also abuse our notation
further and apply set operations to these binary vectors. For example, the
union (intersection) of two (or more) incidence vectors corresponds to applying
the bit-wise boolean OR (AND) operation to these vectors. In the same way,
we say that a column ci contains another column cs if the column cs contains
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no row that is not contained in ci, or, equivalently, if ci∪cs = ci. For any vector
v we use v[i] to refer to the ith element of v. For example, ri[j] = cj[i] = mij .
Finally, the size of an incidence vector refers to its Hamming weight, i.e. the
cardinality of the corresponding subset, i.e. |ri| = |Ri|.
6.3.3.3 Representing defective items
Given a set S of n hosts, the set of defective items can be represented as a
binary vector δ = (δ1, δ2, . . . , δn), where δj = 1 if host cj is defective, and
δj = 0 otherwise. The outcome of all tests can also be represented by a vector
a = (a1, a2, . . . , a|R|), known in this case as the outcome vector, where ai = 1 if
route ri contains a defective host and ai = 0 otherwise, i.e. ai = {i : |ri ∩ δ| >
0}. The union of all columns corresponding to defective hosts is thus equal to
the outcome vector. This follows from the fourth assumption given in §6.3.1,
i.e. that if a host is defective then all routes containing it will yield a positive
outcome.
Example 6.1. Consider the three-agent scenario discussed in §5.3.5. In this
case S = {s1, s2, s3} and the set of spy agent routes consists of all 2-subsets of
hosts. There are thus three spy agent routes: r1 = (1, 1, 0), r2 = (1, 0, 1) and
r3 = (0, 1, 1). The incidence matrix is given in Table 6.1. Suppose that s3 is
the only defective host, i.e. δ = (0, 0, 1). Clearly, δ is only contained in r2 and
r3. Hence, the outcome vector is a = (0, 1, 1). In this simple example, given
the outcome vector of the route design it is trivial to identify the defective
host. However, this route design cannot identify the defectives if there is more
that one defective host. In such a case we will always have a = (1, 1, 1) and
we cannot determine whether {s1, s2}, {s1, s3}, {s2, s3} or {s1, s2, s3} is the
set of defectives.
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Table 6.1: Simple three-agent scenario incidence matrix.
c1 c2 c3
r1 1 1 0
r2 1 0 1
r3 0 1 1
6.3.3.4 Classifier route designs
We define two classes of spy agent route designs which are useful for host
evaluation.
Definition 6.2. Suppose that there are at most d malicious nodes in a network
of n nodes (n ≥ d). If the outcome vector, a, of the incidence matrix, M , of
a route design, H, can be used to successfully identify all the malicious and
honest nodes in the network, regardless of how they are distributed, then H is
said to be a d-classifier.
Definition 6.3. Suppose that there are exactly d malicious nodes in a network
of n nodes (n ≥ d). If the outcome vector, a, of the incidence matrix, M , of
a route design, H, can be used to successfully identify all the malicious and
honest nodes in the network, regardless of how they are distributed, then H is
said to be a d-classifier.
Lemma 6.4. If route design H is a d-classifier then H is a d′-classifier for
all 1 ≤ d′ ≤ d.
Proof. This follows immediately from Definitions 6.2 and 6.3.
In group testing terminology, a d-classifier is a (d, n) NGT design, and a
d-classifier is a (d, n) NGT design (see §2.6.1 or [46]).
Theorem 6.5. (Hwang et al. [94]) Let S be a set of n items containing
a set D of defectives. We refer to the (d, n) group testing problem if D can
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be any d-subset of S, and the (d, n) problem if D can be any k-subset of S,
0 ≤ k ≤ d. Let q be a group testing procedure that identifies D, and let Mq be
the maximum number of tests in q. Then, for each procedure q for the (d, n)
problem, there exists a procedure q′ for the (d, n) problem such that
Mq + 1 ≥Mq′ . (6.3.1)
From the above theorem we deduce that if a design is a d-classifier, then
there exists another design that includes at most one further test and is a
d-classifier. On this basis, in some cases below we restrict our attention to
d-classifiers or d-classifiers.
The problem of designing an optimal spy agent route design (as defined in
§6.3.1) can be summarised as follows:
Problem 6.6. For any given d and n, find a d-classifier route design H satis-
fying one or more of the following criteria (where the choice of criteria depends
on the scenario):
1. For given other parameters, maximize mini |Ri| (derived from (Sec-1)).
2. |Ri ∩ Rj | ≤ 1 for every pair of distinct routes Ri, Rj ∈ R (derived from
(Sec-2)).
3. For given other parameters, maximize n (derived from (Eff-1)).
4. For given other parameters, maximize d (derived from (Eff-2)).
6.4 A spying classifier design
6.4.1 Properties of classifiers
In order to show how to construct a d-classifier or a d-classifier, we first give
some key properties of the incidence matrix, M , of a route design, H. The
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results in this section are adapted from §2.6.5.3, and are taken from Kautz
and Singleton [105] (who use a somewhat different terminology).
Definition 6.7. An incidence matrix M is said to be d-separable if the unions
of the subsets of exactly d columns are all distinct.
Definition 6.8. An incidence matrix M is said to be d-separable if the unions
of the subsets of at most d columns are all distinct.
Lemma 6.9. If the incidence matrix M is d-separable then M is d′-separable
for all 1 ≤ d′ ≤ d.
Theorem 6.10. A route design H is a d-classifier if and only if its incidence
matrix M is d-separable.
Theorem 6.11. A route design H is a d-classifier if and only if its incidence
matrix M is d-separable.
Example 6.12. Following from the analysis in Example 6.1, the 3×3 incidence
matrix given in Table 6.1 is 1-separable and a 1-classifier, but is neither 2-
separable nor a 2-classifier. Also, this incidence matrix is an optimal 1-classifier
for the S(1, 3) problem, i.e. the problem of identifying at most one defective
amongst a set of three hosts, in the sense that it maximises the route length.
One problem with the use of d-separable designs (i.e. route designs with a
d-separable incidence matrix) is that no efficient general decoding algorithm is
known for such designs, where a decoding algorithm takes as input an outcome
vector and gives as output the unique set of malicious hosts (of size at most d)
which could have given rise to this outcome. The trivial decoding algorithm
(involving considering every possible subset of defective hosts) has complexity
exponential in n. As a result we consider a slightly more restrictive class of
designs for which we have a simple and efficient decoding algorithm.
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Definition 6.13. An incidence matrix M is said to be d-disjunct if the union
of any set of d columns does not contain any other column as a subset.
Lemma 6.14. An incidence matrix M is d-disjunct if, and only if, given any
column cj and any set of d other columns, there is at least one row in which
cj has a one and all the d columns have a zero.
Lemma 6.15. If an incidence matrix M is d-disjunct then M is d′-disjunct
and d′-separable for all d′ ≤ d.
Lemma 6.16. If an incidence matrix M is d-separable then M is d′-disjunct
for all d′ < d.
Theorem 6.17. The incidence matrix M of a route design is d-disjunct if
and only if, for any distribution of at most d malicious hosts, the union of all
negative rows of M (i.e. rows that yield a negative outcome) contains all the
negative columns of M (i.e. columns that correspond to non-defective hosts).
Theorem 6.17 implies that the decoding algorithm of a d-disjunct design
has complexity linear in n, since items (columns) not appearing in negative
rows are defective (positive). In other words, in a d-disjunct design, if a column
vector is contained in the outcome vector, then this column vector corresponds
to a defective host.
Corollary 6.18. The route design of a d-disjunct matrix is a d-classifier.
Given hosts cj and the route design outcome a, the binary vector δ of all
malicious hosts, |δ| ≤ d, is determined by the following decoding algorithm:
δ = {j : cj ⊆ a} .
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6.4.2 A simple block design construction
There are numerous constructions for d-disjunct matrices [46, 190]. In this
chapter we consider constructions based on block designs (see §2.6.5.1). We
focus specifically on 2-designs (see Definition 2.12) for the following reasons.
• If we use a block design as a route design, taking blocks as hosts and
elements of V as routes, then the security requirement |Ri ∩Rj| ≤ 1 (in
Problem 6.6) is automatically satisfied by a 2-(v, k, 1) design.
• It can be shown [9, 54] that for a small number of defectives, more pre-
cisely if d ≤ 2, there are cases where 2-designs are optimal pooling designs
in that they identify the defectives using a minimum number of tests.
Such optimal pooling designs are also of interest as route designs since
they maximise the number of hosts contained in each test.
• There are many known construction methods for 2-designs (see, for ex-
ample, [15, 35]).
Theorem 6.19. An incidence matrix of a t-(v, k, 1) design, where the blocks
correspond to columns and the elements to rows, is (q − 1)-disjunct, where:
q = ⌈
k
t− 1
⌉ . (6.4.1)
Proof. By definition of a t-design and since λ = 1, two columns intersect in at
most t − 1 rows. The weight of each column is |B| = k. Hence, it takes the
union of at least q = ⌈ k
t−1
⌉ columns to cover another column [105, Theorem
6]. The result follows.
From Theorem 6.19 it follows immediately that a 2-(v, k, 1) design is a
d-disjunct route design, where:
d = k − 1 . (6.4.2)
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This gives a simple means of constructing sets of visited hosts for spy
agents. If we assume the use of a 2-(v, k, 1) design, then the optimisation
problem given in Problem 6.6 becomes rather simpler. This is because there
is much less freedom to choose the parameters of the route design (essentially
there are only two ‘degrees of freedom’). Note, however, that the reduced
problem may exclude some optimal solutions.
Problem 6.20. Find a 2-(v, k, 1) design in the following scenarios:
1. (Security): Given the number of target hosts n [= b], find a design that
maximises the cardinality of each route r.
2. (Efficiency): Given the number of spy agents v, find the maximum num-
ber of target hosts b that can be tested. This is achieved when k is min-
imised, since, from (2.6.1a) and (2.6.1b), b = v(v−1)
k(k−1)
.
In Problem 6.20 the choice of a minimum d [= k − 1], gives a 2-design
which is optimal both from a security and an efficiency point of view. This
follows since a larger number of blocks (i.e. target platforms) implies a larger
number of blocks containing an element (i.e. larger route cardinality). How-
ever, the choice of d is critical. An underestimate for the maximum number of
malicious hosts could mean that malicious hosts will not be identified, whereas
an overestimate for the maximum number of malicious hosts will reduce the
efficiency and security of the route design.
6.4.3 Further examples
The finite projective plane of order two is known as the Fano plane, and is a
2-design with v = b = 7, k = r = 3 and λ = 1. The corresponding spy agent
system thus has seven hosts, seven tests, three hosts per test (and three tests
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Figure 6.1: Fano plane.
Table 6.2: 2-(7, 3, 1) incidence matrix.
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7
v1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
v2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
v3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
v4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
v5 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
v6 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
v7 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
per host). The Fano plane is shown diagrammatically in Figure 6.1. Note that
each point has three lines on it and each line contains three points.
An incidence matrix for the Fano Plane is given in Table 6.2. This de-
sign has the following seven blocks: (V,B) : B = {B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7},
B1 = {v1, v2, v3}, B2 = {v1, v4, v5}, B3 = {v1, v6, v7}, B4 = {v2, v4, v6},
B5 = {v2, v5, v7}, B6 = {v3, v4, v7} and B7 = {v3, v5, v6}.
It is trivial to verify that this matrix is 2-disjunct but not 3-disjunct (since
d = k− 1 = 2). Hence, this design will successfully identify two defectives but
not three.
Example 6.21. Suppose that the first two hosts in the matrix in Table 6.2 are
malicious. The outcome vector of this matrix is a = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0}. From
Corollary 6.18, the defectives (i.e. the hosts not appearing in all the negative
tests, i.e. r6 and r7) are c1 and c2. However, if the first three hosts are defective,
then the outcome vector is a = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}. The decoding algorithm
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given in Corollary 6.18 suggests that all hosts are defective, contradicting the
implicit assumption that there are most two defectives. It is thus impossible
to decide which hosts are defective. The problem of dealing with inconsistent
results is further discussed in Chapter 9.
The process of finding suitable classifier designs may be further simplified
by choosing a minimum spy agent route length. This is shown in the example
that follows.
Example 6.22. Suppose that we require each spy route to contain at least
five hosts and d = 2. Hence:
r ≥ 5
(2.6.1b)
=⇒
(v − 1)
k − 1
≥ 5⇒ v ≥ 5k − 4
(6.4.2)
=⇒ v ≥ 11
One set of 2-design parameters satisfying this inequality has (v, b, r, k, λ) =
(15, 35, 7, 3, 1). There are known to be at least 80 pair-wise nonisomorphic 2-
designs with these parameters [35], which could, for example, be utilised for
multiple re-evaluations of the same set of hosts.
6.5 Conclusions
Remote security evaluations are inherently unreliable. Malicious hosts may se-
lectively misbehave depending on whether or not they believe they are being
evaluated. In this chapter we have defined a way of identifying the malicious
hosts in a hostile network, while maximising the chance that they will misbe-
have. This has been achieved by applying combinatorial group testing theory
to the spy agent paradigm. A simple class of block designs is proposed for use
in constructing spy agent routes with the desired properties.
The mathematical model of agent route design that we have presented
gives rise to further challenges, including the following.
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• How might the rather strong assumptions made in §6.3.1 be relaxed?
More specifically:
a. What if malicious nodes behave badly in a probabilistic fashion,
e.g. if they only misbehave when the incentive for them to do so is
maximised?
b. What if the spy agent route design is not optimal?
c. Can the requirements for maximum route size and minimum route
intersection size be justified in a practical scenario?
d. What other optimality criteria could usefully be considered?
• What practical scenarios can be devised, and what aspects of host trust-
worthiness might be evaluated?
• How can spy agents be constructed, what data could they carry, and
what operations might they run remotely, e.g. in an e-commerce sce-
nario?
• How could spy agent network scenarios be compromised by colluding
malicious hosts, and how might this be addressed?
Some of these issues are addressed in other chapters of this thesis, or in
the prior art. More specifically, we make the following observations.
• Inconsistent behaviour could be addressed by using other GT designs
such as error-tolerant GT designs (see §2.6.3). This scenario is not stud-
ied further in this thesis as the adaptation of known results (see, for
example, Balding and Torney [9]) is straightforward.
• A different class of combinatorial design that identifies malicious hosts
exhibiting other types of malicious behaviour, including collusion, is
studied in Chapter 7.
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• Chapter 8 describes alternative criteria and spy agent schemes using
sequential GT.
• Chapter 9 discusses a method that can be used to evaluate the credibility
of spy agent system results.
• Chapter 10 discusses spy agent applications and scenarios in which the
requirements and assumptions specified earlier in the thesis are justified.
These issues are also possible topics for future research. This is further
discussed in Chapter 11.
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“Good composition is like a suspension bridge—each line adds
strength and takes none away”
Robert Henri
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7.1 Synopsis
This chapter extends the route design methodology given in Chapter 6. The
main goal is to enhance the properties of the set of spy agent routes to make the
spy agent system resilient to malicious hosts that collude with other malicious
hosts, or use information gained from observing the agents before deciding
whether or not to misbehave. The new model gives rise to a novel group
testing problem in which some defectives yield a positive test outcome only
when other defectives are included in the test. We analyse this problem and
give a range of new results, including an efficient means of analysing the results
obtained when using a particular class of spy agent route design.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The problem of group
testing for hosts that are collectively malicious is formulated in §7.2. Aspects
of the theory of combinatorial ‘group testing for complexes’ are discussed and
extended in §7.3. Building on the previous discussions, in §7.4 the problem of
spy agent testing of collectively malicious hosts is linked to the group testing
for complexes problem. A rank-2 host classification algorithm is proposed and
analysed in §7.5, and conclusions are drawn in §7.6.
Aspects of the work described in this chapter have been published in [99].
7.2 Problem formulation
7.2.1 Behaviour model for malicious hosts
In Chapter 6 it was assumed that an untrustworthy spy agent host will always
perform an act that will enable the sender of the agent to detect that it has
visited a malicious platform. That is, we have assumed that a spy agent that
visits a malicious host will always yield a positive outcome. In this chapter we
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relax this rather strong requirement. That is, we now suppose that a malicious
host may not always exhibit characteristic (malicious) behaviour, even if the
host does not necessarily know that a visiting agent is a spy agent (i.e. even
if the spy agent security requirements are met). As previously, in this chapter
we treat a spy agent route as the (unordered) set of hosts visited by the agent.
In general, malicious host behaviour can be either stochastic (where a
malicious host behaves randomly) or deterministic. In this chapter we focus on
a particular type of deterministic malicious behaviour. (Results from the prior
art applying to route designs that tolerate errors due to stochastic behaviour
were briefly discussed in §6.5.)
More specifically, in this chapter we extend the theory of Chapter 6 by
considering the case where a malicious host will only abuse a visiting spy agent
if it either colludes with, or at least recognises, one or more other malicious
hosts within the spy agent route. The idea is that a (cautious) malicious
host might employ such a selective misbehaviour model in order to escape
detection by a spy agent system (this issue was discussed in general in §1.3).
The following two types of selective malicious host behaviour are considered
here.
• Model 1. An ‘individually malicious’ host will violate all visited spy
agents (in a detectable manner) provided that the lengths of the agent
routes are above a certain threshold. (Ideally, route lengths should be
maximised, as discussed in §6.3.1—see also the first item listed in Prob-
lem 6.6). We refer to such malicious hosts as Type-1 hosts.
• Model 2. A ‘collectively malicious’ host will violate a spy agent if
and only if (a) the agent route length is above a certain threshold (in
subsequent discussions we will assume that this threshold is fixed across
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the host population), and (b) there are at least e−1, (e > 1), other hosts
in the agent route that are known by the host to be malicious. Otherwise,
the collectively malicious host will not violate the agent data. We refer
to such malicious hosts as Type-e hosts.
The discussion in the previous chapter applies to the case where all hosts
will behave according to the first model given above. In this chapter we
generalise our discussion to also cover hosts of the second type.
The second behaviour model fits a scenario in which malicious hosts collude
to manipulate visiting agents. However, this model is also applicable when
hosts decide whether or not to misbehave depending on the information they
hold about the behaviour of other hosts in a spy agent route. The rationale
for a malicious host behaving in such a manner is that a malicious host may
plausibly be able to deny abuse of a spy agent if the agent in question also
visits one or more other hosts known to be malicious. The route designs
discussed in Chapter 6 could fail to reliably identify malicious hosts exhibiting
such selective malicious behaviour. In this chapter we consider how to identity
malicious hosts behaving according to this more complex model.
Of course, the second host misbehaviour model could apply in other sce-
narios. For example, it might apply when spy agents are used to analyse trun-
cation attacks involving colluding hosts (see §2.4.2.1.3). Such applications are
further discussed in Chapter 10.
It is also important to note that, in general, the information that malicious
hosts hold about other hosts may not be correct; i.e. the fact that a host
believes another host to be malicious (or not) does not necessarily mean that
the other host is actually malicious (or not). However, in this chapter we
make the simplifying assumption that a Type-e (e > 1) host will always know
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the identities of (and may potentially collude with) other malicious hosts. For
example, malicious hosts might use spy agent technology to deploy a set of
malicious agents that aim to help identify peer malicious hosts.
Unlike in Problem 6.6, we do not assume here that the number of hosts
common to two spy agent routes will affect malicious host behaviour. This
is likely to be the case when many agents (both spy agents and ‘normal’ e-
commence agents) visit a host over a short period of time. In this case we
consider that an overlap between the route sets of visiting agents is likely to
be a typical, ‘non-suspicious’ event.
We formalise the new model in the following way.
Definition 7.1. Suppose e ≥ 1. When processing a mobile agent whose route
contains d ≥ 0 malicious hosts, a Type-e (malicious) host will behave as
follows:
• if d ≥ e then the host will handle the agent in such a way that it returns
a positive result; and
• if d < e then the host will handle the agent in such a way that a negative
result will ensue unless another host abuses the agent.
By convention, we say that a non-malicious host is a Type-0 host.
In summary, we assume that each deployment of a spy agent will yield a
result of:
• ‘positive’ if, for some e ≥ 1, its route contains at least one Type-e host
and at least e− 1 other malicious hosts, and
• ‘negative’ in all other cases.
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The problem of efficiently identifying Type-e malicious hosts in such a
scenario is a generalisation of the classic GT problem, which reduces to the
classic problem in the case e = 1.
7.2.2 Notation
Using the notation introduced in §6.3.3.1, we treat a spy agent route design
as an incidence structure H = (S,R), where S is the set of n target hosts and
R is a set of routes, i.e. subsets of S. We also let M = (mij) be the incidence
matrix of H, and we refer to a route ri and a host cj.
We suppose that each defective item is of Type-ε, for some ε ≥ 1. The set
of all defective items can thus be partitioned into the sets δε, ε ≥ 1, where
δε = {hosts cj | cj is Type-ε} . (7.2.1)
The set of all defectives (i.e. misbehaving hosts), which we denote by ∆, triv-
ially satisfies ∆ =
⋃
ε≥1 δε. From Definition 7.1 it follows that |δi ∩ δj| = 0 for
i 6= j, i.e. a defective item can only have one Type of behaviour.
We next define the outcome vector for a route design when applied to hosts
conforming to the model introduced in this chapter.
Definition 7.2. Given a particular set S of hosts (some of which may be
defective), the outcome vector of a route design (S,R) is the vector a =(
a1, a2, . . . , a|R|
)
, where ai = 1 if the route ri ∈ R contains at least one Type-ε
host and ε−1 other malicious hosts, for at least one ε (1 ≤ ε ≤ e), and ai = 0
otherwise.
Given the above assumptions about the behaviour of malicious nodes (de-
fectives), the outcome vector indicates the outcomes of the routes (spy agents)
when used on a specific target host set, where 1 and 0 correspond to positive
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Table 7.1: A simple route design for four hosts.
c1 c2 c3 c4
r1 1 1 0 0
r2 1 0 1 0
r3 1 0 0 1
r4 0 1 1 0
r5 0 1 0 1
r6 0 0 1 1
and negative outcomes, respectively. For this reason we also refer below to the
outcome set, meaning the set of routes (spy agents) yielding a positive result.
Example 7.3. Consider the incidence matrix in Table 7.1. In this matrix
a set of six spy agents is used to test four hosts, where each pair of hosts is
visited by a unique agent. Suppose that there are two Type-2 malicious hosts,
where ∆ = δ2 = {c1, c4}. Clearly, the only agent containing δ2 is r3. Hence,
in this case the outcome vector is a = (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0). If the spy agent system
user knows that every malicious host has Type at most 2, then the outcome
of the route design enables the identification of c1 and c4 as malicious.
In order to address the general case, i.e. where there are mixed Types of
malicious hosts, we need the following definitions.
Definition 7.4. If the outcome vector of a route design can be used to distin-
guish between honest and malicious hosts regardless of how they are distributed,
as long as there are exactly d malicious nodes and the Type of each malicious
node is exactly e, then the route design is called a (d, e)-classifier.
Definition 7.5. If the outcome vector of a route design can be used to distin-
guish between honest and malicious hosts regardless of how they are distributed,
as long as there are at most d malicious nodes and the Type of each malicious
node is exactly e, then the route design is called a (d, e)-classifier.
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Definition 7.6. If the outcome vector of a route design can be used to distin-
guish between honest and malicious hosts regardless of how they are distributed,
as long as there are exactly d malicious nodes and the Type of each malicious
node is at most e, then the route design is called a (d, e)-classifier.
Definition 7.7. If the outcome vector of a route design can be used to distin-
guish between honest and malicious hosts regardless of how they are distributed,
as long as there are at most d malicious nodes and the Type of each malicious
node is at most e, then the route design is called a (d, e)-classifier.
In the context of this chapter, a classifier (route) design, or simply a classi-
fier, refers to a (route) design that is either a (d, e)-classifier, a (d, e)-classifier,
a (d, e)-classifier, or a (d, e)-classifier, unless otherwise stated.
The following three results are immediate from Definitions 6.2, 6.3, 7.4,
7.5, 7.6 and 7.7.
Lemma 7.8. A route design is a (d, 1)-classifier if and only if it is a d-
classifier.
Lemma 7.9. A route design is a (d, 1)-classifier if and only if it is a d-
classifier.
Lemma 7.10. A route design is a (d, e)-classifier if and only if it is a (d′, e′)-
classifier for every pair (d′, e′) satisfying 1 ≤ d′ ≤ d and 1 ≤ e′ ≤ e.
As in Problem 6.20, we are interested in constructing classifier route designs
for a range of possible values of d and e. Since we claim that routes which
contain a large number of hosts are less likely to lead to suspicion, we are
interested in route designs with a large minimum route size. Ideally, we also
wish to identify malicious hosts with the minimum effort, and therefore route
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designs which minimise the number of routes (and hence agents) are also to
be preferred.
7.3 Group testing for complexes (GTC)
7.3.1 The notion of complex defective
Before we consider the construction and use of classifiers, we need to adapt
and extend certain definitions from the theory of GTC, introduced in §2.6.4.
In GTC we wish to identify items that are ‘collectively’ positive, in contrast
with GT theory where items are ‘individually’ positive. To proceed, we first
need to introduce some further notation.
Definition 7.11. Let C be a subset of the columns of an incidence matrix M
of a route design, where |C| = ε. We call C an ε-complex, and we denote the
intersection of all the columns in C by ∩C, where
∩C =
⋂
ci∈C
ci . (7.3.1)
The following Lemma follows trivially from the Definition.
Lemma 7.12. If the intersection ∩C of an ε-complex C contains a route ri
then this route contains all the columns in C.
When a route contains all the columns of a complex, we also say that the
complex appears in the route.
The notion of a complex is useful in the context of GTC designs because
the presence of a single defective column in a row will not necessarily cause the
associated test to return a positive result; instead it will be necessary for all
the elements of a complex of a certain size to be present in a row and for them
all to be defective in order for the test to return a positive result. That is,
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for any tested set of items, there is an associated set of complexes (i.e. sets of
subsets of the columns) with the property that a row will give a positive result
if and only if it contains all the elements of at least one of these complexes.
We call this a set of defective complexes.
Defective complexes were introduced in [180], where it was assumed that
“for obvious reasons, no positive subset may include any other positive subset”.
Macula et al. [112] has further studied GTC in the case where all defective
complexes are k-sets, i.e. they all have cardinality k. In this case, each com-
plex is called a k-complex. In the equivalent hypergraph testing problem (see
§2.6.4), the set of defective complexes corresponds to a set of defective (hy-
per)edges, and an assumption is made that no defective edge contains another
defective edge [63]. Similar language is used by Chen et al. [30], where the
theory of hypergraph testing (and GTC) is linked with the theory of cover-free
families.
It would appear that the notion of a defective complex is rather loosely
defined in the literature. GTC is a relatively young area of research, with
applications mainly in the field of DNA testing. We therefore attempt be-
low to provide a more rigorous discussion. We first observe that, as we have
informally defined the notion above, there may be more than one set of de-
fective complexes. For example, suppose that c1 is the only defective host
(where c1 is a Type-1 host) in a set of n hosts {c1, c2, . . . , cn}. Then clearly
D = {{c1}} is a set of defective complexes. However, it is not hard to see that
D = {{c1}, {c1, c2}} is also a set of defective complexes. In order to make D
unique, we first make the following definition.
Definition 7.13. Given a set of hosts, a set of defective complexes is a col-
lection D of subsets of hosts with the property that:
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1. a test chosen from the set of all possible tests (i.e. all possible routes)
will give a positive result if and only if it contains one of the members
of D;
2. the previous property does not hold for any proper subset of D.
The following remark follows trivially.
Remark 7.14. Suppose a route design is applied to a set of hosts for which
{D1, D2, . . . , Dn} is a set of defective complexes. Then the outcome vector of
the route design is the union of ∩Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We note that the second property, i.e. the minimality condition, in Defi-
nition 7.13 is consistent with the literature. This is because, in the context
of DNA testing, a set of DNA molecules is ‘defective’ if and only if all the
molecules in the set are required to cause a disease.
Example 7.15. Suppose that, as above, c1 is the only defective host (where
c1 is a Type-1 host) in a set of n hosts {c1, c2, . . . , cn}. Then, although D =
{{c1}} is a set of defective complexes, by Definition 7.13 D
′ = {{c1}, {c1, c2}}
is not a set of defective complexes.
We now show that, under Definition 7.13, the set of defective complexes is
unique.
Lemma 7.16. All members of a set of defective complexes are mutually non-
inclusive.
Proof. Let D be a set of defective complexes and suppose D1 ⊂ D2, where
D1, D2 ∈ D. Any test that contains D2 will also contain D1. Hence, any test
that contains a member of D will also contain a member of D′ = D − {D2},
which contradicts Definition 7.13.
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Lemma 7.17. If D is a set of defective complexes then D is unique.
Proof. Suppose that D is not unique. Let D and D′ be distinct sets of defective
complexes, and suppose (without loss of generality) that D1 ∈ D
′ and D1 /∈ D.
Consider the route containing only the elements of D1. This route gives a
positive result because D1 is contained in D
′. Hence, this route contains at
least one defective complex D2 ∈ D, where D2 ⊂ D1. Now consider the route
containing only the elements of D2. This route gives a positive result since D2
is contained in D. Hence, this route contains at least one defective complex
D3 ∈ D
′, where D3 ⊆ D2. That is, D
′ contains D3 and D1, and D3 ⊂ D1.
This contradicts Lemma 7.16, and the result follows.
From Lemma 7.17 if follows that the unique set of defective complexes in
Example 7.15 is D = {{c1}}.
7.3.2 Property of GTC designs
The primary goal of GTC theory is to find a design which enables the set of
defective complexes to be identified. That is, we wish to find a GTC design
which has the property that the outcome vectors for any two distinct sets of
defective complexes will always be different.
With this goal in mind, we next adapt and extend the notions of separable
and disjunct GTCs, as given by Du and Hwang [46, Chapter 6].
Definition 7.18. The rank of a set of complexes C = {C1, C2, . . . , C|C|} is the
size of the largest complex, i.e. max1≤i≤|C||Ci|.
Definition 7.19. A set C of complexes is said to have uniform rank if all the
complexes in C have the same size.
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Definition 7.20. A route design is said to be (d, e)-separable if, given any
two distinct sets of defective complexes of size d and rank e, it yields distinct
outcome sets.
Definition 7.21. A route design is said to be (d, e)-separable if, given any
two distinct sets of defective complexes of size at most d and rank e, it yields
distinct outcome sets.
Definition 7.22. A route design is said to be (d, e)-separable if, given any
two distinct sets of defective complexes of size d and rank at most e, it yields
distinct outcome sets.
Definition 7.23. A route design is said to be (d, e)-separable if, given any
two distinct sets of defective complexes of size at most d and rank at most e,
it yields distinct outcome sets.
Definition 7.24. A route design is said to be (d, e∗)-separable if, given any
two distinct sets of defective complexes of size d and uniform rank e, it yields
distinct outcome sets.
Definition 7.25. A route design is said to be (d, e∗)-separable if, given any
two distinct sets of defective complexes of size at most d and uniform rank e,
it yields distinct outcome sets.
Definition 7.26. A route design is said to be (d, e)-disjunct if, given any set
of d+ 1 mutually non-inclusive complexes {C0, C1, C2, . . . , Cd} with rank e,
∩C0 *
d⋃
i=1
(∩Ci) . (7.3.2)
Definition 7.27. A route design is said to be (d, e)-disjunct if, given any set
of d + 1 mutually non-inclusive complexes {C0, C1, C2, . . . , Cd} with rank at
most e, Equation 7.3.2 applies.
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Definition 7.28. A route design is said to be (d, e∗)-disjunct if, given any set
of d + 1 mutually non-inclusive complexes {C0, C1, C2, . . . , Cd} with uniform
rank e, Equation 7.3.2 applies.
The following three lemmas follow immediately from the above three defi-
nitions.
Lemma 7.29. A route design that is (d, e)-disjunct is (b, e)-disjunct for 1 ≤
b ≤ d.
Lemma 7.30. A route design that is (d, e)-disjunct is (b, e)-disjunct for 1 ≤
b ≤ d.
Lemma 7.31. A route design that is (d, e∗)-disjunct is (b, e∗)-disjunct for
1 ≤ b ≤ d.
The following six theorems are from Du and Hwang [46, Chapter 6], re-
stated in our notation.
Theorem 7.32. A route design that is (d, e)-disjunct is (d, e)-separable.
Theorem 7.33. A route design that is (d, e)-disjunct is (d, e)-separable.
Theorem 7.34. A route design that is (d, e∗)-disjunct is (d, e∗)-separable.
Theorem 7.35. A route design that is (d, e)-separable is (d− 1, e)-disjunct.
Theorem 7.36. A route design that is (d, e)-separable is (d− 1, e)-disjunct.
Theorem 7.37. A route design that is (d, e∗)-separable is (d−1, e∗)-disjunct.
Example 7.38. Consider the route design H given in Table 7.1. Each of the
six routes of this design contains a distinct pair of hosts from the population
of four hosts. The following properties hold.
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• H is (1, 1)-disjunct because, given any column (i.e. a 1-complex), no
other column is contained in this column.
• H is (2, 1)-disjunct for the following reason. The union of any two
columns (1-complexes) will include all but one row. This row will always
be contained in the remaining two columns. It follows that the union of
any two columns will not contain either of the other two columns.
• H is (1, 2)-disjunct. To establish this we need to show that the in-
tersection of a complex of size at most two cannot be contained in the
intersection of a distinct complex of size at most two. Consider a com-
plex containing either one or two columns. If it contains one column,
then this column is not contained in any other column and is thus not
contained in the intersection of any two other columns. If the complex
contains two columns, then the intersection of these two columns is not
contained in either of the other two columns and is thus not contained in
the intersection of any pair of columns (distinct from the complex itself).
• H is (2, 2)-disjunct. To establish this we need to show that the inter-
section of columns in a complex of size at most 2 is not contained in the
union of the intersection of any two complexes of size at most 2. Clearly,
if we can show that the intersection of columns in a complex of size ex-
actly 2 is not contained in the union of the intersection of two complexes
of size exactly 1 (not contained in the complex of size 2) then the result
will follow. However, this follows immediately since the intersection of
two columns contains a unique row, which is not contained in either of
the other two columns.
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• H is (2, 2)-disjunct. This follows immediately, given that H is (2, 1)-
disjunct and (2, 2)-disjunct.
• H is (2, 2)-separable. This follows immediately from the fact that H is
(2, 2)-disjunct (see above) and Theorem 7.33.
• H is neither (3, 2)-disjunct nor (3, 2)-separable because the union of
any three distinct columns contains all rows.
• H is (5, 2∗)-disjunct, because the intersection of any 2-complex contains
only one row, which is distinct from the single row contained in the
intersection of each of the five other 2-complexes.
• H is (5, 2∗)-separable. This follows immediately from the fact that H
is (5, 2∗)-disjunct (see above) and Theorem 7.34.
The disjunct and separable properties were originally studied in two con-
texts. First, in graph testing, a hypergraph, i.e. a generalisation of the notion
of a graph in which an edge can connect any number of vertices, is tested in or-
der to identify a defective subgraph [45, Chapter 10]. Second, in the DNA com-
plex model, a set of molecules is tested to identify diseases, where each disease
corresponds to a subset of molecules [112]. More recently, the GTC prob-
lem has been connected to three further application domains, namely secure
key distribution [120], binary superimposed codes [47] and cover-free fami-
lies [190]. The importance of these connections is that known results across
all these problems can be used in the context of GTC. We adapt some existing
results to our setting below.
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Definition 7.39. (Mitchell and Piper [120]) A route design is a (d, e)-
KDPif, for any set of d+ e distinct columns c1, c2, . . . , cd+e,
e⋂
i=1
ci *
e+d⋃
i=e+1
ci . (7.3.3)
Note that a (d, e)-KDP is the same as a (d, e)-superimposed code and a
(d, e)-cover-free family [30].
Theorem 7.40. (Chen et al. [30]) A route design is (d, e)-disjunct if and
only if the route design is a (d, e)-KDP.
The next lemma helps identify a set of defective complexes of uniform rank
given the output of a disjunct route design.
Lemma 7.41. Let S be a set of hosts, let D be the set of defective complexes
for S, which we assume have uniform rank e, and let E be the set of all possible
e-subsets (e-complexes) of S, for some e ≥ 1. Suppose that |D| = d, and that
a route design gives output vector a. If the route design is (d, e∗)-disjunct,
then all the complexes in E − D appear in a route ri that tests negative.
We can use this lemma to give a simple decoding algorithm, as follows.
Algorithm 7.42. Suppose a (d, e∗)-disjunct route design has outcome a when
applied to a specific set of hosts S and suppose that the set D of defective com-
plexes for S has cardinality d and uniform rank e. Then, D can be determined
using the following decoding algorithm:
• Step 1: Create the set E = {E1, E2, . . . , E|E|} containing all possible
e-complexes.
• Step 2: Put D = {Ei : ∩Ei ⊆ a}.
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We next generalise Lemma 7.41 to the case where the rank of the set of
defective complexes is not uniform. We need this generalisation since (as shown
below) defective hosts of non-uniform Type give rise to defective complexes of
varying sizes.
Theorem 7.43. Let S be a set of hosts, let D be the set of defective complexes
for S, which we suppose has rank e, and let E be the set of all possible ε-subsets
(ε-complexes) of S, for every ε, (1 ≤ ε ≤ e). Suppose that |D| ≤ d, and that
a route design gives output vector a when applied to S. Suppose that D′ is
the superset of D containing every superset (within S) of a defective complex.
If the route design is (d, e)-disjunct, then all complexes in E − D′ appear in a
route ri that tests negative.
Proof. Suppose that the route design is (d, e)-disjunct. Then, by definition,
given any d + 1 mutually non-inclusive complexes of cardinality at most e,
there is at least one row contained in the intersection of the first complex that
is not contained in the intersections of any of the other complexes. Choose any
complex Ei ∈ (E − D
′), |Ei| ≤ e. We first show that all the complexes in the
set {Ei}∪D are mutually non-inclusive. This follows because all the elements
of D are mutually non-inclusive (by definition) and Ei is not a superset of a
defective complex. It follows that there is a row, say rj, that is contained in
∩Ei and is not contained is the intersections of any of the d complexes in D.
Hence, aj = 0 (where aj is the bit in a corresponding to rj), and the result
follows.
We can use Theorem 7.43 to generalise the decoding Algorithm 7.42 in the
following way.
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Algorithm 7.44. Suppose that a (d, e)-disjunct route design has outcome a
and the set D of defective complexes has cardinality at most d and rank e.
Then, D can be determined using the following decoding algorithm.
• Step 1: Create the set E = {E1, E2, . . . , E|E|} containing all possible
ε-complexes, for every ε, (1 ≤ ε ≤ e).
• Step 2: Put G = {Ei : ∩Ei ⊆ a}.
• Step 3: Put D = {Gi : Gi 6⊃ Gj, where Gi, Gj ∈ G, for all i 6= j}.
Proof of correctness. Since all the complexes that appear in a route giving a
negative result are non-malicious, each of the complexes in G contains at least
one defective complex. Step 3 guarantees that the members of D are non-
inclusive, which is consistent with the minimality property in Definition 7.13.
Example 7.45. Consider again the (2, 2)-disjunct route design in Table 7.1,
in which six spy agents visit a set of four hosts, and each spy agent visits a
different pair of hosts. Suppose that this spy agent route design is applied in
four different scenarios where the sets of defective complexes are as follows.
D = {{c1}, {c2}}
D′ = {{c1}, {c2, c3}}
D′′ = {{c1, c2}, {c2, c3}}
D′′′ = {{c1, c2}, {c3, c4}}
In each scenario, there are at most two defective complexes and each defective
complex contains at most two hosts. The outcomes a, a′, a′′, a′′′ of the
corresponding designs for the four scenarios are shown in Table 7.2. With
the (a priori) knowledge that the set of defective complexes has cardinality at
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Table 7.2: Outcome sets for defined scenarios.
route label route a a′ a′′ a′′′
r1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
r2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
r3 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
r4 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
r5 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
r6 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
most 2 and rank at most 2, we now show how in each case the design can be
used to identify the set of defective complexes using Algorithm 7.44.
First observe that, since e = 2, we have
E = {{c1}, {c2}, {c3}, {c4},
{c1, c2}, {c1, c3}, {c1, c4}, {c2, c3}, {c2, c4}, {c3, c4}}
• In the first scenario, it is trivial to show that the only elements of E
whose intersection is not included in the outcome vector a are {c3}, {c4}
and {c3, c4}. That is, G contains all supersets of either c1 or c2. It follows
immediately that D = {{c1}, {c2}} is the set of defective complexes.
• In the second scenario, G contains {c1}, {c1, c2}, {c1, c3}, {c1, c4}, and
{c2, c3}. After applying Step 3 we obtain D
′ = {{c1}, {c2, c3}}.
• In the last two scenarios, the set of defective complexes has a uniform
rank of two, and the sets D′′ and D′′′ are obtained after applying only
the first two steps of Algorithm 7.44.
It is clear that Step 2 of Algorithm 7.44 has complexity linear in |E| =∑e
ε=1
(
n
ε
)
, where n is the number of hosts. As a result we observe that a
set of defective complexes of cardinality at most d and rank e can be readily
identified if a (d, e)-disjunct route design is used (as long as e and n are of
bounded size).
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7.3.3 Some GTC constructions
Designs that satisfy Definitions 7.26 and 7.39 have been studied by a variety
of authors [48, 63, 81, 112, 120, 181, 190]. We next give two constructions from
the literature that are of potential use in our setting.
Proposition 7.46. (D’yachkov et al. [47]) Let d, e, t and w be positive
integers such that e ≤ w ≤ t− d, and suppose M is the
(
t
w
)
× t binary matrix
whose rows consist of all possible binary vectors of length t and weight w. Then
M is (d, e∗)-disjunct.
Example 7.47. The route design given in Table 7.1 is an example of Propo-
sition 7.46 for the case d = e = 2, t = d+e = 4 and w = 2. Hence, this matrix
is (2, 2∗)-disjunct, as discussed in Example 7.38.
Theorem 7.48. (Mitchell and Piper [120]) An incidence matrix of a (d+
e)-design, where the blocks correspond to rows and the elements to columns, is
a (d, e)-KDP (and, by Theorem 7.40, is (d, e)-disjunct).
Theorem 7.48 implies that we can use a (d+e)-(v, b, r, k, λ) design to find up
to d defective complexes of size at most e within a set v of hosts, by sending b
spy agents, where each host meets r spy agents and each agent visits k hosts.
However, given that b ≥ vt/2 for a t-design (if v > k/2) [15], t-designs for
t > 3 are unattractive for use in GTC since the number of tests required is
considerably greater than the number of test items. However, for spy agent
applications, we are primarily interested in maximising k (i.e. the spy agent
route length, see also §3.4.3.2). Hence, t-designs have some value for spy agent
testing. We discuss this further in the examples provided in §7.5.4.
A (d, e)-disjunct route design can be used to identify complex defectives;
166
7.4. Identifying individual malicious hosts
however, we have not discussed how individual malicious hosts can be identi-
fied, given a set of defective complexes. This is the subject of the next section.
7.4 Identifying individual malicious hosts
7.4.1 Problem representation
The objective of spy agent testing, in this chapter, is to identify individual
malicious hosts (potentially of multiple Types) by testing (large) groups of
hosts. We first consider how the characteristics of a set of malicious hosts
define the set of defective complexes.
We start by introducing some further notation. Let P (X, k) denote the set
of all k-subsets of the set X . Clearly, |P (X, k)| =
(
|X|
k
)
, |X| ≥ k. Formally we
let P (X, k) = ∅, if |X| < k.
We first observe the following trivial result.
Lemma 7.49. If all malicious hosts have Type e (for some e > 0), then the
set of defective complexes is P (∆, e), where ∆ is the set of malicious hosts.
Corollary 7.50. If all malicious hosts have Type e (for some e > 0), then
the set of defective complexes is non-empty if and only if |∆| ≥ e, where ∆ is
the set of malicious hosts.
Example 7.51. Suppose that there is only one defective host and it is of
Type-2. Then, by Corollary 7.50, the set of defective complexes is empty. That
is, a Type-2 host will only misbehave if there is at least one other malicious
host present.
The following algorithm gives a means of computing the set of defective
complexes given a particular set of malicious hosts. The reverse process, i.e.
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identifying the malicious hosts given a set of defective complexes, is discussed
in §7.4.2.
Algorithm 7.52. Suppose that the set ∆ of malicious hosts is partitioned into
the sets δε of the Type-ε (malicious) hosts, 1 ≤ ε ≤ e (where e is the largest
occurring Type of a malicious host). The set of defective complexes can be
constructed using the following procedure.
• Step 1: Let
D∗ =
e⋃
ε=1
P (δε, ε) . (7.4.1)
• Step 2 (which applies only if e > 2): For every ε (2 ≤ ε < e), let
∆ε+1 =
⋃e
i=ε+1 δi. Then put
D{ε} =
ε−1⋃
k=1
{X ∪ Y : X ⊆ δε, |X| = k, Y ⊆ ∆ε+1, |Y | = ε− k} .
(7.4.2)
• Step 3: The set of defective complexes is
D = D∗ ∪
(
e−1⋃
ε=2
D{ε}
)
. (7.4.3)
Proof of correctness. Since (from Lemma 7.17) the set of defective complexes
is unique it is sufficient to show that D satisfies the two properties of Def-
inition 7.13. To establish the first property we need to show that a route
will give a positive result if and only if it contains an element of D. Suppose
Di ∈ D and |Di| = ε. Then, by definition, Di will contain at least one Type-ε
′
malicious host (2 ≤ ε′ ≤ ε) and ε − 1 other malicious hosts. Hence any route
containing Di as a subset will yield a positive result. Now consider a route
that gives a positive result. From Definition 7.1, this route must contain a set
A containing a Type-ε host, cj and ε−1 other malicious hosts, for some ε ≥ 1.
Suppose that ca ∈ A is a Type-a host, and that this is the malicious host with
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the smallest Type in A, a ≤ ε. Take any a-subset of A containing ca. This
subset is contained in D since if all hosts in this subset have the same Type
then it is contained in P (δa, a), and otherwise, it is contained in D
{a}. To
prove the second property it is sufficient to show that all the pairs of elements
in D are mutually non-inclusive, which follows immediately by definition.
Lemma 7.53. If D{ε} is as defined in Algorithm 7.52, then:
|D{ε}| =
ε−1∑
k=1
(
|δε|
k
)(
|∆ε+1|
ε− k
)
. (7.4.4)
Proof. As defined, the number of complexes in D{ε} is equal to the number
of different ways of choosing the first k elements of an ε-complex from the set
δε of Type-ε hosts (1 ≤ k ≤ ε − 1), multiplied by the number of all different
ways of choosing the last ε − k elements of this ε-complex from the set ∆ε+1
of Type-(ε+ 1)+ hosts.
Example 7.54. Consider a set of hosts {c1, c2, . . . , cn} where c1 is of Type-1,
c2 is of Type-2, and the other hosts are non-defective. From Algorithm 7.52
we have D = D∗ = {{c1}}. Since there is no defective complex containing c2,
there is no way for the operator of a spy agent system to know whether or not
c2 (or, indeed, any of the hosts other than c1) is malicious of Type greater
than 1. More generally, the same problem will arise for all malicious hosts
of Type e > 1 if there are less than e malicious hosts of Type greater than 1
present.
Example 7.55. Consider a set of hosts {c1, c2, . . . , cn}, where c1 is of Type-1,
c2 and c3 are of Type-2, and the other hosts are non-defective. From Algo-
rithm 7.52 we have D = D∗ = {{c1}, {c2, c3}}. In this case the spy agent
operator can successfully deduce that c1 is a Type 1 defective and that at least
one of c2 and c3 is a Type 2 defective.
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Example 7.56. Consider a set of hosts {c1, c2, . . . , cn} where c1 is of Type-1,
c2 and c3 are of Type-2, c4 is of Type-x, x > 2, and the other hosts are non-
defective. From Algorithm 7.52 we have:
D∗ = {{c1}, {c2, c3}}
∆3 = {c4}
D{2} = {{c2, c4}, {c3, c4}}
D = D∗ ∪D{2}
= {{c1}, {c2, c3}, {c2, c4}, {c3, c4}}.
We observe that, in this example, the spy agent system cannot distinguish
between the case where c2, c3 and c4 are all of Type 2, and the case where
either or both of them are of Type 2 and the other (or others) have Type
greater than 2. Through this example, we can also observe that a malicious
host (c4, in this example) might still be included in defective complexes (and
be identified) even if it never misbehaves. In this example this arises when
x > 2 (c4 is of Type 3
+). In this case the fact that c4 is malicious is revealed
by other malicious hosts (c2 and c3) which will generate a positive result if
and only if they are aware of the appearance of another malicious host in the
route.
The above examples motivate the following lemma.
Lemma 7.57. Suppose that the set ∆ of malicious hosts contained in a par-
ticular set of hosts is partitioned into the sets δε of Type-ε (malicious) hosts.
If there are hosts of Type greater than 1, let µ > 1 be the Type of the malicious
host with the smallest Type amongst the hosts in ∆−δ1; otherwise put µ = 1.
Then it follows that all malicious hosts are included in at least one defective
complex if and only if | ∪i≥µ δi| ≥ µ.
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Proof. We assume that ∆ is non-empty throughout (otherwise the lemma
holds trivially). First suppose that µ = 1, i.e. ∆ = δ1. In this case each
defective host will be contained in exactly one defective complex. Also, we
must clearly have | ∪i≥µ δi| = |δµ| ≥ 1
Now suppose that µ > 1. We consider two sub-cases. If there are no
hosts of Type greater than µ, then (using the notation of Algorithm 7.52)
D{µ} will be empty and | ∪i≥µ δi| ≥ µ if and only if |P (δµ, µ)| > 0. However,
from Algorithm 7.52 we know that a host of Type µ will be included in a
defective complex if and only if P (δµ, µ) is non-empty. The result follows in
this sub-case.
Finally suppose µ > 1 and that there are hosts of Type greater than µ. It
follows that (using the notation of Algorithm 7.52) | ∪i≥µ δi| ≥ µ if and only
if |D{µ}| > 0. If D{µ} is non-empty then, by definition, every defective host
of Type greater than or equal to µ will be included in an element of D{µ}.
Equally, if any defective host of Type greater than µ is included in a defective
complex then D{µ} must be non-empty, and the result follows.
Finally we comment on the rationale of representing the spy agent problem
as a GTC problem. Consider Example 7.55, in which the malicious hosts, c1,
c2 and c3, can be trivially identified by sending one spy agent to each host
and one to each pair of hosts. However, this trivial solution is not attractive
in our context as we are interested in maximising the route length. Also the
identification of some or all defectives becomes harder when the number of
Type-1 and Type-2 defective complexes is unknown. In the most general
case, the trivial solution would require sending a spy agent to each subset of
the set of all hosts. By using GTC designs we aim to: a) reduce the number
of tests, and b) increase the route length.
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7.4.2 Host classification
Algorithm 7.52 provides us with a means of identifying the set of defective
complexes given a particular set of malicious hosts. However, as discussed in
the examples in §7.4.1, this mapping is not injective; as a result, identifying
the malicious hosts (and their Types) given a set of defective complexes is not
always possible. In this section we consider this host classification problem in
greater detail.
We first consider the special case where all the malicious hosts have the
same Type; in this case we have the following simple result, which follows
immediately from Lemma 7.49.
Lemma 7.58. Suppose the set ∆ of malicious hosts contains only Type-e
hosts and |∆| ≥ e. Then ∆ =
⋃
Di∈D
Di, where D is the set of defective
complexes.
The following lemma follows trivially.
Lemma 7.59. If a route design is (
(
d
e
)
, e∗)-disjunct and e ≤ d, then it is a
(d, e)-classifier.
We note that if all hosts have the same Type then the set of defective
complexes has uniform rank (equal to the Type). However, the opposite is
not always true. For example, consider a modified version of Example 7.56
in which c1 is a non-malicious host and D = {{c2, c3}, {c2, c4}, {c3, c4}}. As
discussed above, and following the analysis in Algorithm 7.52, the same set D
would be obtained if all three of c2, c3 and c4 were of Type 2, and if two were
of Type 2 and the other of larger Type.
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In the case where there are mixed Types of malicious hosts, there is gen-
erally no unique host classification. The following two lemmas follow immedi-
ately from Algorithm 7.52.
Lemma 7.60. If D is a set of defective complexes, then all the hosts in the
set {ci|ci ∈ Dj, Dj ∈ D} are defective hosts.
Lemma 7.61. If Di is a defective complex then all the elements of Di are
hosts of Type e, for some e ≥ |Di|.
Using Lemmas 7.57 and 7.61 we can classify all malicious hosts as the
following corollary suggests.
Corollary 7.62. Suppose a set of hosts contains a set ∆ of malicious hosts
and the elements of the corresponding set D of defective complexes jointly con-
tain all the malicious hosts. If a route design is (|D|, r)-disjunct (or (|D|, r)-
separable), then the route design is a (|∆|, e)-classifier, where r is the rank of
D and e is the largest Type of a host of ∆.
7.5 A rank-two Type classification algorithm
7.5.1 Standard classification scenario
In the standard rank-e Type classification problem we consider malicious hosts
with Type at most e, defective complexes with cardinality at most e, and a
set of defective complexes with rank at most e. The hosts can be classified
with the use of a GTC route design as long as the conditions established in
Lemma 7.57 are satisfied.
We focus on the simple case where the set∆ of defectives contains a mixture
of Type-1 and Type-2 defectives. As discussed in Example 7.54, if there is
only one Type-2 defective, no route design can determine whether or not this
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host is malicious, as this host is not included in the set of defective complexes.
This observation follows immediately from Lemma 7.57, where in this case the
necessary condition is: | ∪i≥2 δi| = |δ2| ≥ 2.
Applying Algorithm 7.52 in this special case, we obtain:
D = D∗ = δ1 ∪ P (δ2, 2) . (7.5.1)
Observe that, in this scenario, the set of malicious hosts and their corre-
sponding Types can be trivially identified given the (identified) set of defective
complexes.
7.5.2 Classification scenario with design restrictions
In this section we consider a slightly modified rank-2 Type classification prob-
lem. We modify Definition 7.1 to the following (the changes are underlined).
Definition 7.63. Suppose e ≥ 1. When processing a mobile agent whose
route contains d ≥ 0 malicious hosts, a Type-e (malicious) host will behave
as follows:
• if d ≥ e and the route length is at least two then the host will handle
the agent in such a way that it returns a positive result; and
• if d < e then the host will handle the agent in such a way that a negative
result will ensue unless another host abuses the agent.
The rationale for the above modification is that it seems reasonable to
assume that Type-1 hosts will not misbehave if they are the only hosts included
in the spy agent route. This restriction is consistent with the path length
assumption discussed in §3.4.3.2.
The modified problem can be addressed in two different ways. Firstly,
we could simply choose route designs that are classifiers and that satisfy the
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route length restriction. An example of a suitable design has been studied in
Example 7.38. Secondly, the set of defective complexes could be constructed
in accordance with the modified host behavioural model. In this section we
discuss the second approach (and its rationale).
To illustrate how the modified problem changes the situation, suppose that
a route r1 only contains one host, c1, which happens to be Type-1. In the
standard classification problem, the complex {c1} is a defective complex. In
our modified classification problem, {c1} is no longer a defective complex
because the route r1 will give a negative result.
Following from the above example, it is straightforward to show that the
set of defective complexes D is made up of the 2-subsets of hosts that include
at least one Type-1 host and the 2-subsets of Type-2 hosts. That is:
D = P (δ2, 2) ∪ (P (S, 2)− P (S − δ1, 2)) , (7.5.2)
where S is the set of all hosts.
From (7.5.2) (observing that P (δ2, 2) is disjoint from P (S, 2)−P (S−δ1, 2)),
we obtain:
|D| =
(
|δ2|
2
)
+
(
n
2
)
−
(
n− |δ1|
2
)
. (7.5.3)
In this new problem, the modified host behaviour model leads to the con-
struction of a different set of defective complexes, which has a uniform rank.
Hence, to identify D it sufficient to use a (|D|, 2∗)-disjunct or a (|D|, 2∗)-
separable route design.
One benefit of this new approach is that (d, e∗)-disjunct designs have been
studied more extensively than other classes of disjunct design and more con-
structions are known—see, for example, [112].
However, this approach clearly increases the size |D| of the set of defective
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complexes, if there are Type-1 hosts. Also, it complicates the process of
identifying the individual defective hosts given a set of defective complexes,
as Lemma 7.60 no longer applies. In particular, a defective complex may now
contain a non-defective host. This problem is studied in the next section,
where we provide a naive classification algorithm.
7.5.3 The algorithm
Consider a set of n hosts containing a set of d defective hosts (0 ≤ d < n− 1)
that are of Type-1 or Type-2. Suppose also that a malicious host will only
misbehave if the route length is at least two.
The classification algorithm described below requires the use of a (|D|, 2∗)-
disjunct route design, where |D| is as in (7.5.3). This route design is used to
determine the set of defective 2-complexes, using Algorithm 7.42.
Algorithm 7.64 (Resilient rank-2 classification). Suppose a set of hosts S
contains a set ∆ malicious hosts of Type at most 2 and that a malicious host
will only mishandle an agent if the agent visits at least 2 hosts. The following
two-part algorithm partly or completely identifies ∆ (depending on the num-
ber of Type-2 defective hosts). Note that two alternatives are provided for the
second part of the algorithm.
A. Identify Type-1 hosts.
Require: A (|D|, 2∗)-disjunct route design, and |∆| < n− 1.
Using Algorithm 7.42, identify the set D of defective complexes (which, from
(7.5.2), has uniform rank 2).
for i = 1 to i = n do
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Construct the set Ti of the 2-complexes that contain ci:
Ti = {{ci, cj} | j 6= i}, |Ti| = n− 1.
if Ti ⊆ D then
ci is Type-1 (otherwise |∆| ≥ n− 1).
Add ci to the set δ1.
end if
end for
B. Identify Type-2 hosts.
Require: Part A (above).
Put: B = D − (P (S, 2)− P (S − δ1, 2)).
if |B| 6= 0 then
ci ∈ ∪B are Type-2, i.e. δ2 = {ci | ci ∈ Bj , Bj ∈ B}.
ci /∈ δ1 ∪ δ2 are non-defective.
else
Within the set S − δ1 there are at least (n− |δ1| − 1) non-defective hosts
and at most one Type-2 host, which cannot be identified.
end if
B-alt. Identify Type-2 hosts (alternative).
Require: Part A (above).
for All ci in S − δ1 do
for All Dj ∈ D do
if ci ∈ Dj and Dj ∩ δ1 = ∅ then
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Add ci to the set δ2.
Break inner loop
end if
end for
end for
if |δ2| = 0 then
There is at most one Type-2 host and at least n− |δ1| − 1 non-defective
hosts.
end if
Ensure: δ1 ∩ δ2 = ∅, |δ1|+ |δ2| < n− 1, and (7.5.3) hold.
End of algorithm.
Proof of correctness. In part A, the algorithm identifies the Type-1 hosts,
given the set D of positive 2-complexes obtained by Algorithm 7.42. We can
determine whether or not a host ci is a Type-1 defective as follows.
• If D contains all n− 1 possible 2-complexes containing ci, then ci is a
Type-1 host. This follows since, if ci was not a Type-1 defective then
all the n − 1 other hosts would have to be defective, which contradicts
the assumption that |∆| < n− 1.
In part B, the algorithm attempts to identify the Type-2 hosts and the
remaining non-defectives. To do so, we consider the a subset B of the set
D of defective complexes consisting of the defective complexes that do not
contain any of the Type-1 hosts identified in part A. We consider the following
subcases.
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• If B is non-empty then the hosts contained in all the 2-complexes in B
must be Type-2 hosts (and there are at least two such hosts).
• Otherwise, there is at most one Type-2 host. It cannot be determined
whether or not there is a single Type-2 defective host.
In the alternative version of part B, we consider the hosts that appear in a
defective complex and that are not Type-1 hosts. If such a host appears in at
least one defective complex which does not contain a Type-1 host, then both
elements of this 2-complex must be Type-2 hosts.
Finally, the ‘Ensure’ step is present to check that the results given by the
algorithm are consistent; inconsistencies may arise if the assumptions on which
the algorithm depends regarding the number of types of malicious hosts do
not hold.
The following observations are key to the correct operation of Algorithm
7.64.
Remark 7.65. Suppose a set of n hosts contains less than n − 1 malicious
hosts, each of which are of Type at most 2. If all the 2-complexes containing
a host cj are defective complexes, then cj is a Type-1 host.
Remark 7.66. Suppose a set of n hosts contains only Type-1 or Type-2 mali-
cious hosts. If at least one (but not all) of the 2-complexes containing a host cj
are defective complexes, and at least one of these 2-complexes contains another
host ck that is not a Type-1 defective, then cj is a Type-2 defective (and so is
ck). If some (but not all) of the 2-complexes containing a host cj are defective
complexes, and all these 2-complexes contain another host that is a Type-1
defective, then cj is either non-defective or is the only Type-2 defective.
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7.5.4 Example implementation
We conclude this discussion of the rank 2 case by describing a series of exper-
iments performed to demonstrate the operation of Algorithm 7.64.
Using Theorem 7.48 we can construct a (2, 2)-disjunct route design from a
4-design as follows. Consider the 4-(11, 5, 1) design derived from the Mathieu
GroupM11 [38], which has b = 66 blocks, and r = 30. Associating blocks with
rows (routes) and the elements to columns (hosts) we obtain a route design
with 66 routes, 5 hosts per route, that can test 11 hosts, and in which each
host is visited by 30 agents.
The 66 blocks of the 4-(11, 5, 1) design are listed in Table 7.3. The sets of
blocks incident with each of the 11 points (i.e. the columns of the spy agent
route design) are given in Table 7.4.
Using a computer program (see Appendix A), we checked that, as expected,
the above 4-design is (5, 2)-disjunct and a (5, 2)-KDP by checking that (7.3.2)
and (7.3.3) hold for the case d = 5 and e = 2.
Software was also developed to implement the following procedure.
1. Input: choose a set of Type-1 hosts and a set of Type-2 hosts.
2. Outcome: calculate the route design outcome, for the chosen distribu-
tion of malicious hosts using the Mathieu design.
3. Decoding: identify the defective complexes using Algorithm 7.44.
4. Classification: use Algorithm 7.64 to verify the given input.
Table 7.5 summarises some results from this routine for different given
inputs. These experiments showed that, as expected, the 4-(11, 5, 1) design
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Table 7.3: The blocks of a Mathieu 4-(11, 5, 1) design.
blocks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 7 8 4 4
4 5 6 9 5 6 7 6 7 9 8 10 5 7
10 8 7 11 9 8 11 11 10 10 9 11 6 9
blocks 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
4 5 5 6 6 7 5 5 6 6 8 6 6 8
8 7 9 8 10 8 7 10 7 9 9 7 8 9
11 11 10 9 11 10 8 11 10 11 10 9 10 11
blocks 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
7 9 4 4 4 5 5 6 7 8 5 5 6 7
8 10 5 6 7 6 7 8 10 9 6 8 10 9
11 11 11 9 8 10 9 11 11 10 7 10 11 10
blocks 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56
2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 5 5 5 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
8 6 7 9 7 7 5 5 6 6 9 6 6 8
9 8 8 10 8 9 7 8 7 8 10 7 9 10
11 9 11 11 10 11 10 9 11 10 11 8 11 11
blocks 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 6
6 7 5 5 5 6 7 6 7 8
7 8 6 6 7 7 8 7 8 9
9 9 8 9 9 8 10 10 9 10
10 11 11 10 11 9 11 11 10 11
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Table 7.4: Dual of a Mathieu 4-(11, 5, 1) design.
points 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 4 1 4
2 2 2 5 5 6 7 6 5 9 7
3 3 3 6 8 8 9 11 10 10 8
4 4 4 7 9 10 11 12 11 12 12
5 5 13 13 13 13 14 15 14 17 15
6 6 14 14 16 18 16 18 17 19 16
7 7 15 15 17 19 20 20 18 20 19
8 8 16 21 21 23 21 21 24 22 22
9 9 17 22 22 24 23 25 25 23 24
10 10 18 23 26 26 26 27 26 25 28
11 11 19 24 27 27 29 28 28 27 29
12 12 20 25 28 29 30 29 30 30 30
13 31 31 31 31 32 33 33 32 34 31
14 32 32 32 34 34 35 36 35 37 36
15 33 33 33 35 36 37 38 38 38 37
16 34 34 39 39 39 39 40 42 40 41
17 35 35 40 40 41 42 43 43 41 43
18 36 36 41 44 44 45 44 44 42 45
19 37 37 42 45 47 47 45 46 46 46
20 38 38 43 46 48 48 47 48 47 48
21 39 49 49 49 51 49 50 50 49 51
22 40 50 50 50 52 51 52 53 52 53
23 41 51 51 54 54 54 54 55 53 55
24 42 52 52 55 55 57 56 57 56 56
25 43 53 53 56 57 58 58 58 57 58
26 44 54 59 59 59 61 59 60 60 59
27 45 55 60 60 60 62 62 61 63 61
28 46 56 61 61 62 63 63 62 64 63
29 47 57 62 64 64 64 65 65 65 64
30 48 58 63 65 66 65 66 66 66 66
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Table 7.5: Evaluation results for resilient rank-2 classification algorithm.
Case Input Outcome GTC alg. Alg.
(a) result (D2) result
1 δ1 = {1} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, As Input
δ2 = {2, 3} 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, {1, 4}, {1, 5},
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, {1, 6}, {1, 7},
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, {1, 8}, {1, 9},
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, {1, 10}, {1, 11},
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38} {2, 3}}
2 δ1 = ∅ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, As Input
δ2 = 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, {1, 4}, {2, 3},
{1, 2, 3, 4} 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, {2, 4}, {3, 4}}
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31,
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53}
3 δ1 = {5} {2, 5, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, {{1, 5}, {2, 5}, δ1 = {5}
δ2 = {8} 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 31, {3, 5}, {4, 5}, δ2 =
34, 35, 39, 40, 44, 45, {5, 6}, {5, 7}, “at most
46, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, {5, 8}, {5, 9}, one def.”
59, 60, 61, 64, 65} {5, 10}, {5, 11}}
will classify any 5 defective hosts of Type at most 2, except for the case where
there is either one Type-2 host or no Type-2 host.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter has extended the results of Chapter 6 by weakening the assump-
tion that a malicious host will always violate a visiting spy agent. We have
applied GTC theory to a complex spy agent behavioural model in which some
defective will only yield a positive outcome in the presence of (or after collusion
with) other defectives. In particular we have looked at scenarios in which:
• some malicious hosts will always mishandle a visiting spy agent, whereas
• other malicious hosts will only violate the spy agent if they identify a
certain number of other malicious hosts in the agent’s route.
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We have shown that combinatorial route designs can still be used to identify
malicious hosts that exhibit these more sophisticated types of behaviour when
certain criteria are met, and we have introduced a classification algorithm.
In this direction we have derived fundamental properties of GTC theory and
we have proposed a rank-2 classification algorithm. It seems likely that this
algorithm could be generalised for use in higher rank problems, although this
is expected to yield a larger number of cases where complete host classifica-
tions cannot be achieved. Further, we note that computer based experiments
indicate that some of the designs discussed here can also be successfully used
for malicious host classification in higher rank cases. This more effective than
expected operation may arise because of the symmetry of the defective com-
plexes that arise when analysing hosts of a range of different Types. The
study of further properties of route designs in the case where the set of defec-
tive complexes has other sets of specific properties is an interesting topic for
future research.
The results of this chapter are important as they can be used to develop
more sophisticated spy agent route designs with increased resilience to complex
malicious host behaviour, as compared with those discussed in Chapter 6.
These results also contribute to the general art of group testing for complexes
(e.g. they may be adapted for use in DNA complex group testing applications)
and could potentially become useful in future group testing applications. Such
research directions are further discussed in Chapter 11.
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8.1. Synopsis
8.1 Synopsis
In this chapter we take a different approach to that described in Chapters 6
and 7, in that we consider sequential group testing (SGT). We introduce an
optimal SGT algorithm that can be used to construct spy agent routes.
Basing spy agent routing on SGT schemes differs from the NGT based
approach developed in Chapters 6 and 7, in that the choice of which hosts to
test depends on the outcome of the previous test. This means that a sequential
(or multi-stage) spy agent routing algorithm is only likely to be preferable to
a NGT construction if the outcome of a test can be acquired after a relatively
short delay.
The objectives of spy agent group testing were introduced in §6.2, where
two optimisation parameters were defined, namely spy agent security and
group testing economy. Spy agent security is improved when the route length
is increased, and economy is improved when the number of spy agents (tests)
is reduced. The problem of optimising these two parameters is non-trivial for
NGT schemes. In this chapter we give a formal definition of spy agent routing
optimality, and give a simple SGT solution.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 introduces
the sequential spy agent GT scenario and formulates the design problem, and
§8.3 addresses optimality issues for spy agent routing in SGT schemes. Finally,
a simple optimal multi-stage algorithm is described and analysed in §8.4.
Aspects of the work described in this chapter have been published, [96].
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8.2 Introduction
8.2.1 Scenario
In this chapter we consider the use of adaptive, i.e. sequential, GT for con-
structing spy agent routes. This may be preferable in spy agent applications
where test outcomes are available quickly enough to enable all the tests to be
completed in a reasonable time. This scenario contrasts with that described
in §6.3.2 and considered in Chapters 6 and 7.
The choice of the general approach to spy agent route design, and how it
depends on the application scenario, is discussed further in Chapter 10.
8.2.2 The problem
As discussed in §2.6.2, a fundamental objective of a GT algorithm is to min-
imise the total number of tests required to find all the malicious hosts within
a set of hosts. In our particular application of GT our primary objective is
to select spy agent routes so as to maximise the number of hosts that each
spy agent visits, i.e. the route lengths. This objective is discussed in various
places in this thesis, including §3.4.3.2, §5.4.3, §6.3.1 and §7.2.1.
In a NGT scheme, all the routes are predetermined. A carefully chosen
route design can thus be designed to contain sufficiently long routes (see, for
example, the NGT constructions given in §6.4.2 and §7.3.3).
One major problem with using a standard SGT algorithm (see, for exam-
ple, [45]) in a spy agent setting is that it is likely to involve the use of very
short routes. This is because the a priori knowledge of a route outcome is
likely to reduce the size of the initial GT space. This, in turn, is likely to
reduce the length of the routes of spy agents deployed later in the procedure.
Thus a standard SGT algorithm may not be usable in a spy agent application.
187
8.2. Introduction
This observation is treated more formally in Lemma 8.8 below.
We next give two examples illustrating the possible use of SGT in a spy
agent scenario.
Example 8.1. Let {c1, c2, c3, c4} be a set of hosts known in advance to contain
exactly one defective. The single defective can be identified with log2 4 =
2 tests (the minimum number possible), as follows. First, test the subset
{c1, c2}: if this gives a positive result, then the defective is either c1 or c2;
otherwise, the defective is either c3 or c4. In either case, the defective can be
identified with a further single-host test. This is an efficient GT algorithm (in
terms of minimising the number of tests) but it is inappropriate for spy agent
applications as a result of the use of a single-target agent.
Example 8.2. Let {c1, c2, c3, c4} be a set of hosts known in advance to contain
exactly one defective. Suppose all 3-subsets of the four hosts are tested in
turn until a negative result is obtained. The defective host is then the one
not contained in the route giving this negative result. In this case, the route
length is 3, and superficial analysis suggests that between one and four tests
are required, with an expected number of 2.5 tests. However, more careful
analysis reveals that a fourth test will never be required since, after three
positive tests, the fact that the fourth test will yield a negative result can be
inferred. That is, this algorithm will always require between one and three
tests, with an expected number of 2.25 tests. Whilst this is not much more
than the minimum for this small case, for larger sets of hosts the worst case of
this algorithm will require n− 1 tests, i.e. no better than the trivial algorithm
in which the hosts are tested one by one.
In the sections that follow we consider possible approaches to route design
for SGT that maximise the lengths of spy agent routes. We propose a simple
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SGT algorithm suitable for use in a spy agent scenario, and prove that it is
optimal in a sense we define below.
8.3 Optimal spy agent sequential group test-
ing
8.3.1 Assumptions
We make the same assumptions as in §6.3.1. We also suppose that all ma-
licious hosts are of Type-1, as discussed in §7.2.1, i.e. a spy agent visiting
a malicious host will always yield a positive outcome. Moreover, we assume
that the number of malicious hosts is unknown, i.e. we consider the S(n, n)
GT problem.
We next consider a measure of optimality for a SGT algorithm when used
in a spy agent scenario. We first give some terminology.
8.3.2 Definitions
During operation of a SGT scheme, the choice of subsequent tests depends
on previous test outcomes, and a test outcome depends on the number and
distribution of malicious hosts but not on the order in which they are visited.
As a result, we can make the following observation.
Remark 8.3. Let S(d, n) be a sample space consisting of a set of n hosts
containing at most d defectives. Since there are at most d defectives, there
are
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
ways in which the defectives could be distributed amongst the set
of n hosts, and hence during the operation of a SGT algorithm designed to
cope with this number of defective hosts, up to
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
different sequences of
routes may be used, depending on whether individual tests give a positive or
negative result.
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As discussed in §8.2.2, given a SGT algorithm we wish to identify the
minimum length of a route generated by this algorithm for all possible sample
spaces S(d, n). This requirement is captured by the definition below.
Definition 8.4. Let S be a set of n hosts containing at most d malicious
hosts, let j be an identifier for a particular distribution of at most d malicious
hosts within S, and let A be a SGT algorithm that is capable of identifying
up to d malicious hosts. Suppose also that A, given a particular distribution
of at most d malicious hosts (with label j), uses a sequence of routes Qj =
(R1, R2, . . . , Rk), where Ri is the ith set of hosts to be tested, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then
a route Ri in Qj is said to be a weak route in A if |Ri| ≤ |Ri′ |, for every route
Ri′ in Qj′, for every distribution j
′.
Definition 8.4 enables us to define a notion of optimality for SGT algo-
rithms when used in a spy agent setting, as follows.
Definition 8.5. Let S be a set of n hosts. Suppose that a SGT algorithm
A can identify all the malicious hosts in S, regardless of their number and
distribution, and let ρA be the length of a weak route in A. A is said to be an
optimal sequential spy agent routing algorithm, if, given any other SGT algo-
rithm B that can also identify all the malicious hosts, ρA ≥ ρB, where ρB is
the length of a weak route in B.
Z In this chapter, we use the terms optimal sequential group testing algorithm,
optimal sequential routing algorithm, and optimal algorithm interchange-
ably to mean an optimal sequential spy agent routing algorithm, as de-
fined above.
Example 8.6. In Example 8.2 the length of a weak route is ρA = 3. The
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given algorithm is optimal since the only route containing all 4 hosts cannot
help to identify the malicious host.
8.3.3 Optimality properties
In this subsection we derive some properties of optimal spy agent routing
algorithms.
Theorem 8.7. Suppose a set of n hosts is known in advance to contain at
most d defectives. Then the length ρ of a weak route in an optimal sequential
spy agent routing algorithm capable of detecting all the malicious hosts satisfies
ρ = n− d.
Proof. Consider the route design consisting of all subsets of hosts of size n−d.
This clearly has the property that the length of a weak route is n−d. We show
that this route design is capable of identifying all the defective hosts (given
there at most d of them).
There are at least n− d well-behaved hosts, and hence every well-behaved
host will appear in at least one route containing only well-behaved hosts, i.e.
a route giving a negative result. Thus the union of all routes giving negative
results contains all well-behaved hosts. However, it clearly cannot contain any
defective hosts, since the presence of a defective host will always cause a route
to give a positive result. Thus the complement of this union is precisely the
set of defective hosts, and the route design can identify up to d defectives.
Hence ρ ≥ n− d.
Now suppose that there are exactly d defective hosts. Any route of size
greater than n − d will thus always contain at least one defective host and
hence will always give a positive result. As a result, if a route design is to be
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capable of identifying the defective hosts it must contain at least one route of
size n− d, i.e. ρ ≤ n− d, and the result follows.
Lemma 8.8. Suppose a set of n hosts contains exactly d defectives and let A
be a SGT algorithm that can identify all the defectives. Suppose that for all
possible distributions of the d defectives algorithm A requires a maximum of
Nmax routes (tests). If A is optimal, then Nmax ≥
(
n
d
)
− 1.
Proof. If A is optimal then, from Theorem 8.7, all routes have length no less
than ρ = n−d. Any route that contains more than n−d hosts will always give
a positive result (because that route will surely contain at least one defective),
and, thus, such a test is redundant (because it provides no new information).
It follows that Nmax is minimised if all the routes of A have length less or
equal to n − d. Thus, for an optimal A, Nmax is minimised if all the routes
have length n− d. To identify the defective hosts for all possible distributions
it is necessary and sufficient to consider all but one of the routes containing
all the possible (n− d)-subsets of hosts. The result follows.
We note that Lemma 8.8 implies that Nmax ≥ n − 1 if 1 ≤ d < n. This
condition is to some extent inconsistent with the main objective of GT theory,
which is to design algorithms with the property that Nmax is significantly less
than n, as discussed in §2.6.2. This observation suggests that known GT
algorithms are not suitable in the context of the optimality criterion defined
above; for this reason, we propose in the next section a new optimal routing
algorithm.
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8.4 Multi-stage sub-group routing algorithm
8.4.1 Objectives
In this section we present a special type of SGT algorithm which we call a
multi-stage sub-group routing algorithm, and show that it is optimal.
The objective of the multi-stage sub-group routing algorithm is to construct
routes that can identify all malicious hosts within a group of hosts, regardless
of how they are distributed, in such a way that the length of a weak route
is maximised. That is, we wish to devise an optimal algorithm, as given by
Definition 8.5.
8.4.2 The algorithm
The algorithm operates as follows. As previously, we suppose that there are n
hosts and that we wish to identify up to d malicious hosts. We construct and
test routes in the following series of stages:
Stage 0: Deploy a single agent with a route containing all n target hosts.
If the outcome is negative, the algorithm terminates and all hosts are
deemed to be well-behaved.
Stage 1: Deploy a set of n agents, with routes equal to every possible (n−1)-
subset of the n hosts. If one route tests negative then the algorithm
terminates, and the single agent not in this route is deemed to be the
only defective host. (In all other cases all routes will test positive, there
are at least two defective hosts, and the algorithm continues).
. . .
Stage i (1 < i < n): Deploy a set of
(
n
i
)
agents, with routes equal to every
possible (n− i)-subset of the n hosts. If at least one route tests negative,
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then the algorithm terminates, and the complement of the union of the
routes giving a negative result are deemed to be the set of defective
hosts. (If all routes test positive then there are at least i + 1 defective
hosts, and the algorithm continues).
. . .
Stage n: If all the above stages complete without the algorithm terminating
then all hosts are defective.
We can describe this algorithm in a more formal way as follows.
Algorithm 8.9 (Multi-stage sub-group routing).
Require: the set S of n hosts contains some unspecified number of Type-1
defective hosts.
for i = 0 to i = n− 1 do
Deploy a set of
(
n
i
)
agents, with routes equal to every possible (n−i)-subset
of S.
if at least one route gives a negative result then
The set of well-behaved hosts is equal to the union of the routes giving
a negative result.
Stop algorithm.
end if
end for
All hosts are defective
We note that Algorithm 8.9 can be modified by always terminating at
stage k, for some k satisfying 1 ≤ k < n, if it is required that a route length
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should be at least n− k. If, however, such a modification is required, then it
is possible that the set of defective hosts will not be identified.
8.4.3 Correctness
We now show that Algorithm 8.9 performs as claimed.
Theorem 8.10. Suppose Algorithm 8.9 is applied to a set S of n hosts. Then
the following properties hold:
(P1) if Algorithm 8.9 does not terminate at stage i (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1), then there
are at least i+ 1 defective hosts;
(P2) if Algorithm 8.9 terminates at stage i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), then there are
precisely i defective hosts, and if R (which must be non-empty) is the set
of routes giving a negative result, then the set of defective hosts is equal
to S −
⋃
r∈R r;
(P3) Algorithm 8.9 is an optimal routing algorithm, regardless of the number
of defective hosts.
Proof. We address each listed result as follows.
1) In stage i, non-termination means that every route gives a positive
result. If there were at most i defective hosts, then there would exist at least
one (n− i)-subset of hosts (i.e. a route) excluding all the defective hosts, i.e.
there would exist a route giving a negative result, contradicting our assumption
of non-termination, and hence the result follows.
2) From (P1), if the algorithm reaches stage i then there are at least i
defective hosts. If there were more than i defective hosts then the algorithm
would not terminate, since every (n − i)-subset of S would contain at least
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one defective host, and hence every route would give a positive result. This
contradicts our assumption of termination and thus (P2) follows.
3) From (P1) and (P2), if S contains precisely d defective hosts, then the
algorithm will terminate at stage d, and hence the smallest route used will
have size n− d. The result follows from Theorem 8.7.
8.4.4 Efficiency
Whilst the multi-stage sub-group routing algorithm described above is optimal
under our definition, it is clearly not efficient in terms of the number of tests
required to identify the defective hosts. Indeed, if there is more than one
defective host then it is clearly less efficient in this sense than simply testing
the hosts one by one. The precise performance of the algorithm is captured
by the following results.
Lemma 8.11. If Algorithm 8.9 is applied to a set of n hosts containing pre-
cisely d defectives (d < n), then the number of tests performed will be equal
to:
A(n, d) =
d∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
. (8.4.1)
Proof. From Theorem 8.10, the algorithm will terminate at stage d. As de-
scribed above, at stage i (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1), Algorithm 8.9 will involve performing
a total of
(
n
n−i
)
=
(
n
i
)
tests. The result follows.
Lemma 8.12. If Algorithm 8.9 is applied to a set of n hosts containing pre-
cisely d defectives (d < n), then the number of agents processed by each host
will be equal to:
C(n, d) =
d∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
. (8.4.2)
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Proof. From Theorem 8.10, the algorithm will terminate at stage d. As de-
scribed above, at stage i (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1), Algorithm 8.9 will involve performing
a total of
(
n
i
)
tests involving every possible (n − i)-subset of hosts. For any
particular host, a total of
(
n−1
n−i−1
)
=
(
n−1
i
)
of these tests will involve a route
that visits that host. The result follows.
8.4.5 Discussion
In this chapter we have considered optimality in route designs from one per-
spective, namely maximising the route size. However, as documented in §8.4.4
and Lemma 8.8, this has the effect that the number of tests required and the
number of agents processed by each host can become very large. As discussed
in §5.4.1, if a host is visited by a large number of spy agents then the accuracy
of the test results may be compromised. It is thus clear that optimality needs
to be considered from a variety of perspectives, and a more complex definition
of optimality would be helpful.
One alternative approach would be to use other system parameters to
evaluate the credibility of the GT identification results. We return to this
problem in Chapter 9, where we introduce a method to evaluate spy agent
results obtained from either NGT or SGT schemes.
8.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the application of SGT algorithms to the
spy agent routing problem. This work complements the spy agent NGT and
GTC problems, studied in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.
Unlike standard NGT constructions, standard SGT algorithms yield rout-
ing schemes that are not appropriate for spy agent scenarios. This is because
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SGT algorithms typically involve the use of routes containing very few hosts.
To address this problem, in this chapter the problem of spy agent routing op-
timisation is formulated, and a new type of SGT algorithm is proposed that
is optimal under the definition given.
The defined optimality criterion and the challenge of non-trivial malicious
host behaviour give rise to further challenges, including the following.
• What alternative optimality definitions can be given?
a. How can other spy agent system parameters (see §5.4) influence spy
agent security?
b. How can a GT algorithm be both (near) optimal and efficient in
terms of the number of tests and the number of agents visiting each
host?
• How can malicious hosts be identified when they behave in more complex
ways?
a. What happens if Type-e hosts are assumed?
b. What happens if malicious hosts behave inconsistently?
These issues are possible topics for future research. In the next chapter
we relax some of the assumptions made in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 by considering
how the reliability of group testing identification results might depend on a
number of spy agent system parameters.
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9.1. Synopsis
9.1 Synopsis
In this chapter we introduce a methodology for the evaluation of the credibility
of spy agent classification results. We assume that the behaviour of a malicious
host towards a visiting spy agent depends on a) the total number of hosts this
spy agent visits (as discussed in 5.4.3), and b) random choice.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 revisits
the spy agent evaluation problem. Section 9.3 introduces the assumptions
underlying the proposed model, presents the spy agent credibility evaluation
model, and describes its application to the NGT and SGT schemes introduced
in previous chapters. Section 9.4 analyses the impact of random malicious
host behaviour models, and, finally, §9.5 concludes this chapter.
Aspects of the work described in this chapter have been published, [97].
9.2 Introduction
9.2.1 Previous discussions
The evaluation of remote hosts is the main objective of a spy agent system. The
evaluation process involves a set of trust assessments that can yield estimates
for a variety of security issues, as discussed in §3.4.4 (and as analysed further
in Chapter 10).
In Chapters 6, 7 and 8, trust evaluation was discussed in the context of
identifying the malicious hosts from amongst a set of hosts, using the results
obtained from a set of spy agents with specified routes. In such schemes, the
fundamental spy agent security requirement is to construct spy agent routes
in a manner that ensures that malicious hosts exhibit characteristic behaviour
(see §4.4.2). The problem of designing appropriate sets of spy agent routes
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was considered for two main host behaviour models. More specifically,
1. in §6.3.1 and §8.3.1 it is assumed that a malicious host always yields a
positive spy agent outcome if the spy agent route length is sufficiently
large; whereas
2. in §7.2.1 it is additionally assumed that a malicious host will only exhibit
behaviour leading to a positive outcome if a certain number of other
malicious hosts appear in the spy agent’s route.
Also, as discussed in §6.5, error-tolerant GT designs can be used to identify
malicious hosts exhibiting inconsistent behaviour (at least to a certain extent).
These spy agent routing schemes can be improved in a number of ways,
as discussed in §6.5, §7.6 and §8.5. This is not the objective of this chapter;
instead we attempt here to evaluate the credibility of given host evaluation
results, i.e. the level of trustworthiness of the spy agent results acquired using
the given schemes.
9.2.2 Problem description
The trustworthiness of spy agent results depends on the validity of the under-
lying assumptions for the application scenario. In this chapter we relax some
of the assumptions previously made, and consider the following cases:
• a malicious host may not behave maliciously if the route of a visiting
agent is insufficiently long;
• a malicious host may not behave maliciously for random reasons.
Example 9.1. Consider the NGT spy agent route design given in Exam-
ple 6.21 (based on the Fano Plane) where, given a set of test results, the
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design can be used to identify at most two malicious hosts. Now suppose that
the first malicious host misbehaves if and only if the route length is greater
than three, and the second malicious host misbehaves if and only if the route
length is greater that two. Clearly, since all routes have length equal to three,
the first malicious host will not misbehave and the design can only be used to
identify the second malicious host.
Example 9.2. Consider again the spy agent route design given in Exam-
ple 6.21, and suppose that the spy agents are sent sequentially. Also sup-
pose that the hosts c1 and c2 are malicious and will misbehave if and only if
the route length is greater that two and they have been visited by at most
two spy agents. Although all routes have length equal to three, the routes
r3 = {c1, c6, c7} and r5 = {c2, c5, c7} will test negative regardless of the fact
that r3 contains c1 and r5 contains c2. This is because c1 = {r1, r2, r3} and
c2 = {r1, r4, r5}, which means that the agent with route r3 is the third agent
to visit c1, and the agent with route r5 is the third agent to visit c2. The
outcome will be a = {r1, r2, r4} and, using Corollary 6.18, we cannot identify
any defective. This is because, in this case, the union of all negative routes
contains all hosts: r3 ∪ r5 ∪ r6 ∪ r7 = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7}.
Example 9.2 shows that, if some malicious hosts misbehave in a selective
way, then the route design can yield inconsistent results. That is, while some
routes test positive, the malicious hosts responsible cannot be identified. This
means that, in this case, it can be deduced that one or more hosts are malicious,
but that they have not mistreated all the spy agents they have processed.
More generally, when presented with an inconsistent set of spy agent test
results, the following options for addressing the issue could be considered.
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1. The evaluator could attempt to assess the probability that the individual
hosts are malicious.
2. The evaluator could attempt to assess the probability that the obtained
results are believable (which is discussed in this chapter).
3. The evaluator could retest the hosts using longer routes (e.g. by intro-
ducing additional hosts) and re-evaluate the new results.
Typically, retesting should only be performed after a delay long enough
to minimise the likelihood that a potentially malicious host will associate the
two tests.
Example 9.3. Let S = {c1, c2, c3, c4} be a set of hosts containing two de-
fectives c1 and c4. Suppose that c1 misbehaves if and only if the agent
route length is at least two, and c2 misbehaves if and only if the agent route
length is at least three. Now consider the application of the multi-stage sub-
group routing algorithm described in §8.4. At stage zero, the agent containing
{c1, c2, c3, c4} will test positive, implying the presence of at least one defec-
tive. At stage one, all four of the agents visiting 3-subsets of the four hosts will
test positive. This implies the presence of at least two defectives. Stage two
involves the use of six agents, each visiting a distinct 2-subset of the four hosts.
Of these, only the three containing c1 will give a positive result. Host c1 is
the only host that can tentatively be identified as malicious and the algorithm
ends.
Example 9.4. Now suppose that c1 is the only well-behaved host in the set
of hosts S = {c1, c2, c3, c4}, and that the hosts c2, c3 and c4 will always
misbehave if an agent has route length at least three. Suppose also that, if the
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route length is equal to two, the hosts c2, c3 and c4 will misbehave randomly.
Then the application of the multi-stage sub-group routing algorithm described
in §8.4 will reach stage two, in which six agents are despatched each visiting
a distinct 2-subset of the four hosts. Then c2, c3 and c4 might, by chance,
choose to misbehave when handling the agents {c1, c2}, {c1, c3}, and {c1, c4},
respectively, but not for any other agents. This will yield exactly the same
result that is observed in Example 9.3, i.e. the algorithm will identify host
c1 as the only malicious host. We note that malicious hosts could choose to
exhibit this behaviour through a desire to ‘frame’ c1.
In Example 9.3 it is clear that there is a discrepancy in the results, since
from stage 1 there are known to be at least two malicious hosts, but only
one (c1) can be tentatively identified. Also, from Example 9.4 we observe
that when malicious hosts behave inconsistently, the obtained result (c1 is
malicious) may be completely wrong.
Inconsistent host behaviour will not necessarily be obvious from the spy
agent results. That is, whilst in Examples 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 the results make
it clear that at least one host has misbehaved in a selective way, scenarios
could arise in which no such evidence is available from the test results. This
possibility is highlighted in the following example.
Example 9.5. Suppose that, as in Example 9.4, S = {c1, c2, c3, c4} is a set of
hosts in which c1 is the only well-behaved host, and that the hosts c2, c3 and
c4 always misbehave if a visited agent has route length at least three. Then the
application of the multi-stage sub-group routing algorithm described in §8.4
will reach stage two. Now suppose that, at this stage, c2, c3 and c4 misbehave
when handling the agents they receive except for the one with route {c1, c2}.
The algorithm will then identify hosts c1 and c2 as well-behaved, hosts c3 and
204
9.3. Credibility evaluation model
c4 as malicious, and there is no indication of any inconsistency in the results.
More generally, there may be a variety of reasons why test results cannot be
trusted. Such a situation could arise if malicious hosts do not behave according
to the assumptions on which the routing scheme is based. For example, as in
the examples above, inconsistent results could be obtained when a malicious
host chooses whether or not to misbehave depending on the agent route length
and/or randomly.
The presence of inconsistent (or erroneous) results means that we need
to use probabilistic arguments to try to determine which hosts are (and are
not) defective. However, this is not the purpose of the assessment scheme
discussed in this chapter. Instead, in the next section, we propose a method
of evaluating the credibility of an obtained set of spy agent outcomes. That
is, we wish to evaluate the probability that all the hosts contained in a spy
agent route are non-malicious hosts when this agent yields no signs of abuse.
We note that the proposed method is based on less restrictive assumptions
about possible malicious host behaviour than have applied in previous chap-
ters. We propose a means to analyse results obtained from the application of a
spy agent scheme without requiring any additional spy agents to be deployed.
9.3 Credibility evaluation model
9.3.1 Assumptions
A spy agent GT scheme has the objective of classifying target hosts as ei-
ther malicious or non-malicious. To assess the credibility of such classification
results, we make the following assumptions about host behaviour and its in-
terpretation by the operator of the spy agent system.
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(A-1) A malicious host cannot identify whether or not a visiting agent is a
spy agent. [That is, the spy agent dissemblance requirements are met,
as discussed in §4.3.5.]
(A-2) A malicious host has two modes of operation: a malicious mode and
a non-malicious mode. A malicious host is in the malicious mode of
operation with a certain probability called the Probability of Malicious
Mode (PMM).
(A-3) A host’s PMM depends only on the internal characteristics of the host.
That is, the mode of operation of a malicious host is independent of any
external events, including the existence and behaviour of other malicious
hosts.
(A-4) A malicious host estimates that it can avoid being identified as mali-
cious, if it misbehaves, with a certain probability. We call this proba-
bility the Probability of Identification Avoidance (PIA).
(A-5) A host’s PIA depends on the spy agent route length; we suppose that
the PIA increases linearly with the length of the agent route. This
assumption is in line with the assumption that the longer the agent
route, the less a malign host is likely to suspect a spying scenario, as
discussed in §3.4.3.2. We note that in deterministic host behaviour
models, such as those developed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, we assume that
the route length is always sufficiently long and that PIA = 1.
(A-6) A malicious host processes a visiting spy agent maliciously if and only
if a) the host is in the malicious mode of operation, and b) the host
decides it can avoid identification. Building on (A-2) and (A-4) we
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suppose that a malicious host processes a visiting spy agent maliciously
with a certain probability, which we call the Probability of Characteristic
Behaviour (PCB), where PCB = PMM × PIA.
(A-7) A positive spy agent outcome is always credible in the sense that it
always indicates the existence of at least one malicious host in the spy
agent route.
(A-8) A negative spy agent outcome is not credible, in the sense that it may
contain malicious hosts that do not behave maliciously. We associate
a value (between 0 and 1) with a spy agent route which is an estimate
for the probability that this route contains a malicious host and gives
a negative result. We call this value the Probability of Uncharacteristic
Result (PUR).
(A-9) We assign a value (between 0 and 1) for a set of spy agent classification
results, which depends on the degree to which the outcome set of a spy
agent routing scheme is believable. We call this value the Credibility of
Classification (CC).
9.3.2 The model
In line with (A-2) and (A-3), we assume that a malicious host is always in
either a Malicious Mode (MM) or a Non-malicious Mode (NM), and that
the transitions between MM and NM are probabilistic. I.e. a malicious node
behaves according to a Markov Model, as shown in Figure 9.1.
Based on this behavioural model, we define PMM as follows.
Definition 9.6. Suppose that a host cj is malicious and that its malicious
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(pij)(1− pij)
NM MM
Figure 9.1: Markov model with two states: Non-malicious Mode (NM) and
Malicious Mode (MM).
behaviour is characterised by a discrete random process with the Markov prop-
erty. The PMM of cj (written PMMj) is the steady-state probability that cj
is in the MM state:
PMMj = pij . (9.3.1)
In line with (A-5), we define PIA as follows.
Definition 9.7. Suppose that host cj is malicious. The PIA of cj w.r.t. a
route ri that contains cj (written PIAij) is defined as follows:
PIAij =
{
|ri|/ξj if 1 ≤ |ri| < ξj,
1 if |ri| ≥ ξj.
(9.3.2)
where ξj is a fixed characteristic behaviour parameter of the host cj, called the
route length threshold.
Lemma 9.8. Let PCBij denote the PCB for a malicious host cj when pro-
cessing an agent with route ri. Then:
PCBij = pij
(
min(|ri|, ξj)
ξj
)
. (9.3.3)
Proof. From (A-6) we have PCBij = PIAij × PMMj. The result then follows
immediately from Definitions 9.6 and 9.7.
The following remarks follow trivially from Lemma 9.8 and (A-6).
Remark 9.9. Let PCBij denote the PCB for a malicious host cj when pro-
cessing an agent with route ri. The probability that cj does not misbehave is
1− PCBij.
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Remark 9.10. Suppose that cj and cj
′ are malicious hosts that are visited by
spy agents ri and ri
′, respectively, where cj and ri are not necessarily different
from cj
′ and ri
′, respectively. Whether or not cj processes ri maliciously is
independent of whether or not cj
′ processes ri
′ maliciously.
In line with (A-8), we define PUR as follows.
Definition 9.11. The PUR of a spy agent route ri (written PURi) is the
probability that ri contains a non-empty set A of malicious hosts and each
host in the set A does not misbehave (i.e. ri gives a negative result).
Lemma 9.12. Let PURi denote the PUR for route ri, and let Pr(A, i) be the
probability that the set of malicious hosts in ri is A. Then:
PURi =
∑
A⊆ri,A 6=∅
Pr(A, i)
∏
cj∈A
(1− PCBij) . (9.3.4)
Proof. From Definition 9.11 we have:
PURi =
∑
A⊆ri,A 6=∅
Pr(A, i) Pr(cj does not misbehave for every cj ∈ A) .
The result follows immediately from Remarks 9.9 and 9.10.
Corollary 9.13. If a route ri contains no malicious hosts, then PURi = 0.
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of PUR, since if ri contains
no malicious hosts, then Pr(A, i) = 0.
Corollary 9.14. If a route ri contains at least one malicious host that behaves
maliciously then PURi = 0.
Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of PUR, since if ri contains
at least one malicious host, cj , that behaves maliciously then PCBij = 1.
Moreover, if A is a subset of ri that does not contain cj then Pr(A, i) = 0.
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One problem with applying Lemma 9.12 is that the probability Pr(A, i)
is generally not known, as the operator of a spy agent system will not a pri-
ori know the probability distribution of malicious hosts. We address this by
estimating this probability, using the following result.
Lemma 9.15. Suppose that a set of n hosts contains d malicious hosts, 0 ≤
d ≤ n, where each host is equally likely to be malicious. Suppose that route ri
contains r hosts (1 ≤ r ≤ n). Then the probability Pr(r, θ, n, d) that ri contains
exactly θ malicious hosts (where 0 ≤ θ ≤ min{r, d} and r ≤ n−d+θ) is given
by:
Pr(r, θ, n, d) =
(
d
θ
)(
n− d
r − θ
)
/
(
n
r
)
. (9.3.5)
Proof. There are
(
d
θ
)
ways of choosing the θ malicious hosts in ri. Also, since
there are n−d non-malicious hosts, there are
(
n−d
r−θ
)
ways of choosing the r− θ
non-malicious hosts in ri. There are
(
n
r
)
possible routes containing r hosts.
The result follows.
By convention we set Pr(r, θ, n, d) = 0 if θ > d, θ > r, or n− d < r − θ.
The following remark follows immediately from the definition of Pr(r, θ,
n, d).
Remark 9.16. If θ ≤ r, d ≤ n, and r ≤ n, then
r∑
θ=0
Pr(r, θ, n, d) = 1 . (9.3.6)
The following two corollaries follow trivially.
Corollary 9.17. Suppose that a set S of n hosts contains d malicious hosts.
The probability that an r-subset of S contains no malicious hosts is given by:
Pr(r, 0, n, d) =
{ (
n−d
r
)
/
(
n
r
)
=
∏r−1
l=0
n−d−l
n−l
if r ≤ n− d,
0 otherwise.
(9.3.7)
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Corollary 9.18. Suppose that a set S of n hosts contains d malicious hosts.
The probability that an r-subset of S contains r malicious hosts is given by:
Pr(r, r, n, d) =
{ (
d
r
)
/
(
n
r
)
=
∏k=r−1
k=0
d−k
n−k
if r ≤ d,
0 otherwise.
(9.3.8)
Using Lemma 9.15, we can obtain the following estimate for PUR.
Lemma 9.19. Suppose that a set of n hosts contains d malicious hosts, 0 ≤
d ≤ n, where each host is equally likely to be malicious. Suppose that route ri
contains r hosts (1 ≤ r ≤ n). Then, using the notation of Lemma 9.12:
PURi =
r∑
θ=1
Pr(r, θ, n, d)
(
r
θ
)−1 ∑
A⊆ri,|A|=θ

∏
cj∈A
(1− PCBij)

 . (9.3.9)
Proof. Let Pr(A, i) be as defined in Lemma 9.12, i.e. the probability that A is
the set of malicious hosts in ri. Then, if |A| = θ, it follows by definition that
Pr(A, i) = Pr(r, θ, n, d)/
(
r
θ
)
.
Now, from Lemma 9.12:
PURi =
r∑
θ=1

 ∑
A⊆ri,|A|=θ
Pr(A, i)
∏
cj∈A
(1− PCBij)


and hence
PURi =
r∑
θ=1
Pr(r, θ, n, d)
(
r
θ
)−1 ∑
A⊆ri,|A|=θ

∏
cj∈A
(1− PCBij)

 ,
as desired.
Lemma 9.19, when combined with Lemma 9.15, enables us to estimate the
PUR of a route when the parameters n, d, r, pij, ξj are known.
Remark 9.20. By definition, the PUR of one route is independent of the
PUR of any other route.
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We next use the notion of PUR to evaluate the CC of a spy agent classifi-
cation outcome, in line with (A-9).
Lemma 9.21. Let R be a set of spy agent routes that is used to test a set of
hosts, and let RN ⊆ R be the set of routes that yield a negative result. Then,
using the notation of Lemma 9.19, the CC of this spy agent scheme is:
CC =
∏
ri∈RN
(1− PURi) . (9.3.10)
Proof. The outcome set of this scheme is credible if and only if the outcome
of every route ri ∈ R is credible. From Definition 9.11 and Remark 9.20 it
follows that:
CC =
∏
ri∈R
(1− PURi)
=
∏
ri∈RN
(1− PURi)
∏
rj∈(R−RN )
(1− PURj) .
The result follows from Corollary 9.13.
In general, the notion of CC is useful for benchmarking the effectiveness
of spy agent route designs. We note, however, that the above result does not
capture how the an uncharacteristic outcome affects host identification results.
That is, the CC does not take account of the ability of some spy agent schemes
to successfully classify a set of hosts even in the presence of uncharacteristic
results. One example of such a spy agent scheme was proposed in Chapter 7,
where in some cases malicious hosts can be correctly identified even if they
do not always misbehave. Further, the CC does not take account of the fact
that certain types of host behaviour can give inconsistent or misleading spy
agent results, as discussed in §9.2.2 (see Examples 9.1–9.5). The study of more
complex evaluation models remains a topic for future work.
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We next demonstrate the use of the above results by providing a detailed
analysis of four case studies.
9.3.3 Case study 1: Single spy agent route
In our first case study we consider a simple scenario in which a single spy
agent migrates through a set of r hosts, i.e. the route design is R = {r1 =
{c1, c2, . . . , cr}}. We further assume that all malicious hosts contained in the
route have the same PMM and PIA, i.e. pij = pi and ξj = ξ for 1 ≤ j ≤ r. If
r1 contains θ malicious hosts, then these hosts can be distributed in
(
r
θ
)
ways.
Combining Lemmas 9.8, 9.19 and 9.21 we obtain the following estimate for
the CC of the system (written CCS).
CCS =
∏
ri∈R
(1− PURi)
= 1− PUR1
= 1−
r∑
θ=1
Pr(r, θ, n, d)
(
r
θ
)−1 (rθ)∑
k=1
θ∏
j=1
(1− pi(min(r, ξ))/ξ)
= 1−
r∑
θ=1
Pr(r, θ, n, d) (1− pi(min(r, ξ))/ξ)θ . (9.3.11)
Remark 9.22. In the above equation CCS = 1 if and only if r ≥ ξ and pi = 1,
i.e. there is at least one malicious host and it always behaves maliciously.
In Figures 9.2–9.9 we illustrate the effect on CCS of a range of values for
the system parameters. We make the following observations.
(GEN) In the figures we use a colour ramp palette that interpolates between
‘red’ and ‘green’, and we associate the colours of this palette with the
values of CCS, which range from 0 (red) to 1 (green).
1. CCS is a function of five parameters: the route length r, the number
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of malicious hosts, d, the number of target hosts, n, the route length
threshold of malicious hosts, ξ, and the malicious host PMM, pi.
2. We consider all possible cases where three of the four parameters
d, n, ξ, pi are fixed (we do not consider the case where r is fixed).
This gives four groups of evaluation results, (A)–(D), which are
discussed below.
(A) Figures 9.2 and 9.3 plot CCS against r × pi, 1 ≤ r ≤ n, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, for
fixed d, n, ξ. We first observe that, in all these figures, CCS increases
monotonically with pi. In all the contour maps, greener colours are ob-
tained (meaning CCS → 1) as the PMM pi increases. We also observe
that the effect of r is non-convex.
A visual comparison suggests that CCS tends to increase as r increases,
with the following three exceptions: 1) if pi → 0, then CCS → 0; 2) if
pi → 1, then CCS has two local maxima and one minimum for a value of
r which depends on the remaining three parameters; and 3) for smaller
values of d, the minimum value of CCS in exception 2) is obtained for
a larger r (the red zone shifts to the right). We note that, while r
is determined by the route design, pi depends on inherent behavioural
characteristics of the malicious hosts. This emphasises the importance
of making accurate assumptions regarding malicious host behaviour.
We make the following additional observations regarding changes to the
other parameters.
1. Figures 9.2(c) and 9.2(d) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of
d, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.2(b). We observe
that, as d increases, so does CCS. One way of interpreting this
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9.2: CCS vs. r × pi, for r ∈ [1, 20] and pi ∈ [0, 1], for the cases where:
(a),(b) d = 5, n = 20, and ξ = 10; (c) d = 1, n = 20, and ξ = 10; and (d)
d = 10, n = 20, and ξ = 10.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9.3: CCS vs. r × pi, for r ∈ [1, 20] and pi ∈ [0, 1], for the cases where:
(a) d = 5, n = 20, and ξ = 5; (b) d = 5, n = 20, and ξ = 15; (c) d = 5,
n = 10, and ξ = 10; and (d) d = 5, n = 30, and ξ = 10.
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result involves considering (9.3.5): a larger value of d increases the
probability that a route contains a larger set of malicious hosts,
which in turn reduces the probability that a route giving a negative
result contains a set of malicious hosts, none of which misbehaves.
This suggests that a spy agent outcome is more credible when more
hosts are found (or known) to be malicious.
2. Figures 9.3(a) and 9.3(b) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of
ξ, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.2(b). We observe
that CCS increases monotonically as ξ decreases. This effect arises
from our assumption that a malicious host is more likely to behave
maliciously if it has a smaller route length threshold ξ, as follows
from (9.3.3).
3. Figures 9.3(c) and 9.3(d) plot CCS for smaller and larger values
of n, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.2(b). A visual
comparison suggests that by, as n increases, CCS decreases. This
effect is further analysed under (D) below.
(B) Figures 9.4 and 9.5 plot CCS against r × ξ, 1 ≤ r ≤ n, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ n, for
fixed d, n, pi. We first observe that, in all these figures, CCS increases
monotonically as ξ decreases. This observation is consistent with (A-
2) above. We further observe that, if r ≥ ξ, then changes in ξ have
no effect on CCS. This is because, in this case, the value of PCB, as
given in (9.3.3), is independent of ξ. As in (A) above, the effect of r is
non-convex.
We make the following additional observations regarding changes to the
other parameters.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9.4: CCS vs. r × ξ, for r ∈ [1, 20] and ξ ∈ [0, 1], for the cases where:
(a),(b) d = 5, n = 20, and pi = 0.5; (c) d = 1, n = 20, and pi = 0.5; and (d)
d = 10, n = 20, and pi = 0.5.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9.5: CCS vs. r × ξ, for r ∈ [1, 20] and ξ ∈ [0, 1], for the cases where:
(a) d = 5, n = 20, and pi = 0.1; (b) d = 5, n = 20, and pi = 0.9; (c) d = 5,
n = 10, and pi = 0.5; and (d) d = 5, n = 30, and pi = 0.5.
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1. Figures 9.4(c) and 9.4(d) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of
d, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.4(b). We observe
that, as d increases, so does CCS. This result is consistent with the
analysis in (A-1) above.
2. Figures 9.5(a) and 9.5(b) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of
pi, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.4(b). We observe
that relatively large values of CCS are obtained with large pi (that
is, for the case where malicious hosts are more likely to misbehave).
In this case, relatively large values of CCS are obtained for larger
values of r, regardless of the other parameters. This behaviour
arises because a malicious host is very likely to behave maliciously
when pi → 1 and when PIA → 1, as follows from (9.3.2). This
conclusion reinforces the conclusions reached under (A) above.
3. Figures 9.5(c) and 9.5(d) plot CCS for smaller and larger values
of n, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.4(b). A visual
comparison suggests that, as n increases, CCS decreases. This effect
is further analysed under (D) below.
(C) Figures 9.6 and 9.7 plot CCS against r × d, 1 ≤ r ≤ n, 1 ≤ d ≤ n, for
fixed n, ξ, pi. In this case CCS exhibits two local minima. One arises for
a large value of d and a small value of r, and the other for a small value
of d and a large value of r. This extends the observations made under
(A) above where, for a fixed d, CCS exhibits one local minimum. These
observations reinforce the conclusions given in (A-1). For example, the
local minimum (red area) in Figure 9.2(c) appears on the right side of the
map (large r, small d), and the local minimum in Figure 9.2(d) appears
220
9.3. Credibility evaluation model
on the left side (small r, large d).
This behaviour emphasises the importance of choosing an appropriate
value of r for a spy agent routing scheme. This choice becomes more
difficult when there is no a priori knowledge of d. In such cases, it would
appear prudent to choose a relatively moderate value for r, i.e. neither
too high nor too low. The initial choice can be further refined as knowl-
edge builds up (e.g. with the help of previous spy agent evaluations). For
example, previously obtained results might suggest that a larger value
of r should be used in order to improve CCS if there are a large num-
ber of malicious hosts, and/or if the malicious hosts are more likely to
exhibit malicious behaviour. If, however, there are only a very small
number of malicious hosts, and if these hosts have a very small PMM,
then the probability that a route contains a malicious host that does not
misbehave is likely to be higher for a larger route length.
A visual comparison of Figures 9.6 and 9.7 further suggests that CCS is
more ‘unstable’ for small d, i.e. its gradient is larger; that is, it changes
faster as other parameters change. We make the following additional
observations regarding changes to the other parameters.
1. Figures 9.6(c) and 9.6(d) plot CCS for larger and smaller values
of n, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.6(b). A visual
comparison suggests that, as n increases, CCS decreases. This effect
is consistent with (A-3) and (B-3) above, and this issue is further
analysed under (D) below.
2. Figures 9.7(a) and 9.7(b) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of
pi, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.6(b). These plots
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9.6: CCS vs. r × d, for r ∈ [1, 20] and d ∈ [0, 20], for the cases where:
(a),(b) n = 20, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.5; (c) n = 30, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.5; and (d)
n = 10, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.5.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9.7: CCS vs. r × d, for r ∈ [1, 20] and d ∈ [0, 20], for the cases where:
(a) n = 20, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.1; (b) n = 20, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.9; (c) n = 20,
ξ = 5, and pi = 0.5; and (d) n = 20, ξ = 15, and pi = 0.5.
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are consistent with the discussion under (A) above.
3. Figures 9.7(c) and 9.7(d) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of
ξ, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.6(b). These plots
are consistent with the discussion in (A-2) above.
(D) Figures 9.8 and 9.9 plot CCS against
r
n
× n, 0 ≤ r
n
≤ 1, 1 ≤ n ≤ 20,
for fixed d, ξ, pi. We first make two general observations. 1) If the ratio
r/n is kept fixed, increases in n seem to have a relatively small effect
on CCS, although there are some exceptions. That is, the contour lines
are predominantly vertical in the corresponding plots. 2) If pi and d are
both relatively large, high values of CCS are obtained when r/n → 1
(i.e. when r is maximised).
Combining these observations with the discussions in (A-3), (B-3), and
(C-1) above, we suggest that, if n is increased while keeping all other pa-
rameters fixed, the exhibited decrease in CCS can mainly be attributed
to the decrease in the ratio r/n (rather than the increase in n). This un-
derlines the importance of selecting spy agent routes with long migration
paths.
However, as indicated above, there are a few exceptions to this picture.
That is, CCS takes a relatively low value (as marked in red) when pi or d
are small. This behaviour is consistent with previous observations. By
only considering the case where pi is large, the findings suggest that the
model presented in this chapter is more appropriate if malicious hosts
have a high likelihood of behaving as expected (i.e. maliciously).
We make the following additional observations regarding changes to the
other parameters.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9.8: CCS vs.
r
n
× n, for r
n
∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ [0, 20], for the cases where:
(a),(b) d = 5, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.5; (c) d = 1, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.5; and (d)
d = 10, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.5.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9.9: CCS vs.
r
n
× n, for r
n
∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ [0, 20], for the cases where:
(a) d = 5, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.1; (b) d = 5, ξ = 10, and pi = 0.9; (c) d = 5,
ξ = 5, and pi = 0.5; and (d) d = 5, ξ = 15, and pi = 0.5.
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1. Figures 9.8(c) and 9.8(d) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of
d, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.8(b). We observe
that, as d increases, CCS reaches a maximum for a relatively large
value of r/n. This observation supports the conclusions given under
(D) above.
2. Figures 9.9(a) and 9.9(b) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of
pi, respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.8(b). As for d, as
pi increases, CCS reaches a maximum for a relatively large value of
r/n. This observation also supports the conclusions given under
(D) above.
3. Figures 9.9(c) and 9.9(d) plot CCS for smaller and larger values of ξ,
respectively, than the value used in Figure 9.8(b). We observe that
ξ significantly influences the results only when r < ξ. For larger
values of r, the effect of ξ is diminished, yielding more credible
results.
We note that the above observations will also apply for more complex
route designs. This is because from Remark 9.20 we observe that the CCS of
individual routes are independent of one another. This is further discussed in
the next case study.
9.3.4 Case study 2: A homogeneous system
In our second case study we consider the special case where all routes have
the same length, r, and the PMM and PIA of every malicious host cj is the
same, i.e. pij = pi and ξj = ξ. The analysis of this case builds upon the first
case study, and the CC of this system (written CCH) can be trivially derived
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from Lemma 9.21 and (9.3.11) as:
CCH = (CCS)
β , (9.3.12)
where β = |RN | is the number of routes that yield a negative result.
This case study applies to both NGT and SGT spy agent route designs,
as described in Chapters 6 and 8, respectively. Specific studies of these two
types of route design are given below.
9.3.5 Case study 3: NGT route designs
The CC of a NGT spy agent routing design can be estimated from (9.3.12) in
the case where a design with uniform route length is used. For example, this
is the case if the spy agent routes are constructed using a t-(v, b, r, k, 1) design,
as discussed in §6.4.2. This is achieved by associating the blocks and points
of the design with hosts and routes, respectively. In this case, there are v spy
agents, b hosts, k agents visiting each host and r hosts per agent.
In Figures 9.10 and 9.11 we plot estimates for the CC for certain well-
known t-(v, b, r, k, 1) designs. In these examples, the parameters r and n are
determined by the design. From Theorem 6.19 and Corollary 6.18 we know
that 2-designs are k − 1-disjunct, and k − 1-classifiers. This means that the
corresponding routing designs can only identify a limited number of malicious
hosts. For this reason, we only consider small values of d, i.e. 1 ≤ d ≤ 4. For
convenience, we set pi = 0.7 (giving rise to more credible results, as discussed
in §9.3.3) and β = 1 (i.e. there is only spy agent that yields a negative result).
We make the following observations regarding these figures.
1. The value of CC is smaller for larger d and larger ξ.
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2. The value of CC is larger for designs with larger r and smaller ξ. The
value of CC is maximised when r ≥ ξ. This means that ‘larger’ designs
(such as the 2-(27, 117, 13, 3, 1)) will give more credible results.
These findings are consistent with the conclusions given in §9.3.3.
We note here that our choices for β and pi may not be consistent with the
choice of d. This is highlighted by the example that follows.
Example 9.23. Consider the design 2-(7, 7, 3, 3, 1) in which a single malicious
host is visited by k = 3 spy agents. If there is only one malicious host and this
host abuses all visited agents, then three routes will yield a positive result,
and 7− 3 = 4 routes will yield a negative result. This result is not consistent
with the assumption β = 1. If, on the other hand, less than three routes give a
positive result, then the outcome cannot be used to deterministically classify
the hosts, and it is 100% certain that the outcome is not credible. This result
is not consistent with our estimation of CCH.
More generally, as discussed in §9.2.2, the credibility model does not take
into account whether or not a certain combination of spy agent results yields
consistent host classification results. Instead, the simplifying assumption is
that the PUR of a route is independent of the PUR of all other routes. For this
reason, we claim that the credibility model may not be suitable for posterior
evaluations of obtained results. Instead, it provides a technique that can be
used to help choose route designs that are likely to give credible results.
9.3.6 Case study 4: SGT route designs
In this case study we wish to estimate the CC of the multi-stage sub-group
routing algorithm described in §8.4. For convenience we only consider the
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Figure 9.10: CCS for 2-(7, 7, 3, 3, 1), 2-(9, 12, 4, 3, 1), 2-(16, 20, 5, 4, 1) and 2-
(21, 21, 5, 5, 1) designs. We set pi = 0.9.
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Figure 9.11: CCS for 2-(13, 26, 6, 3, 1), 2-(31, 31, 6, 6, 1), 2-(25, 100, 12, 3, 1) and
2-(27, 117, 13, 3, 1) designs. We set pi = 0.9.
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case where the algorithm reaches a final stage in which malicious hosts are
identified. In this case, if the algorithm tests n hosts and ends at stage i,
then there is only one route that yields a negative result (i.e. β = 1), the
single negative route has length r = n − i, and d = i malicious hosts are
identified. The CC of this scheme, written CCM, can then be trivially derived
from (9.3.11) and (9.15) as follows.
CCM = 1−
n−d∑
θ=1
Pr(n− d, θ, n, d) (1− pi(min(n− d, ξ))/ξ)θ
= 1−
n−d∑
θ=1
(
d
θ
)(
n−d
n−d−θ
)
(
n
n−d
) (1− pi(min(n− d, ξ))
ξ
)θ
. (9.3.13)
Remark 9.24. In the above equation CCM = 1 if and only if n ≥ d + ξ and
pi = 1.
Remark 9.24 suggests that n should be chosen to be sufficiently large to
allow higher values of CCM to be obtained. We note that this result gives
additional weight to the third part of Theorem 8.10, which states that Algo-
rithm 8.9 is ‘optimal’ in the sense that it identifies malicious hosts using routes
with the longest possible length.
CCM is a function of four parameters: the number of target hosts, n, the
number of malicious hosts, d, the route length threshold of malicious hosts, ξ,
and the malicious host PMM, pi. In Figure 9.12 we plot CCM against d × pi,
1 ≤ d ≤ n, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for a case in which n and ξ are fixed. We make the
following observations.
• For large values of d (large i, small r) the value of CCM is small.
• For small values of d (large r) the value of CCM depends on pi. If, in this
case, pi is small (i.e. the malicious hosts behave less consistently) then
the value of CCM is small.
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Figure 9.12: CCM vs. d× pi, for n = 20, ξ = 10.
• The value of CCM is more likely to be relatively large in the presence of
neither too many nor too few malicious hosts.
The above results are consistent with the discussions in §9.3.3.
9.3.7 Discussion
The validity of the credibility model presented in this chapter depends on:
a) the validity of the assumptions given in §9.3.1, b) the correctness of the
estimates for the parameters d, ξ, and pi, and c) the choice of the parameters
n and r that characterise the route design, as discussed in §9.3.3.
In general, the credibility model will not be appropriate for use in cases
where malicious hosts behave in very complex ways (either deterministically or
stochastically). This is highlighted by Example 9.4, in which malicious hosts
attempt to frame a non-malicious host. That is, the possibility that malicious
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hosts collude to frame a non-malicious host and, at the same time, the value
of CC is misleadingly high, cannot be precluded. However, while the estimate
for CC cannot capture all the ways in which a set of malicious hosts may
choose to behave, we claim that the credibility evaluation model is still useful
in establishing a probabilistic result. Note also that the model should not be
used to make predictions in the case of selective or worst-possible malicious
host behaviour.
9.4 Impact analysis of malicious behaviour
9.4.1 Procedure
In this section we attempt to analyse the statistical properties of host identi-
fication results obtained for a range of possible of behaviour choices.
We first need to define our notion of malicious behaviour choice, as follows.
Definition 9.25. Suppose that a malicious host cj is contained in (incident
with) a set of k routes {ri, r2, . . . , rk}. We define the vector of behaviour of
cj to be the binary vector Bj = {b1, b2, . . . , bk}, where bm = 1, 1 ≤ m ≤ k, if
cj misbehaves for route rm, and bm = 0 otherwise.
In the rest of this section, we only consider NGT spy agent schemes. We
analyse the classification results obtained for all possible malicious host be-
haviour choices with the use of the following algorithm.
Algorithm 9.26. Suppose that a set S = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} of hosts is tested
using an d-classifier NGT route design, d < n. The following procedure can
be used to analyse the impact of random malicious host behaviour.
Step 1. Choose a set ∆ ⊂ S to be the set of malicious hosts, |∆| ≤ d.
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Step 2. Choose a set of vectors of behaviour B = {Bj : cj ∈ ∆} and
calculate the route design outcome vector. Identify the set I of mali-
cious hosts using Corollary 6.18 (i.e. let I be the set of hosts that are
not included in the union of all routes that give a negative result). Let
λ = |I ∩∆|/|∆|, where λ is the classification ratio of successfully iden-
tified malicious hosts.
Step 3. Repeat Step 2 for all possible choices of B. [If each malicious host is
visited by k agents then there are σ = 2kd different choices.]
Step 4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for all possible choices of ∆. [Suppose that there
are τ such choices].
Step 5. Calculate the statistical credibility of the classification algorithm as
SC = φ/(τσ), where φ =
∑
∆
∑
B λ.
9.4.2 Case study
We now provide a simple case study of the use of Algorithm 9.26. In this case
study we consider a spy agent route design based on the Fano Plane, shown in
Table 6.2, in which there are v = 7 routes, b = 7 hosts, k = 3 routes per host
and r = 3 hosts per route. We assume that there are exactly two malicious
hosts.
We use Algorithm 9.26 to study the impact of random malicious host be-
haviour.
Step 1. Suppose we choose ∆ = {c1, c7}.
Steps 2 and 3. The two malicious hosts are contained in the following routes:
c1 = {r1, r2, r3} and c7 = {r3, r5, r6}. Suppose the vectors of be-
haviour for the two hosts are B1 = (b1, b2, b3) and B7 = (b4, b5, b6),
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where b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6 correspond to the routes r1, r2, r3, r3, r5, r6, re-
spectively. Clearly, there are 2kd = 26 = 64 different ways for choosing
B1 and B7. That is, there are 64 different ways in which the two hosts
can behave.
We show that a host is identified as malicious if and only if all the
(three) routes that include this host give a positive result. As discussed
in §6.4.3, the Fano Plane is 2-disjunct, and hence the union of any two
columns (hosts) does not contain any other column. Thus, a malicious
host cannot be included in three routes that test positive unless it mis-
behaves at least once. [That is, if there are no more than two malicious
hosts, then the spy agent scheme based on the Fano Plane is frame-
proof.] It follows that both hosts c1 and c7 will be identified if and only
if b1 = b2 = b5 = b6 = 1 and at least one from b3, b4 is also one. That is,
both malicious hosts are identified in 3 of the 64 different behavioural
cases. Furthermore, only one malicious host, say c1, is identified if and
only if b1 = b2 = b3 = 1 and at least one from b4, b5, b6 is zero, or
b1 = b2 = b4 = 1, b3 = 0, and at least one from b5, b6 is zero. That is,
only c1 is identified in 7+3 = 10 behavioural cases. Similarly, only c2 is
identified in a further 10 behavioural cases. If both hosts are identified
then λ = 1. If only one host is identified then λ = 1/2. If no malicious
host is identified then λ = 0.
Steps 4 and 5. As a result of the symmetry of the Fano plane, any choice
of ∆ containing two malicious hosts will yield identical results in steps
2 and 3 to those given above. We thus have:
SC =
φ
τσ
=
∑
∆
∑
B λ
τ2kd
=
∑
B λ
2kd
=
3 + 10 + 10
64
≃ 0.36 .
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We next illustrate the effect of different possible malicious behaviour choi-
ces. We group together all the behaviour patterns (vectors) for each defective
host, in which zero, one, two or all three spy agents that visit the host yield a
positive result. This clearly defines 4× 4 = 16 groups of malicious behaviour
patterns for the two malicious hosts. We then aggregate the classification
results for all the 16 malicious behaviour scenarios. The results are shown in
Figure 9.13.
We make the following observations regarding this figure.
1. We denote the occurrence of any host in the route of an abused agent by
OIAA. We also denote the occurrence of any host in three abused agents
by OI3AA. We depict OIAA with a circle, and OI3AA with a cross.
2. We use the tuple (NAAH1,NAAH7) to identify the malicious behaviour
patterns, where NAAH1 and NAAH7 represent the number of spy agents
abused by the malicious hosts c1 and c7, respectively.
3. In the bottom left box (first pattern of malicious behaviour) both c1 and
c7 abuse zero agents (NAAH1 = NAAH7 = 0), and thus OIAA is zero
for all seven hosts. In the bottom row (NAAH7 = 0) we observe only
one OI3AA, when NAAH1 = 3 (bottom right box). In the top right
box (where each malicious host abuses all three visiting agents) both
malicious hosts are correctly identified. In other scenarios (boxes), we
note that a malicious host may or may not be identified, depending on
whether the choices of the two malicious hosts result in one malicious
host being included in three routes that test positive.
4. Across all the boxes, we observe that no well-behaved host can be framed
for any malicious behaviour choice. Also, statistically, when the choice of
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Figure 9.13: Aggregated identification results for different malicious host be-
haviour patterns of two malicious hosts, based on the route design defined by
the Fano Plane.
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malicious behaviour is random, a large number of occurrences of a host
in malicious routes can be linked with a high likelihood that this host
is malicious (although, this might entail statistical errors, as previously
discussed).
9.5 Conclusions
In this chapter a model designed to enable the credibility of spy agent results
to be evaluated was introduced. This model enables the evaluation of a variety
of spy agent routing schemes on the assumption of probabilistic malicious host
behaviour. Numerical results based on the model indicate that credibility is
maximised when the spy agent route is long enough to mitigate the effects of
random or inconsistent malicious host behaviour. However, there are excep-
tions where mixed results are obtained, especially when malicious hosts only
misbehave with a low probability.
The credibility evaluation results can be used to choose appropriate spy
agent route designs or algorithms. In this direction, this chapter provides a
methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of both NGT designs and SGT al-
gorithms. We have also provided a methodology for analysing the results of
all possible behaviour choices that could be made by malicious hosts.
The credibility model is probabilistic, and it can thus exhibit significant
statistical errors, especially if malicious hosts collude to try to manipulate the
results. This chapter has also shown that, under certain conditions, a careful
selection of spy agent routes might provide some protection against framing
of hosts.
In future work, spy agent frameproof and error-resilient properties could be
further tested and analysed, and more decisive/precise credibility evaluation
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models could also be developed. For example, the likelihood of the mali-
cious host collusion scenarios discussed in Chapter 7 could be studied. The
probability in erroneous results can be further analysed within the context of
error-tolerant route designs.
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“ I really believe that we don’t have to make a trade-off between
security and privacy. I think technology gives us the ability to have
both.”
John Poindexter
10
Spy agent applications
Contents
10.1 Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
10.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
10.2.1 Setting the scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
10.2.2 Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
10.2.3 Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
10.2.4 An application framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
10.3 Spy agent email honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
10.3.1 Outline of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
10.3.2 Threat detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
10.3.3 The scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
10.3.4 Similar applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
10.4 Spy agent shopping honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . 252
10.4.1 Outline of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
10.4.2 Threat detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
10.4.3 The scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
10.4.4 Alternative applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
10.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
241
10.1. Synopsis
10.1 Synopsis
This chapter is concerned with the practical application of spy agent systems.
In §10.2 we provide a general introduction to the application of spy agents.
We then analyse two specific examples of spy agent applications.
• In §10.3 we describe an application of spy agents designed to help address
data privacy violation attacks on mobile agents.
• In §10.4 we consider an application of spy agents designed to help address
sabotage attacks on mobile agents.
Aspects of the work described in this chapter have been published in [99],
and a UK patent has been granted [98].
10.2 Introduction
10.2.1 Setting the scene
In Chapters 6, 7, 8 we introduced and analysed a range of spy agent routing
and host classification schemes, and we observed that the choice of scheme
depends on the application. In this chapter we consider the application of
these schemes in particular practical scenarios.
A spy agent system, as introduced in Chapter 3, combines a spy agent
routing scheme with other mobile agent security functions, such as those spec-
ified in §2.4, in order to support the required services. This idea is explored
further in this section, the remainder of which is structured as follows.
• §10.2.2 outlines the security services that must be provided to support
the operation of a spy agent system, and the services that can be provided
by such a system;
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• §10.2.3 introduces fundamental applicability requirements for spy agent
applications; and
• §10.2.4 gives a framework which is subsequently used to specify two
examples of practical applications.
10.2.2 Services
10.2.2.1 Required services
The deployment of a set of spy agents can be used to obtain estimates for
a variety of security issues, as discussed in §3.4.4. The suitability of a spy
agent system for a particular application depends on how well the spy agent
requirements defined in Chapter 4 can be met in practice. These requirements
imply the need for the following set of services, the provision of which is
necessary for the successful application of a spy agent system.
Host security services. These mobile agent system services support secure
agent communications and mobility, as described in §4.5 and §4.6. These
services help to hold a set of hosts accountable for the secure execution
and migration of a visiting mobile agent. Security controls that can be
used to provide such security services were discussed in §2.4.4, and a
host security architecture was outlined in §2.4.4.2.5.
Mobile code security services. These mobile code execution and migra-
tion protection services can be used to detect and/or prevent security
attacks on mobile agents. Security controls that can be used to provide
such services were discussed in §2.4.3. Schaefer [155] provides an exam-
ple of such a set of services, in which known security controls are used
as building blocks to provide mobile agent e-commerce security services.
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In the context of spy agent applications, mobile code security services
are required to support threat detection, as described in §4.4.1. Addi-
tionally, mobile code security services can help to ensure that malicious
hosts process spy agents in the same way as they would other ‘standard’
mobile agents, as discussed in §4.3.3. The required set of mobile code se-
curity services will vary depending on the particular application. Indeed,
the applications presented in §10.3 and §10.4 themselves have somewhat
different security service requirements.
10.2.2.2 Offered services
Spy agents are designed to identify which hosts attack visiting mobile agents.
Providing this service requires a set of spy agents to be disseminated in a
manner that satisfies the spy agent dissemblance requirements, given in §4.3,
and the attack identification requirements, given in §4.4.2. Spy agent schemes
providing such services have been proposed in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. The
degree to which the spy agent services are provided will depend on the degree
to which the assumptions underlying the spy agent scheme are met.
There are a variety of ways in which a host could attack a mobile agent, as
discussed in §2.4.2.1. A particular implementation of a spy agent system might
only be capable of detecting certain categories of security attack. In order
to test for a range of different security issues, it may therefore be necessary
to deploy multiple spy agent systems, each employing a different means of
constructing and disseminating spy agents.
Host identification results could be used to provide further services. For
example, they could be used as part of the credibility evaluation approach
described in Chapter 9, or for risk management, as discussed in §4.6.2.
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10.2.3 Applicability
As discussed in §4.4.1, an application of spy agent techniques requires an
attack detection mechanism. A tentative list of mobile agent attack detection
mechanisms was provided in Table 2.2. We make the following observations
regarding the suitability of known attack detection mechanisms for use in spy
agent systems.
• Spy agents are likely to be most effective when the impact of an attack on
a single mobile agent does not provide sufficient information to identify
the host responsible (since malicious hosts are most likely to misbehave
in such circumstances).
• Spy agents can be useful in cases where other detection methods are
available to help identify malicious hosts; in such a case spy agents could
be used to corroborate other assessment results. More generally, a variety
of host evaluation techniques could be used in a complementary way.
Example 10.1. Consider a scenario in which agents employ secure chain re-
lation protocols (see §2.4.3.3.7) in order to help identify modification or trun-
cation attacks. Such protocols have potentially large overheads, as discussed
in §2.4.3.3.6, which runs counter to the objective of using mobile agents to
improve network efficiency. A spy agent system could be used in addition to a
secure chain relation protocol in order to corroborate the attack identification
results.
Example 10.2. Secure chain protocols, as discussed in Example 10.1, cannot
be used to detect DoS and black-box attacks (see §2.4.3.2.2 and §2.4.3.3.2).
This can be seen from an attack of the following type.
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a. Suppose a malicious host blocks the execution of the agent code in such
a way that this action is not recorded by the mobile agent. For example,
the host could block the execution of mobile agent logging processes.
b. The host could repetitively execute copies of the agent code until it
understands how the agent operates.
c. Using its understanding of the operation of the agent, the host pre-
computes responses for a variety of possible agent execution calls. For
example, suppose that the agent and the host are negotiating the details
of a sale, and the negotiation comprises a sequence of agent requests and
corresponding host responses. The host might, in this attack scenario,
precompute the sequence of responses that is certain to result in the
agent accepting an offer that is most advantageous to the host.
d. Finally, the host resumes the original execution of the agent and uses
its precomputed sequence of responses to answer the appropriate agent
requests without leaving any trace of the black-box attack. For example,
the host could adjust its system clock to make sure that the timestamps
do not reveal processing delays.
The deployment of detection objects (see §2.4.4.2.3) could be used to detect
such black-box attacks. This is discussed further in §10.4.4.
10.2.4 An application framework
We use the following framework to present our specific example applications
of spy agent systems.
1. Outline of operation: this involves reviewing the objectives of the
application, and the assumptions underlying its operation.
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2. Threat detection: under this heading we describe the means of detect-
ing when a malicious act has been performed on an agent, and justify
its suitability for the application concerned.
3. The scheme: this involves specifying the system architecture and the
spy agent routing scheme.
4. Alternative applications: finally, other applications for which similar
threat detection mechanisms and spy agent schemes may be suitable are
considered.
10.3 Spy agent email honeypots
10.3.1 Outline of operation
Our first example application is the Spy Agent Email Honeypot (SAEH). This
involves the use of spy agents to identify mobile data fraudsters and data pri-
vacy infringers. Spy agents are used to identify the hosts that are responsible
for either mishandling or failing to protect agent PII. This is a ‘posterior
impact scenario’, where the impact of an attack on a mobile agent is realised
(potentially a significant time) after the agent visits the malicious host that is
responsible for the attack.
Such an application is useful in an environment in which mobile agent hosts
hold private mobile agent data covered by privacy protection policies. While
thwarting passive security attacks that infringe a privacy agreement is almost
impossible if these attacks are deliberately performed by the hosts that hold
the data, it is still desirable to identify the hosts that are responsible for such
infringements. This security issue was discussed in §2.5.1.3.
The main assumption underlying SAEH is that it is the host’s responsibility
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to protect the data privacy of a visiting mobile agent. This was argued in §4.2,
where we stated that a host is held accountable for any intended or unintended
privacy violation resulting from this host accessing, processing, or retaining
agent’s data. Hence, hosts allowing such infringements can be regarded as
malicious and/or untrustworthy.
The main objective of SAEH is to use spy agents to identify malicious hosts
that violate the privacy of a visiting agent’s email address.
10.3.2 Threat detection
10.3.2.1 The technique
The data privacy violation detection technique involves the use of decoy email
addresses. This technique is adapted here from Seigneur and Jensen [158],
who describe a proactive privacy protection mechanism. In the Seigneur and
Jensen system, individuals subscribe to a number of online providers using, in
each case, a unique decoy email address associated with a unique decoy user
account. Thus each decoy email address is known by only one provider. If at
any later time emails from other providers are sent to this address, then there
is a high probability that the email address has been exchanged between the
providers involved. This system resembles a honeypot (see §2.5.3.1), in which
decoy email addresses are uniquely registered with providers in accordance
with a mutual privacy agreement, and the uniqueness of this registration is
not known to the providers.
A provider is deemed to be responsible for the reception of any unsolicited
email via the associated email address, provided that the ‘secrecy’ of this
unique email address has not been compromised in other ways. A host is
held responsible for both attacks in which it abuses the email address itself,
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and indirect attacks involving the disclosure of the decoy email address to an
unauthorised third party, knowingly or unknowingly (e.g. due to poor stor-
age security). The system enables the exchange of private email addresses
between online providers to be tracked, and will thereby provide potentially
useful information about the trustworthiness of such providers, such as which
providers respect privacy policies and how often private email leakages occur.
The use of honeypot email addresses in the way described by Seigneur et
al. [158,159] is limited by the fact that the registration process requires manual
input. For the purposes of SAEH we extend and automate this concept by
using spy agents and by exposing each decoy email address to a number of
hosts, rather than just one. Exposure to multiple hosts is essential for the spy
agent concept as it provides a malicious host with an incentive to misbehave,
as described in §3.4.3.2. The outcome of a spy agent test is determined by
whether or not a host in the agent’s route violates the confidentiality of the
spy agent’s email address. As a result, a positive outcome for a spy agent
corresponds to the reception of unsolicited email via the unique email address
associated with the agent’s route.
10.3.2.2 Applicability
The applicability of the SAEH detection method described above depends on
the security characteristics of the email addresses employed in the scheme.
Each spy agent should be equipped with a unique decoy email address.
Apart from the entities operating the spy agent system, we assume that a
decoy email address will only be known by:
• the subgroup of hosts to which the agent containing it is sent; and
• parties that acquire it illegitimately from other hosts (that themselves
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either obtain the address legitimately by receiving an agent containing
it or acquire it from another host).
The successful operation of SAEH also depends on the assumption that the
email address cannot be found in other networks, and cannot be obtained by
any other parties without a host in the agent route ultimately being respon-
sible. In order to make this assumption more tangible, the following secrecy
requirements should be met.
• It should not be possible to compromise a decoy email address by a
brute-force attack. In particular, each email address must have high
entropy.
• A decoy address should not have, or refer to, a ‘suspicious’ name.
If the above requirements hold, it can be inferred that the reception of any
unsolicited email via a decoy email address is evidence that there is at least
one untrustworthy host within the destination set of the associated spy agent.
10.3.3 The scheme
10.3.3.1 System architecture
An implementation of SAEH should use a ‘standard’ structure for mobile
agents, as described in §3.4. The spy agent originator creates a set of ‘normal’
mobile agents and equips them with pseudonymous ID credentials, including
decoy email addresses, as discussed in §3.4.2.
10.3.3.2 Route designs
The choice of the routing scheme depends on the assumed behaviour charac-
teristics of malicious hosts. A variety of spy agent routing schemes applying
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for different sets of assumptions about malicious host behaviour were given in
§6.3.1, §7.2.1 and §8.3.1.
In any application, the choice of the routing scheme depends on when the
outcome of a spy agent becomes available. In this case, if an agent’s PII (such
as an email address) is violated, we assume that the impact of this violation will
eventually become evident. As argued in §6.3.2, NGT spy agent schemes are
preferable to SGT schemes when the test outcome for a spy agent is only likely
to be available after a significant delay. This applies in the SAEH application,
as the impact of the misuse of an email address might only become evident
some significant time after the related spy agent has commenced its migration.
In addition, NGT schemes allow groups of target hosts (i.e. the hosts in a
spy agent route) to be tested at independent times. For example, in a carefully
designed spy agent routing scheme, spy agents could be despatched at random
times in order to reduce the chance of a malicious host linking them, thereby
enhancing the design’s subterfuge characteristics (see §4.3.1).
Finally, NGT schemes enable malicious host identification and credibility
results to be updated as the test outcomes change over time. For example,
if, soon after a spy agent terminates, no violation of the corresponding email
address has occurred, then all hosts in the agent route can be classified as well-
behaved, albeit with a low evaluation credibility (as analysed in Chapter 9).
Over time, the identification result can be updated if the outcome changes
following detection of the misuse of an email address. Further background on
the subject of PII violations is provided in §2.5.1.
10.3.4 Similar applications
SAEH can be adapted to detect other types of spy agent PII violation, such
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as the misuse of credit card information. For example, fraudulent use of credit
card details could be detected using spy agents if the spy agent originator
cooperated with issuing banks in order to establish decoy sets of credit card
details (see Figure 3.4). In such case, the spy agent system would need to
cooperate with other trusted services, as discussed in §4.6.1.
10.4 Spy agent shopping honeypots
10.4.1 Outline of operation
Our second application is the Spy Agent Shopping Honeypot (SASH). It
involves the use of spy agents to identify the misuse of mobile agent code. Spy
agents are used to identify the hosts that are responsible for delaying agent
execution as a result of either DoS or black-box attacks (see Example 10.2).
This is an ‘immediate impact scenario’, where the impact of an attack on a
mobile agent is realised shortly after the agent visits the malicious host that
is responsible for the attack.
Such an application is likely to be useful in an environment where au-
tonomous mobile agents are designed to make purchases on behalf of users,
and are protected with code obfuscation techniques (see §2.4.3.2.2).
More specifically, we consider a mobile agent marketplace in which hosts
(merchants) are visited by shopping agents (customers). Each agent executes
on each visiting host an obfuscated shopping negotiation program, which is
designed to protect the confidentiality of the agent’s negotiation semantics
from the visiting host, at least before the agent migrates elsewhere. While
it is hard to prevent a malicious host from analysing the negotiation code’s
functionality, it is, at least, important to detect such an attack.
The main assumption underlying the operation of SASH is that correctly
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operating hosts employ all the security controls necessary to receive, execute,
negotiate with, and despatch a shopping agent in a timely and secure manner.
A host is held accountable for delaying the execution of an agent regardless of
the reason for such a delay, such as negligence or an intention to analyse the
agent code.
The main objective of SASH is to use spy agents to identify malicious
hosts that attempt to discover the semantics of an agent (see §2.4.2.1). Many
schemes have been proposed with the goal of protecting an agent against
such attacks, such as encrypted functions (§2.4.3.2.1) and code obfuscation
(§2.4.3.2.2); however current techniques are still vulnerable to black-box at-
tacks, as discussed in Example 10.2. Given that all threat prevention mech-
anisms have practical limitations, the aim of this application of spy agent
technology is to provide a threat detection technique that can be used to
identify malicious hosts.
10.4.2 Threat detection
10.4.2.1 The technique
The SASH scheme makes the fundamental assumption that the time taken for
an agent to complete its migration and negotiation tasks can be used as an
indicator of whether or not any of the hosts in its route have attempted to
compromise it (e.g. using a DoS or black-box attack). That is, for each spy
agent we define a threshold time interval, which will need to be dependent on
the length of the agent route, the latency of inter-host communications, and
the expected time required to legitimately process the agent. If a spy agent
completes its migration in a period of time less than the threshold then the
spy agent outcome is deemed to be negative; however, if the agent takes longer
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than the threshold (or fails to complete) then the outcome is deemed to be
positive.
A shopping spy agent should ideally provide a malicious host with an in-
centive to mishandle it. For example, the agent could be equipped with high
value data enquiries, as discussed in §4.3.4. Also, sending an agent to a signif-
icant number of hosts helps to meet the fundamental spy agent incentivisation
requirements given in §3.4.3.2.
10.4.2.2 Applicability
The applicability of the SASH detection method described above depends on
the predictability of host behaviour. It is reasonable to assume that there are
practical scenarios in which all hosts are expected to meet well-defined agent
processing deadlines. For example, suppose a host is not able to process a
visiting spy agent within the required time period. In this case, a well-behaved
host should report the service problem, and allow the agent to migrate to the
next host rather than delay execution. In such a scenario, the delay threat
detection mechanism is likely to yield reliable outcomes.
The maximum acceptable delay for spy agent migration can be deduced by
estimating the time required by a black-box attack to analyse the semantics
of the sensitive portions of the agent code. An agent must be designed so that
the minimum time required to compromise the code semantics is significantly
greater than the maximum time that a host is normally allowed to keep an
agent.
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10.4.3 The scheme
10.4.3.1 System architecture
SASH spy agents emulate shopping agents equipped with e-commerce negoti-
ation functionality. The use of mobile agents in such applications was briefly
discussed in §2.3.4.
In this setting, spy agents could be used to perform comparisons across a
range of products and a set of hosts. Spy agents could use a range of different
(personalised) criteria to compare products and negotiate deals, covering issues
such as price, delivery time, customer service and returns policy [68]. We
assume that, given a set of visiting hosts and corresponding set of offers, a spy
agent will attempt to negotiate the best possible offer with each host. The
encoding of a negotiation strategy could be based on a common ontology such
as a declarative rules language [162].
The use of distinct product comparison and negotiation strategies by dif-
ferent customers helps to promote merchant differentiation. At the same time,
knowledge of agent negotiation semantics could help a malicious host to adapt
its offer and maximise its profit (unfairly) at the expense of the customer and,
more generally, of the market. This explains why it is desirable for the se-
mantics of the negotiation code in a shopping agent to remain secret. As a
result, we assume that agent code is protected using a time-limited black-box
technique (see §2.4.3.2.2).
10.4.3.2 Route designs
As with SAEH, the choice of the routing scheme for a SASH application de-
pends on assumptions about the behaviour of malicious hosts. We note that
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the assumed lack of significance of the order of spy agents in a route is justi-
fied by an assumption that a malicious host is not interested in decoding other
hosts’ offers; instead, we suppose that the malicious host only wishes to anal-
yse the agent semantics. This assumption is strengthened if a shopping agent
migrates through the same set of malicious hosts at least twice (in opposite
directions). Such a migration technique will also provide a malicious host with
more opportunities (and potential incentives) to misbehave.
The choice between an NGT and a SGT scheme depends on how long
it takes for a spy agent to complete its migration. As is generally the case,
NGT is preferable when test outcomes are only available after a significant
and/or variable delay, while adaptive (sequential) GT is preferable when the
test outcomes are produced quickly enough for the tests to be completed in a
reasonable time.
10.4.4 Alternative applications
The SASH approach could be adapted to address the detection of other se-
curity threats. For example, a GTC-based spy agent scheme (introduced in
Chapter 7) could be used to detect inconsistencies in (or corroborate) results
obtained from security checks of secure chain protocols, used to detect if ma-
licious hosts have colluded to implement a truncation attack (see §2.4.3.3.7).
10.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have considered general aspects of the practical application
of spy agent techniques. We then investigated two specific examples of possible
applications of spy agents.
In the first application, we studied the suitability of spy agent systems
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for identifying malicious hosts that infringe the privacy of email addresses
of visiting mobile agents. We described a spy agent email honeypot system
in which a) the abuse may take place at some time after an agent visits a
malicious host, and b) a host may exhibit sophisticated behaviour in order
to avoid being linked to the outcome of this behaviour. For example, some
malicious hosts might always violate the PII of a visiting spy agent, whereas
other malicious hosts might only violate the PII of the spy agent if they identify
other malicious hosts in the agent’s route. We have described how spy agent
systems can be used to help identify the malicious hosts.
In the second application we considered the case where mobile agents mi-
grate between hosts to compare and negotiate quotes. In this case, a malicious
host might attempt to gain a competitive advantage by performing a invis-
ible black-box attack that compromises the privacy of the semantics of the
negotiation code embedded in the agent. Such an attack can be detected by
measuring the overall migration delay. We described a spy agent shopping
honeypot system in which spy agents are engineered so that a black-box at-
tack will take a certain amount of time; at the same time, malicious hosts are
given an incentive to mount a black-box attack in order to test how the agent
responds to a range of different quotes. A spy agent system can use the out-
comes computed from the agent migration delays to identify the responsible
host(s).
The identified spy agent applications have a number of remaining practical
limitations, and therefore need to be developed further before real-world de-
ployment. The necessary development work could benefit from, and contribute
to, further advances in other mobile agent protection and threat detection tech-
niques. For example, ongoing research findings in encrypted functions, code
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obfuscation, and detection objects could be useful both in providing spy agent
applications with appropriate threat detection techniques, and in verifying spy
agent results.
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11.1 Synopsis
This chapter concludes this thesis. While specific conclusions were drawn at
the end of each main chapter, in this chapter we summarise all the research
findings and contributions of this thesis as well as identify possible future
research directions.
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11.2 Contributions
11.2.1 Spy agents
This thesis is concerned with the design of spy agent systems. Spy agents
were introduced in Chapter 3. They can be used to help evaluate the trust-
worthiness of remote hosts that offer services in mobile code systems, in which
programs (software agents) travel from host to host to accomplish their goals.
The main purpose of spy agents is to help identify the origin of detected
anomalies, i.e. the hosts responsible for associated attacks. This information
could be used in a variety of different ways. For example, mobile agents might
avoid identified malicious hosts, and/or law enforcement agencies could use
the information to target their investigations. In essence, spy agents help to
preemptively protect software agents against the hosts that they visit.
The benefits and significance of spy agents need to be considered within
the context of the prior art. As discussed in Chapter 2, mobile code security
has for many years been an active and challenging area of research involving
two parallel sets of security issues, namely protecting hosts (and other agents)
against malicious agents, and protecting agents against malicious hosts. The
latter problem is inherently harder to address, since mobile agents are at the
mercy of the host which executes them, and ultimately the host can misuse the
agent or the agent’s data at its discretion. To complicate this problem further,
a malicious host might (selectively) misbehave only when it perceives that it
can do so without being held accountable. Additionally, a malicious host might
(selectively) behave well in order to make a false positive impression.
Spy agents were introduced in this thesis to help address the above prob-
lems.
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11.2.2 Detailed review
We summarise below the contributions of this thesis on a chapter-by-chapter
basis.
• In Chapter 3 we developed the concept of spy agents and we described the
core elements of our spy agent system architecture. Such a system uses
a set of agents to obtain information reflecting the behaviour of remote
hosts, and that can therefore be used to assess their trustworthiness. We
described how spy agents could be used to identify a malicious host in
cases where common mobile agent security techniques fail through their
inability to identify the origin of a detected attack. We further described
the principles underlying the development of spy agent systems and their
contribution to mobile code security. These principles involve a) spy
agents giving malicious hosts incentives to misbehave, and b) methods
for collectively evaluating spy agent outcomes. A key issue is that host
evaluations depend on the manner in which spy agents are coordinated.
We considered a variety of aspects of the selection of both the contents
of spy agents (e.g. unique pseudo-ID credentials), and their migration
paths (e.g. paths with small correlation and large lengths).
• In Chapter 4 we further developed the spy agent concept by specify-
ing the system requirements. We divided these requirements into four
groups, namely spy agent dissemblance requirements (subterfuge, statu-
tory, protection and incentivisation), host evaluation requirements (at-
tack detection and identification, fairness, optimisation), spy agent rout-
ing requirements, and trusted services requirements. We also provided
the assumptions underlying the design of the spy agent system, covering
261
11.2. Contributions
both the nature of malicious host behaviour and network security issues
such as agent anonymity and host identification.
• In Chapter 5 we analysed a number of spy agent routing architectures
adhering to the principles given in Chapter 3 and the system require-
ments given in Chapter 4. Complementing this analysis we considered
how a set of spy agents can be designed to achieve the desired objec-
tives. This analysis provided the basis for the formulation of the spy
agent routing problem, as given in the following chapter.
• In Chapter 6 we formulated the spy agent routing and host evaluation
problem as a (combinatorial) group testing problem. In group testing
theory a (large) population of items containing a small set of defec-
tives is tested in order to identify the defectives. The analogy with spy
agents arises from the fundamental spy agent assumption that larger test
groups yield more credible results. That is, as discussed in Chapter 3,
we assume that the longer the migrating route, the less a malign host
is likely to suspect a spying scenario, and the greater the chance that
it can cheat without being detected. As a result, a malicious host is
more likely to misbehave if it is sent an agent visiting a multiplicity of
hosts, and not just one. We examined the properties of non-adaptive
group testing algorithms and we showed how these algorithms can be
used to obtain ‘good’ spy agent route sets, i.e. collections of routes that
maximise the chance that a malicious host will misbehave and that will
provide sufficient information for malicious hosts to be identified. Fi-
nally, we proposed the use of a simple class of block designs to construct
route sets with the desired properties.
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• In Chapter 7 we considered a generalisation of the case studied in Chap-
ter 6 in which some malicious hosts only misbehave collectively, i.e. when
they identify other malicious hosts in an agent route. We showed that the
spy agent route design problem for such a scenario can be formulated
as a non-adaptive complex group testing problem, in which defectives
yield a positive test outcome only when other defectives are included in
the test. Complex group testing, also known as hypergraph testing, is a
relatively young area of research. While in the standard group testing
problem we assume that a test result is positive if and only if there is
at least one defective item, in this case we assume that a defective con-
sists of a number of items (known as a ‘complex’). We analysed known
properties of complex group testing, and produced further results. In
particular, we developed the concept of complex defectives, and intro-
duced algorithms that can identify individual malicious hosts given an
identified set of complex defectives. Finally we proposed the use of a t-
designs to construct sets of routes with the desired complex group testing
properties. These new results allow us to construct routing designs that
are more resilient to complex host behaviour and collusion. Our results
could also contribute to the research area of DNA screening group testing
problem, which uses hypergraph testing algorithms to identify subsets of
molecules that are collectively responsible for the cause of an observed
disease.
• In Chapter 8 we considered a different class of spy agent applications,
in which malicious behaviour can be detected within a sufficiently short
time window to allow the use of sequential group testing algorithms, i.e.
algorithms that choose which hosts to test based on the outcomes of
263
11.2. Contributions
previous tests. We studied the optimisation problem for such a scenario,
in which the length of spy agent routes is maximised. We presented and
analysed a multi-stage sub-group routing algorithm for this case which
we showed to be optimal.
• In Chapter 9 we discussed a scenario in which spy agent evaluations can-
not be trusted because of inconsistent results or, more generally, because
of inconsistent host behaviour. In this case, the assumptions underly-
ing the host evaluation methods presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 do
not hold. We discussed the degree to which the results obtained with
such methods can be trusted, and we developed a credibility evaluation
model. This model can be used to help identify route designs that are
less likely to provide erroneous results. For example, we showed how, in
certain cases, the results obtained from using route designs containing
longer routes are more credible. This occurs because in such cases the
longer routes mitigate the effects of random or inconsistent malicious
host behaviour. Further, we developed a methodology that analyses the
impact of random or inconsistent malicious host behaviour. This pro-
vides a methodical way of analysing error-tolerance properties of spy
agent route designs.
• In Chapter 10 we discussed possible practical applications of spy agents,
and we introduced two specific examples of such applications. The first
example involves a spy agent email honeypot system designed to de-
tect email privacy infringements. The second example is a spy agent
shopping honeypot system designed to detect black-box attacks. We
discussed how these applications might be extended, so that spy agents
can be used to help detect the origin of mobile code data privacy and
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sabotage attacks. These applications highlight the benefits of the spy
agent approach developed in this thesis.
11.3 Future directions for research
We now briefly consider two areas in which further research could be beneficial.
11.3.1 Host testing
As outlined in §11.2.2, in this thesis we have considered a range of scenarios
involving specific malicious host behaviour models.
In general, malicious hosts may behave in a wide variety of different ways.
As a result, a range of different testing mechanisms, criteria for maximising
the incentive to misbehave, and optimum route set constructions are likely to
be required.
Future work on spy agent route designs could therefore be approached in
the following ways.
• Specific models of malicious host behaviour and attack detection scenar-
ios might need to be defined for individual applications. These could give
rise to new problems in spy agent design, depending on the underlying
assumptions.
• Conversely, the properties of spy agent route designs of various types
could be studied in a more abstract way. Such research might then lead
to new spy agent applications.
Elaborating on the above general approaches, we now identify specific pos-
sible future research directions.
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• The behaviour model of a malicious host might depend on a range of
factors, including the degree to which a host is incentivised to misbehave,
as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 provide spy
agent route designs for specific malicious host behaviour models. In the
future it would be useful to define behaviour models based on observed
host behaviour. In this direction, it would be interesting to perform
practical experiments in which the behaviour of real world malicious
hosts is investigated using a series of spy agent evaluations. The objective
here would be to obtain a better understanding of how malicious hosts
might behave in real scenarios. For example, it might be interesting to
investigate:
a. how the contents of a spy agent can be used to incentivise a mali-
cious host to misbehave;
b. how the properties of a spy agent route design affect whether or not
a malicious host misbehaves; and
c. to what degree the behaviour of a malicious host depends on the
behaviour of other malicious hosts.
• Specific applications and malicious host behaviour models might require
particular route design properties. For example:
a. the NGT design proposed in Chapter 6 is based on the assumption
that malicious hosts are more likely to misbehave when the routes
of visiting agents are long and are not inter-correlated;
b. the GTC design proposed in Chapter 7 is based on the assumption
that some malicious hosts will only misuse a visiting agent if this
agent also visits another malicious host; and
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c. the SGT algorithm proposed in Chapter 8 is based on the assump-
tion that the impact of an attack on a spy agent can be detected
immediately.
These route designs and algorithms could be enhanced in a variety of
different ways, e.g. as follows.
a. It would be interesting to study spy agent routes with error-tolerant
and/or frameproof properties, i.e. routes that can be used to iden-
tify malicious hosts that behave in unpredictable ways, including
those that attempt to frame well-behaved hosts. Such research
could draw on and potentially contribute to work on probabilistic
or combinatorial group testing.
b. It would also be interesting to study routes with collusion-proof
properties, i.e. routes that can be used to identify malicious hosts
that are jointly responsible for an attack. This problem becomes
harder to address if a joint attack involves more than two malicious
hosts. Such research can draw on and potentially contribute to
work on complex group testing and DNA testing.
c. Optimality of a spy agent route design can be defined in many
ways depending on both application requirements and assumptions
regarding the scenario of use. For example, one possible optimisa-
tion problem would be to find spy agent route designs that give the
highest possible credibility of classification. A model for calculat-
ing credibility of classification was proposed in Chapter 9; however,
improved models might also be sought.
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11.3.2 Mobile code applications
The success of any application of spy agents depends on how well the spy
agent requirements are met in the particular application scenario. This in
turn depends on which aspect of host trustworthiness is under evaluation,
how the impact of host misbehaviour is realised, and how spy agents encourage
malicious hosts to misbehave.
The applications given in Chapter 10 could also be extended in many ways,
as previously discussed. Further, it would be useful to examine applications
in which the nature of a malicious attack can be reflected in the outcome
of a spy agent test. In this direction, advances in encrypted functions, code
obfuscation, and detection objects might be useful in providing spy agents
with the necessary threat detection techniques.
We envisage that, as digital services increase in variety and complexity,
software agents and mobile code applications will become increasingly useful.
This will provide further motivation for work on future spy agent applications.
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Code for complex group testing
A.1 Malicious host identification
## Calculate spy agent outcome
calcoutput <- function(design=design1,D1=c(1),D2=c(2,3)) {
complexdef <- calcdefcomplexes(D1,D2)
output <- c()
if (length(complexdef)>0)
for (i in 1:length(design[1,]))
for (j in 1:length(complexdef[1,]))
if (contained(complexdef[,j],design[,i])==TRUE)
output <- c(output, i)
if (length(output)>0)
output <- unique(output)
return(output)
}
## Decoding algorithm to identify complex defectives
finddef2complexes <- function(desT=transpose(design1),
output=calcoutput(D1=c(1),D2=c(2,3))) {
defectives <- c()
complexes <- combn(length(desT[1,]), 2)
for (i in 1:length(complexes[1,]))
if(contained(disj(desT[,complexes[1,i]], desT[,complexes[2,i]]), output)==TRUE)
defectives <- c(defectives, complexes[,i])
if (length(defectives >0))
defectives <- array(defectives,dim=c(2,length(defectives)/2))
return(defectives)
}
A.2 Function library
## Create the set of complex defectives
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calcdefcomplexes <- function(D1,D2) {
All <- c()
if (length(D1)>0)
D1 <- sort(unique(D1))
for (i in 1:length(D1))
All <- c(All, D1[i], D1[i])
if (length(D2)>1) {
D2 <- sort(unique(D2))
D2 <- combn(D2,2)
for (j in 1:length(D2[1,]))
All <- c(All, D2[,j])
}
if (length(All)>0)
All <- array(All,dim=c(2,length(All)/2))
return(All)
}
## Calculate conjunction
conj <- function(v1, v2) {
return(unique(sort(c(v1, v2))))
}
## Calculate disjunction
disj <- function(v1, v2) {
v3 <- sort(c(unique(v1), unique(v2)))
v4 <- c()
for (i in 2:length(v3)) {
if (v3[i]==v3[i-1])
v4 <- c(v4,v3[i])
}
if (length(v4)>0)
v4 <- unique(sort(v4))
return(v4)
}
## Check if a set is contained in another
contained <- function(v1, v2) {
if (length(v2>0))
if (length(disj(v1,v2))==length(unique(v1)))
return(TRUE)
return(FALSE)
}
## Check if a complex defective is contained in another
complexcontained <- function(Tc, Td) {
tcc <- 0
for (m in 1:length(Tc[1,]))
for (n in 1:length(Td[1,]))
if(contained(Tc[,m], Td[,n])==TRUE)
tcc <- tcc+1
return(tcc)
}
## Transpose matrix
transpose <- function(design,h=11,r=30) {
D <- c()
for (j in 1:h)
for (i in 1:length(design[1,]))
if (length(disj(design[,i],c(j)))>0)
D <- c(D, i)
return(array(D, dim=c(r,h)))
}
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A.3 Resilient rank-2 classification algorithm
## Classification algorithm and verification routine
Alg1 <- function(design=design1, h=11, r=30, D1=c(1), D2=c(2,3)) {
desT <- transpose(design=design,h=h,r=r)
output <- calcoutput(design=design,D1=D1,D2=D2)
defs <- finddef2complexes(desT=desT, output=output)
delta1 <- c()
dother <- c()
for (i in 1:length(desT[1,])) {
Tc <- c()
l <- length(desT[1,])
for (j in 1:l)
if (i!=j)
Tc <- c(Tc, c(i,j))
Tc <- array(Tc,dim=c(2,length(Tc)/2))
tcc <- complexcontained(Tc, defs)
if (tcc == length(Tc[1,]))
delta1 <- c(delta1, i)
else
dother <- c(dother, i)
}
delta2 <- c()
for (i in 1:length(dother)) {
for (j in 1:length(defs[1,])) {
if ((defs[1,j] == dother[i] && !contained(c(defs[2,j]),delta1)) ||
(defs[2,j] == dother[i] && !contained(c(defs[1,j]),delta1))) {
delta2 <- c(delta2, dother[i])
break
}
}
}
ndl = length(desT[1,])-length(delta1)
if (length(delta2)==0)
delta2 <- paste("At most 1 defective host and
at least ", ndl-1, " non-defectives", sep="")
# Collate results
return(list(output=output, defs=defs, delta1=delta1, delta2=delta2))
}
A.4 Disjunctness test
## Check (d,e)-disjunct property
checkDdisj <- function(D=transpose(design1),d=2,e=2) {
h <- length(D[1,]) # 11 hosts
ld <- length(D[,1]) # 30 routes
# calculate union of first (e+d) columns
unions <- D[,(e+1)]
for (t in (e+2):(e+d))
unions <- conj(unions, D[,t])
# calculate first e disjunctions
disjp <- D[,1]
for (t in 2:e)
disjp <- disj(disjp, D[,t])
#check contained condition
return(!contained(disjp, unions))
}
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